As soon as the Japanese surrendered, the GMD and the CCP immediately started to struggle for the right to receive the surrender of Japanese forces.  After a brief lull during the Chongqing negotiations, beginning in mid-October large-scale armed clashes occurred between Nationalist and Communist forces.  During the War of Resistance, several million Nationalist troops were holed up in the rear areas far from big cities and lines of communication that were occupied by the Japanese army.  Communist forces, however, were active behind enemy lines, surrounding the strategic strongpoints occupied by the Japanese.  Particularly in north China, after prolonged efforts the CCP had established large, stable base areas, and controlled the main access routes to Northeast China.  Objectively speaking, this meant that the CCP would be able to control north China, and relying on north China, seize the strategic initiative in the Northeast.

Around the time of the Seventh Congress, the CCP had already begun to stress the strategic importance of seizing Northeast China.  At the Congress, Mao Zedong had pointed out that, “The four Northeastern provinces are extremely important.  We may be able to get hold of them.  If we control the four Northeastern provinces, we could use them as a stable foundation.  Now our base areas are insecure.  If we controlled the Northeast, we would have a stable foundation.”  If the CCP could seize control of the Northeast, this would relieve the long-term encirclement of Chinese revolutionary forces.  Furthermore, the CCP would be able to establish direct links with the Soviet Union via the Northeast and secure international aid.  Mao Zedong believed at the time that the Soviet Union would support CCP plans to seize control of the Northeast.  He said, “The foreign proletariat and the Soviet Union have not assisted us for a long time because they were unable to come to our aid in time... Circumstances did not permit it... [but] in the end there will be international assistance...”[1]  As the War of Resistance drew to an end, the party’s plans to seize control of the Northeast loomed large within CCP postwar strategy as a whole.  They complemented the party’s diplomatic strategy of aligning with the Soviet Union.  These two elements jointly determined the CCP’s entire postwar strategy.  Therefore, it was imperative that the CCP seize control of the Northeast.

In April 1945, anticipating imminent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, the CCP’s Jin-Cha-Ji Sub-Bureau issued an important directive, requesting that all its forces step up training and recruitment for the deployment of main force units to the Northeast.  Toward the end of June, the Je-Re-Liao Military District transferred two-thirds of its troops, organized into three northbound detachments that began to infiltrate behind enemy lines into Rehe and Liaoning, and provide a shield for cadres who were starting to work in designated areas.  In order to cope with the rapidly changing political and military situation, prior to the start of the Chongqing negotiations the CCP decided to concentrate forces in the north, secure a dominant position in the area north of the Longhai railroad, and achieve de facto control of the Northeast.  On September 19, the Central Committee decreed that the party’s postwar strategy for development was “Expand to the north, defend in the south,” i.e. achieve complete control in Rehe and Chahar, and expand our forces in the Northeast in order to secure control of the Northeast.”  The Central Committee asserted that only if “we can control the Northeast along with Rehe and Chahar, and coordinate struggle among all the liberated areas and people throughout the whole country can we guarantee the Chinese people’s victory.”[2]

There is no doubt that by implementing a strategy of “expanding to the north,” the CCP was throwing down the gauntlet to the postwar Great Power system in the Far East.  Historically, Northeast China had served as an arena of intense great power rivalry.  It was the place where complicated international contradictions intersected.  From the start of the twentieth century, the basic pattern of great power contention for the Northeast had consisted of maneuvering among the U.S., Japan, and Russia.  Following the Mukden Incident, Japan gradually achieved its ambition of dominating the Northeast.

Japan’s subjugation of Northeast China was achieved by force of arms.  Therefore, its military defeat inevitably ended its domination of the region.  Any new disposition of the Northeast problem required U.S. and Soviet participation.  Once the Soviet Union decided to enter the war against Japan, for military reasons it chose the Northeast as the main battleground.  After making this military decision, the Soviet Union tried to exploit the favorable situation created by its military occupation of the region after the war to seek partial dominance in the region and economic privileges.  The wartime alliance between the U.S. and the Nationalist government made it very likely that the Nationalists would follow U.S. foreign policy in the postwar period.  The Soviet Union was unable to effect any fundamental change in this regard.  Therefore, in addition to improving Sino-Soviet relations and attempting to secure the neutrality of the Nationalist government, it also tried to control the major ports and rail lines in the Northeast, secure the right to station troops on the Liaodong peninsula, and exert maximum political and economic influence in the Northeast.  Even though this could not prevent the seepage of foreign power into the region, at least it could help the Northeast function as a buffer zone.  In taking these measures, Soviet leaders were undoubtedly influenced by the traditions of tsarist diplomacy.

Soviet plans in the Northeast inevitably clashed with U.S. policy toward China.  Since its proclamation of the Open Door diplomacy, Washington had traditionally opposed any other country’s attempts to secure an exclusive, special position in China or any part of China.  During the war, the U.S. had to make certain concessions to the Soviet Union in the interests of the war against Japan.  But these concessions were limited to satisfying the USSR’s desire for access to the Pacific, and recognizing the USSR’s preeminent economic interests in the Northeast.  In other words, they were restricted to the sphere of Moscow’s economic interests in Manchuria.  Moscow wished to expand and Washington to limit, the Soviet Union’s influence in the Northeast.  Both sides sought accommodation as far as possible, but an element of confrontation began to permeate their relations.

The Nationalist government played a rather awkward role in the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR.  With respect to the Soviet Union, Guomindang diplomacy aimed at resolving the intertwined problems of Sino-Soviet and GMD-CCP relations.  If the Guomindang recognized Soviet control of the Northeast, this could create serious difficulties or even a crisis for the Nationalist government with respect to political, military, diplomatic, economic and other areas.  If concessions were not made to the Soviet Union, however, and Moscow began to actively support the CCP, the threat to the Nationalists would be even greater.  Both of these prospects posed a danger to Guomindang rule, but they could at least try to choose the lesser evil.  In the diplomatic sphere, Chiang Kai-shek was unable to transcend the thinking of recent Chinese rulers.  Soviet infiltration into the Northeast was “an ache in the joints,” but the Chinese Communist Party was “a disease of the heart.”  Chiang Kai-shek, therefore, decided to conciliate the Soviet Union by making concessions to Moscow on the Northeast question while opposing the CCP.