The outbreak of the Pacific War and the formation of the world antifascist Grand Alliance had a profound influence upon the international political situation. First, the antagonism between the tripartite fascist alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan and the antifascist camp with the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union as its core became the basic structure of world politics. By forming the Grand Alliance, the antifascist forces had already achieved a position of overwhelming superiority in the struggle between the two camps. Therefore, the fundamental political principles articulated by the Grand Alliance had become the guiding force in determining the direction of world politics. Second, the establishment of the Grand Alliance accelerated the strengthening of political, military, and economic relations among the antifascist powers. In reality, some of the domestic political problems of these countries unavoidably became problems of international concern, and inevitably the resolution of these problems was profoundly influenced by changes in the international situation. Changes in the international political situation similarly brought new influences to bear upon China’s political situation, and required that the CCP make further adjustments in its foreign and domestic policies.
On January 1, 1942, twenty-six countries, including the U.S., Britain, the USSR, and China signed the United Nations Declaration that proclaimed the principles of freedom, independence, human rights, and justice. All the antifascist forces united under the banner of democracy. From this time on the quest for democracy and national independence became the most powerful ideological weapon in opposing German, Italian, and Japanese antifascist aggression, and an irresistible political current. Without agreement among all the antifascist countries on the democratic principles of the United Nations Declaration, it would not have been possible to construct such a broad world antifascist united front.
The Grand Alliance included different nationalities and countries with different social systems, but they shared a common objective, namely, to defeat the fascist aggressors. In order to achieve this common goal, the countries of the Grand Alliance achieved remarkably effective cooperation. Relations among the Big Three -- the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union -- were the core of the Grand Alliance. The U.S. and Britain on the one side and the Soviet Union on the other represented two entirely different social systms in the world. Although they had certain common war aims, there were also points on which they were not wholly united. Therefore, there were numerous contradictions and conflicts among them. There was nothing surprising about this; it was inherent in the situation.
What really merits attention is the fact that despite differences in their social systems, the U.S., Britain, and the USSR were able to carry out effective and long-term cooperation during the war. Their military and political cooperation endured throughout the antifascist war, and was the crucial factor in rapidly achieving victory. Particularly in the second half of 1942 under military pressure from the Axis powers, Anglo-American relations with the Soviet Union developed extremely rapidly. On May 26, 1942, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, meeting in London, signed the Soviet-British Mutual Cooperation Treaty. On June 11, Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, signed an agreement in Washington with Secretary of State Cordell Hull concerning the principles for mutual assistance in the antifascist war. The agreement stipulated that the United States would continue to provide the Soviet Union with goods and materials, equipment, and intelligence information, and that the Soviet Union would provide the United States with similar assistance.
The fundamental improvement in U.S.-British-Soviet relations demonstrated that at a certain period in history the possibility existed that countries with completely different social systems could possess common interests that outweighed their differences, and that in pursuit of these common interests it was entirely possible for them to establish mutually beneficial and cooperative relations. At the same time, while improving their relations in order to win the war, the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union also emphasized the importance of continuing their cooperative relations into the postwar period. This tendency in international politics had enormous influence at this time. It not only encouraged the peoples who were struggling against fascist aggression, but also inspired in them optimism and hope for the postwar world.
Following the establishment of the Grand Alliance, the tide of world politics similarly influenced the Chinese Communists. Since the signing of the Soviet-German Mutual Non-Aggression Treaty, the Chinese Communists had believed that the main issue in the world had become that of war and revolution. The task of the world proletariat was, “To use revolutionary war in order to defeat the imperialist war, to overthrow the war criminals, and to topple capitalism.”[2] They hardly anticipated that common interests would connect the world’s leading capitalist powers with the Soviet Union, a socialist state, and that close alliance relations might be established between them. The main foundation on which the Chinese Communists judged China’s domestic situation and the development of Guomindang-CCP relations was their assessment of international politics. From the end of 1939 until 1940 this kind of theoretical knowledge led them to believe that they should carry out a Chinese revolution of a New Democratic type, i.e. to negate the authority of the capitalist Guomindang, and implement the proletarian authority of the Chinese Communist Party.[3] Obviously, the source of this Chinese Communist proposal was the Soviet/Comintern assertion that once again the core structure of world politics was the opposition between the two camps of socialism and capitalism.
Even though the Chinese Communists quickly adjusted their foreign policy, particularly toward Britain and the U.S., in the short term there was no parallel change in their domestic policy. In the first half of 1942, the leaders of the CCP Central Committee and the Southern Bureau believed that British and American defeats in the South Pacific would make them even more dependent upon Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government to keep China in the war in order to tie down the Japanese army in China and thereby reduce pressure on British and American forces in the Pacific theater. This British and American attitude fed Chiang Kai-shek’s arrogance. He clearly expressed the hope that Japan would attack the Soviet Union so that he could compel Chinese Communist forces to withdraw toward the north. In circumstances where Britain and the U.S. were looking toward the Chinese Nationalists, and the Soviet Union, facing serious difficulties, was unable to turn its attention toward the east, the Guomindang was able to continue its dual policy. The domestic situation in China became even grimmer. Thus, the year 1942 was “the most difficult year politically in China,” and the CCP had to prepare to deal with Guomindang pressures and attacks.[4]