Starting in mid-October 1945, armed clashes between the Nationalists and the Communists for control over Northeast and North China gradually escalated, and the civil war gradually expanded.  Just three months after the end of the anti-Japanese war, the Far East had become a new hotbed of war.  The CCP’s basic assessment of the current situation was that the next six months would be “a period of transition from the anti-Japanese war period to the period of peaceful reconstruction.”  Peace, democracy, and unity were not only the goals that the CCP was struggling to achieve, but also the path that the Guomindang had no choice but to follow.[1]  The Central Committee believed that both international and domestic factors were vital in forcing the Guomindang onto this path.  Apart from the domestic factor of the Chinese people’s opposition to civil war, the most important international factor was the marked tendency toward Soviet-American conciliation.

In a report on the Chongqing talks to a cadres’ meeting in Yan’an, Mao Zedong said that the future of the postwar world was bright, that capitalist and socialist countries could still achieve compromises on many issues because compromise was beneficial to both sides.[2]  The pattern of Soviet-American conciliation ensured that an anti-Soviet, anticommunist world war would not break out and that the great powers would certainly restrain Guomindang actions, preventing the unbridled expansion of civil war in China.  In such an international environment, the key to whether China would be able to follow the path of peace and development lay in the CCP’s ability to maintain and expand its own power position.  A Central Committee intra-party directive explained that if a large-scale civil war broke out, it would be because the Guomindang was trying to control even more territory, achieve a position of dominance in North and Northeast China and then, once the situation had developed to its advantage, seek to implement peace and reach a compromise.  The Communist party “must urgently mobilize... to smash the Guomindang’s current large-scale military offensive,” wipe out large numbers of Guomindang troops who were on the attack in North China and the Northeast, and force the Guomindang to recognize the Communist position in these regions.  In sum, “the greater the current victory, the sooner will peace come.”[3] 

After it renewed its support for military action along the North China lines of communication and expressed its determination to secure sole occupation of the Northeast, the Central Committee put forward a plan in the beginning of November, “To seize the Northeast and consolidate North and Central China.”  The object was to make use of a military victory to compel the Guomindang to accept self-rule in North China and the Northeast, and present this as a precondition for the transition to the stage of peaceful reconstruction.[4]  In parallel with the military struggle, the Central Committee also instructed its representatives at the Chongqing negotiations to reject Chiang Kai-shek’s proposal to convene the Political Consultative Conference in early November.[5]

The essence of Communist policy was to promote the peace process by achieving military victories.  The degree and scope of this struggle was intimately connected with Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet tension in the Far East and the active support provided by the Red Army in the Northeast to CCP efforts to control that region.  More precisely, if Soviet-American relations quieted down, then Sino-Soviet relations would also not reach the boiling point.  If Chongqing’s relations with Moscow stabilized, the Red Army would be unable to support CCP efforts to seize control of the Northeast or even to recognize the Communist position in the Northeast.  The CCP would be unable to expand rapidly in the region, and it would be very difficult to implement the Central Committee’s plans for self-rule in North and Northeast China.

In mid-November, as the result of a Nationalist government diplomatic offensive aimed at the Soviet Union, the Far Eastern international situation changed yet again.  After the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Changchun had stalemated, and Communist troops aided by the Red Army rapidly entered the Northeast, the Nationalist government faced a series of strategic problems.  First, given the current military situation and the unsettled state of Sino-Soviet relations, should it dispatch a large military force to the Northeast?  Second, should Changchun be the focal point of the Northeast takeover?  At this time, Nationalist troops were poised and ready to strike.  It was also evident that the Changchun negotiations could not possibly make rapid headway.  Thus, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Nationalist armies to advance into the Northeast along the Beining railroad.  In coordination with the military offensive, the Nationalist government broke off the Changchun negotiations, and evacuated the Northeast Headquarters to Shanhaiguan to await further orders.  Meanwhile, it proposed to the Soviet Union that the Sino-Soviet talks be rotated between Chongqing and Moscow.  Chiang Kai-shek’s purpose was to apply pressure to the Soviet Union by elevating the negotiations between local officials to the national level, thereby focusing international attention on them.  While his military operations proceeded, he could avoid creating any new problems on the diplomatic front.

The worsening of the situation in North and Northeast China led to a serious crisis in Soviet-American relations.  Soviet troops in the Northeast and U.S. troops in North China virtually confronted each other and the two countries were lined up in support of opposing sides in the Chinese civil war.  By launching a diplomatic offensive aimed at the Soviet Union, the Nationalist government was adding fuel to the fire.  It tried to raise tension in the area in order to draw in the Americans and secure Soviet concessions.  Inevitably, both the United States and the USSR reacted to this strategy.

After the failure of the London Foreign Ministers’ Conference in September, for a while the U.S. played a lone diplomatic hand in the Far East that violated the norm of Soviet-American cooperation in resolving Far Eastern problems.  This provoked Soviet dissatisfaction and vigilance.  Moscow responded immediately, refusing to participate in the Far Eastern Commission, a consultative body that the U.S. had concocted.  The Red Army also obstructed the transport of Nationalist troops to the Northeast and helped the CCP gain control of that region as a means of strengthening its overall position.  These Soviet measures were merely a warning to the United States as well as retaliation for the hegemonic U.S. attitude in the Far East.  The Soviet Union obviously had no intention of damaging the cooperative relationship it had established with the United States during the antifascist war.  It had even less desire to provoke a military confrontation with the U.S. so soon after the end of World War II, and at a time when full-scale reconstruction topped its national agenda.

The extremely tense relations between the Communists and the U.S. army after the Marine landings in North China had drawn the attention of the Soviet Union.  In early November, General Wedemeyer was ordered on an inspection mission to China.  The Soviets believed that Wedemeyer’s trip “had both overt and covert purposes.  The latter and paramountone was to monopolize all of China, even to the extent of attempting to invade the Northeast.”[6]  Such an assessment reveals the Soviet Union’s high anxiety level regarding the mission of U.S. troops in North China.