As the study of the history of modern Chinese foreign policy deepens, Chinese scholars have begun to turn their attention to the sharp turn toward extreme leftist policies that occurred in the early 1960s.[1] Emphasizing the severe domestic and international difficulties China faced in 1962, recent studies highlight the combination of international incidents and domestic challenges, concluding that these factors had a significant impact on the change in Chinese foreign relations.[2] However, the precise relation between domestic and international factors has yet to be established. How did the two interact and which factor was more influential?
This article discusses the interactions between domestic politics in China and the constantly changing international milieu in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Part One examines the profound impact of the turbulence in Chinese foreign policy in the late 1950s; Part Two the reasons for the adjustment in foreign policy embarked on in 1960; and Part Three the characteristics and nature of the changes in Chinese foreign policy in 1962. It argues that the left turn, but rather from the interaction between the general guidelines adopted for foreign policy.
Leftist Foreign Policy Defined
The basic features of so-called leftist foreign policy need to be clarified, since the conceptions of “left” and “extreme left” had different definitions under different political circumstances. In the Cold War era, some seemingly radical policies may not have shared the same origin, while some so-called moderate policies may not necessarily have stemmed from pragmatic deliberations. In Chinese politics, to put it simply, a leftist policy means one that pursues goals that are ahead of their time or higher than realistically possible. When extended to the domain of foreign policy, left or extreme left policy has the following four basic characteristics:
First, on the theoretical dimension, leftist policy holds a dogmatic attitude toward the traditional doctrine of time. It refuses to make a concrete analysis of the continuously changing international political situation. It simply asserts that the world is “in a time in which capitalism and imperialism are moving toward destruction, and socialism and communism are striding toward victory.” It therefore denies the existence and meaning of detente in international situations, and does not acknowledge the possibility of maintaining peace over the long term.[3]
Second, leftist policy exaggerates China’s position and influence in world politics. A manifestation of this is the theory of “China as a revolution center,” which proclaims China as “the focus of world contradictions and the center of the world revolutionary storm,” and argues that the direction China takes is “an issue that concerns the fate of the world proletarian revolution,” “a matter of paramount importance concerning the fate of the world revolution,” and so on.[4] The “China as a revolution center” theory reflected the strategic thinking of Chinese leaders on the important issues of China’s position and influence in world politics. From a deeper perspective, it more or less involved the “China at the Center” view of the history of China.
Third, leftist policy places so-called proletarian internationalism in the supreme position, denying the paramount status of national interests in making and implementing foreign policies. For instance, “The Bulletin of the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Congress of the Communist Party of China” (Zhonggong zhongyang bajie shiyizhong quanhui gongbao) declared “proletarian internationalism” to be “the highest guiding principle” of Chinese foreign policy.[5]
Fourth, in terms of specifics, leftist policy calls for struggling against imperialism, revisionism, and anti-revolutionists, and adopts strategies such as “to strike enemies with two fists,” (liang ge quan tou da ren) and “to make attacks in all directions” (si mian chu ji). Since there have been many studies of this aspect of leftist policy, it will not be discussed further in this paper.[6]
Taking these four characteristics as criteria, we can conclude that extreme leftist foreign policy took shape roughly before the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. To be more specific, the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956 marked the arrival of this policy.
The Turbulence in Chinese Foreign Policy in the Late 1950s
To understand the significance of the adoption of an extreme leftist policy, we must first examine the basic contours of Chinese foreign policy before 1962. After the People’s Republic of China [PRC] adopted the “Five Peaceful Co-existence Principles” in 1954, Chinese foreign policy entered a period of smooth development. Prior to the Eighth Party Congress, Beijing defined the direction of its foreign policy as “to strive for the enduring peace of the world.” Whatever analysis this policy was based on, Chinese leaders explicitly asserted that “the world situation is moving toward detente, and it has become possible to achieve enduring peace in the world.”[7] However, the momentum fueling this direction did not last long before it was interrupted by two cataclysmic events: the decay of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the unleashing of the Great Leap Forward.
One of the key reasons the Sino-Soviet alliance deteriorated was that the relationship of leading (the Soviet Union) and being-led (China) that had been created during the formation of the alliance could not be sustained after the shock of the revolts in Poland and Hungary in 1956. Capitalizing on the severe crisis the Soviet Union faced as a result of these uprisings, Chinese leaders compelled Soviet leaders to change their approach to inter-state relations within the socialist bloc. Beijing’s Manifesto Concerning Developing and Further Strengthening the Basis of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist Countries called on the Soviet Union to acknowledge previous mistakes.[8] Moreover, in the course of resolving the incidents in Poland and Hungary, China achieved, at least temporarily, the position of mediator between the Soviet Union and the fraternal states of Eastern Europe. These developments heightened China’s role and influence within the Socialist bloc, as demonstrated during the Moscow Conference in November 1957, when it became clear that Mao was respected by Khrushchev and by other socialist leaders.[9]
Beijing now believed that there was no longer a relationship of leading and being-led between China and the Soviet Union and Soviet leaders also acknowledged this change, at least on the surface. Earlier analyses of the roots of the Sino-Soviet split by Chinese scholars have emphasized the serious disagreements over the assessment of Stalin and other theoretical issues after the 20th Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956.[10] An important factor that has been neglected, however, is that after the de-Stalinization campaign begun at the 20th Party Congress and the uprisings that fall in Poland and Hungary, Chinese leaders came to realize that Moscow’s earlier relations with other countries in the Socialist camp, especially with China, characterized as a “cat-mouse relationship” or “father-son relationship,” had fundamentally changed.[11]
As a result, Chinese leaders could no longer tolerate the arrogant attitude of the Soviet leadership and rebuked their Soviet comrades for repeating the mistakes of the Stalin period. Without a belief that the relative positions of China and the Soviet Union had fundamentally changed Mao Zedong would not have become so irritated about the Soviet proposals to create a “united fleet” and “long-wave radio station” that he complained on July 22 that the Soviet demands reminded him that “the behavior of Stalin is coming again,” and “now again (you are) doing what Stalin has done.”[12]
The change in the Sino-Soviet relationship indeed reflected the rise of China’s position within the Socialist camp. However, it remained for Beijing to discover how far it had risen, to what extent Moscow would tolerate such a change, and, when disagreements arose, whether the Chinese would be able to force the Soviets to change their attitudes and policies in accordance with Beijing’s understanding of the alteration in Sino/Soviet relations. Moreover, since the relationship of leading and being-led had been one of the fundamental factors in establishing and sustaining the Sino-Soviet alliance, when this condition changed, how would the alliance be sustained?
Except for its participation in the international alliance against fascism during the last fours years of the Anti-Japanese War, China had had no experience with alliances in the modern period, though it had wished to conclude alliances at several points.
