The aim of this paper is to make a comparative study of decision-making in China and the United States during different stages of the Korean War from the perspective of a local war between big powers. The war in Korea between China and America fifty years ago was a large-scale local war outside their respective territories, unparalleled since the end of the Second World War. Their military objectives underwent obvious changes, forming two similar curves. The Americans began with military intervention, then decided to cross the 38^th parallel and unify Korea by force, but finally was forced to restore the status before the war. For the Chinese, they decided to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea in the beginning, then the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPVs) crossed the 38^th parallel to drive the United Nations army out of the Korean Peninsula, finally retreated to the 38^th parallel and made a truce. This outcome was an inevitable destiny of a local war between big powers, and the conception of local war (referring to the Korean War here) was conditioned on their awareness of their strategic interests on the peninsula, balance of power and their relations with their respective allies.

I.  America Decided to Intervene Militarily and China Decided to Send

Troops to Korea

       Soon after the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950 America decided to make an all-round military intervention. Four months of U.S. armed intervention brought about a reverse of the military situation in Korea and the fire spread to the Sino-Korean border, then China decided to resist American aggression and aid Korea. The military background and nature of the two countries’ decision were quite different and

China’s decision to enter the war was a response to America’s armed intervention. However, since both sides fought the war in a third country, the policymakers of neither country considered the conflict an issue of concern only for the peninsula. After the war broke out, the United States looked upon the offensive from North Korea as the first step of the Soviet conquest of Asia, which must be answered with a counterattack and so decided at once to intervene by arms. On the other hand, in China’s opinion, U.S. military intervention went beyond the Korean Peninsula from the beginning, a sure sign of premeditated expansion and aggression against China. The Chinese thought Sino-American conflict was inevitable and there was no other way to maintain the national security than to strike back.

1.  American decision making on military intervention

The definition of the nature of the war that suddenly broke out on 25 June on the Korean Peninsula played a decisive role in Truman administration’s decision for an all-round military intervention.

After the Berlin Crisis in Europe, the dominant view in the American government with regard to the international situation was that the global tension was escalating and that the most serious threat to American security came from the hostile attempt and formidable strength of the Soviet Union and the very nature of the Soviet System.[1] The Soviet Union successfully conducted the first atomic bomb test in August 1949 and America reacted strongly. Truman ordered the State Department and the Department of Defense on 31 January 1950 to reexamine the American defense policy and global strategy. After three months’ preparation the State Department and the Department of Defense submitted a comprehensive and systematic report, the National Security Council issued the report to relevant agencies. According to this document, titled NSC68, the world was in a “historical process of rights redistribution” between the United States and the Soviet Union; in order to control the Euro-Asian Continent the Soviets were bound to undermine or destroy by all means the American vitality. Therefore the cold war was a war in its true sense that concerned the destiny of the “free world” and the United States could do nothing but to make a life-and-death decision by its conscience and perseverance.[2]

Swayed by the intense consciousness of cold war the American administration was permeated with an air of crisis. The American intelligence departments added fuel to the fire, saying the Soviet Union had the capability in many parts of the world to launch an offensive. The policymakers were convinced that the Soviets might unleash a war wherever the East borders with the West.[3] Amidst such an atmosphere, America would intervene by arms under the pretext of containing the Soviet Union in any place in East or Southeast Asia where a military conflict took place. Therefore, on hearing the news about the breakout of the Korean War the American leaders jumped to the conclusion that “it seemed close to certain that the attack had been mounted, supplied, and instigated by the Soviet Union and that would not be stopped by anything short of force.” Otherwise it would be set off the Third World War just like similar events had set off the Second World War.[4]   The military reacted in similar strong terms. Before the War, the American forced had not experienced local wars and they had no idea of what a “limited war” meant. They simply thought “the Third World War had begun” and the Soviet Union “had decided to fight it out” with the United States.[5]

The conviction of the American leaders that the war had been launched by the Soviet Union drove America onto a fast track of war decision. From 25 to 30 June the U.S. army, navy and air force were fully thrown into the conflict and the operational perimeter was extended beyond the 38^th parallel. Every unit of the troops could be used as long as the security of Japan was not endangered.[6] Later developments revealed American action was not confined to the peninsula from the start. Truman also announced the blockade of the Taiwan Straits and the stepping-up of military aid in Southeast Asia and especially in Indo-China.

America encountered no difficulties in seeking support from its allies because it was the leader of the Western camp and shouldered the main responsibilities. The UN forces were of merely symbol significance and made a pompous show of strength.

2.  China’s decision on resisting American aggression and aiding Korea

Compared with American decision on military intervention, China’s decision on resisting American aggression and aiding Korea was a more complicated and capricious process, taking much longer time. A part from identifying the nature of American military intervention the Chinese leadership was faced with internal difficulties and the restraint of relations with its allies

Before the breakout of the war the Chinese leadership had been concentrating on internal affairs. The target set for the army was march into Tibet and liberation of Taiwan. The Korean Peninsula was a chess game for the United States and the Soviet Union and China did not want to have a finger in the pie. After the war broke out, they assessed the security situation in this area in a new light. China’s attack on America was initially targeted at American blockade of the Taiwan Straits. The Chinese revolutionary movement was also a war to unify the whole country, American blockade collided head-on with the efforts of Chinese revolution and constituted an intolerable invasion and confrontation against China in the eyes of the Chinese leaders. More importantly, America not only resorted to force in the peninsula but also stepped up military deployment in the Taiwan Straits and Southeast Asia. In the view of Chinese leaders, these actions represented an all-out interference with the Korean Peninsula, Indo-China and the Taiwan region and the Korean War only served as a pretext for American aggression. The American forces landed in Inchon on 15 September and crossed the 38^th parallel on 7 September regardless of the warning from China, driving it home to the Chinese leadership that a war with the United States would be inevitable. The judgment by the Chinese top hierarchy of American intention as a result of all-round American intervention in Areas bordering China was an important factor prompting China to enter the war.