There were clear differences between the third GMD-CCP crisis in the summer of 1943 and the two preceding ones.  The third crisis occurred at a time when the world antifascist war had already achieved a decisive victory, and victory in China’s War of Resistance was only a matter of time.  The focus of struggle between the two parties in this crisis had already become the question of what kind of state to establish after the war.  The Guomindang proposed to maintain a firm grip on its one-party rule while the CCP desired to establish a democratic republic in which all groups and parties cooperated.  Therefore, this crisis not only seriously influenced Allied plans vis-à-vis Japan, but also stirred up the Far Eastern pot, eliciting strong reactions from the U.S. and the USSR.

Sino-Soviet relations during the war were chronically unstable.  After the outbreak of the War of Resistance, the Soviet Union quickly took the initiative to extend a helping hand to China, and the Nationalist government responded positively.  Sino-Soviet relations took a turn for the better.  But the signing of the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty in 1941 and the outbreak of the Soviet-German war seriously weakened the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East.  From then on, the Soviet Union gradually reduced and then finally terminated its aid to China.  This undoubtedly weakened the common anti-Japanese effort that was the foundation for maintaining good Sino-Soviet relations.  When Chiang Kai-shek realized that the burden of the war against Japan had shifted to the United States, he used the opportunity afforded by the Soviet Union’s setbacks on the western front to resolve the Xinjiang problem.  The result was renewed tension between China and the USSR.  During the third CCP crisis in the summer of 1943, Soviet public opinion had forcefully criticized the Nationalist government.  These were the Soviet Union’s first strong comments on Far Eastern affairs after two years of virtual silence.

Ultimately, there were limits to the Soviet Union’s response to the Nationalist government’s actions in Xinjiang and to the GMD-CCP crisis.  In his December 1942 letter to Chiang Kai-shek regarding the situation in Xinjiang, Stalin adopted a rather cautious attitude, expressing the Soviet Union’s hope of maintaining good relations with China.[1]  There were also distinct limits to the Soviet criticism of the Nationalist government in the summer of 1943.  There were two main reasons for the relative restraint displayed by the Soviet Union.  First, the foundation of Soviet Far Eastern policy was to employ every means at its disposal to tie down Japan so that it would be unable to attack the USSR.  When the time was ripe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan and basically eliminate the long-term threat Japan posed to the eastern part of the USSR.  Maintaining the antifascist alliance with China was one of the essential guarantees for implementing this strategy vis-à-vis Japan.  Second, because Britain and the United States, particularly the latter, maintained special relations with the Nationalist government, in order for Moscow to sustain its alliance with London and Washington, it had to stabilize its relations with Chongqing.  Particularly after Soviet foreign policy switched onto the tracks of Great Power diplomacy, it became even more important for it to maintain relations with the Nationalist government.  Stabilizing Sino-Soviet relations helped to harmonize Soviet-American relations.  This became an increasingly important element of Soviet foreign policy.  Of course, even though stabilizing Sino-Soviet relations was extremely important to the USSR, this was not to say that Moscow would make unconditional compromises.  Its earliest condition was that the Nationalist government should persevere in the War of Resistance and make certain democratic reforms.  Later, the conditions put forth by the Soviet Union continually changed in accordance with the evolution of the international situation.  In sum, the conditioned stabilization of Sino-Soviet relations, with stability being the main point, was the fundamental characteristic of Soviet China policy during the war.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, U.S. Far Eastern policy embraced two objectives.  The first was the thorough defeat of Japanese fascism; the second was to achieve a position of strategic superiority in the Far East after the war in order to create a stable situation favorable to the United States.  It was precisely from these considerations that Washington followed a policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, and at the same time demanded that the Nationalist government implement democratic reforms and actively prosecute the war while opposing Guomindang and Communist policies that might precipitate a large-scale civil war.  In sum, the U.S. desired a united and stable political situation in China.  In order to achieve this goal, the GMD-CCP question could only be resolved through political means.

By the end of 1943 the situation was as follows.  The U.S. was pressuring Chiang Kai-shek to abandon his policy of armed attack against the Communists, and urging the GMD to implement democratic reforms.  Meanwhile, the Soviet Union demanded that the CCP not adopt too radical a policy vis-à-vis the Guomindang.  At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, Roosevelt told Chiang Kai-shek that, “while the war is still going on, you must shake hands with the Communists in Yan’an.”  He also reminded Chiang that, “The United States will not fall into the trap of any sort of civil war over there) in China).”[2]  Coincidentally, on December 22, Dimitrov, the former head of the Comintern, wrote to Mao Zedong from Moscow, advising “A policy of withdrawal from the struggle against foreign aggressors, of obvious deviation from the policy of the national united front is politically mistaken.  While the Chinese people are engaged in a national war, following such a policy runs the risk of isolating the party from the masses, of increasing the danger of civil war.  This can only benefit the foreign aggressors and their agents within the Guomindang.”[3]  The parallel actions of the United States and the Soviet Union in exerting pressure on the Guomindang and the CCP perfectly reflected the harmony of their China policy keynotes, namely to do whatever they could to prevent the outbreak of civil war in China.

The changes in U.S. and Soviet China policy influenced the CCP in rather complicated ways.  Generally speaking, the opposition of the two powers to the outbreak of civil war in China, their policy toward the CCP’s adherence to the anti-Japanese national united front, and their opposition to the Guomindang’s anticommunism was undoubtedly beneficial.  But there was a more important question.  To what extent would the Chinese Communists be able to take advantage of Soviet and particularly of U.S. Soviet policy in order to achieve a better future while avoiding a rupture in GMD-CCP cooperation and a breakdown in the anti-Japanese national united front?  Chinese Communist leaders paid close attention to, and tried to make use of, all sorts of international factors, and in particular of U.S. policy toward China as they constantly adjusted their political strategy.