2.  The Chinese decision to cross the 38^th parallel

The CPVs successfully conducted the third campaign and then crossed the 38^th parallel. This development was also linked with the changing strategic objective on the part of China.

  As early as the beginning of August the Chinese leadership began considering the matter of dispatching troops to Korea. However, the goal was not very clear, just to help North Korea “to win victory.”[17] What did victory mean in the mind of the top Chinese leaders would perhaps depend on the development of the situation. When the U.S. forces had landed at Inchon and the North Korean forces were even unable to organize effective resistance the question of whether to send the troops immediately was squarely put before the Chinese authorities. In a telegram to Stalin on 2 October Mao Zedong stated in clear terms that the goal of China’s entry into the war was “to annihilate and drive out the invading armies of the United States and other countries.” At the same time he admitted that there existed the probability of the inability of the Chinese troops to annihilate American troops in Korea and the involvement of the two countries troops in a stalemale.[18]

       Since the majority of his colleagues opposed China’s entry into the war Mao Zedong conveyed to Stalin the fear among the policymaker circle. Zhou Enhai’s speech perhaps reflected the mentality of the Chinese leadership. In a talk with Panikkar Zhou Enlai said whether China would send troops to Korea depended on whether U.S. troops were going to cross the 38^th Parallel. There were two major questions China was concerned about. First of all, the American forces were not going to cross the 38^th parallel and extend the war. Second, the Korean incident were to be solved peacefully, which called for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign troops.[19] these might be the common understanding of the Chinese policy makers.

       The Chinese leaders did not believe U.S. troops would stop at the 38^th parallel. At the meeting in the following days, they not only decided on whether to send troops or not, but also pondered over the concept of operations. It was at this stage that Lin Biao put forward the suggestion of “sending out troops but not engaged in war,” that is, the troops would just stay in North Korea to watch how the situation was developing.[20] relevant historical documents indicated Lin Biao was criticized by Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai for his opposition to China’s entry into the war. But it is not clear yet whether his idea of “sending out troops but not engaged in war” was discussed at the meeting. It is most probable that the Chinese leadership has not decided on how to fight the war, for the concept of operations would depend in a large degree on the result of China’s coordination with the Soviets in their policies.

       The telegram sent back by Zhou Enlai on the twelfth showed the Soviets would not provide air cover for the time being. The Chinese leadership therefore formulated a scheme for both offensive and defensive campaigns. First, they decided to enter the war; second, they decided to fight a defensive warfare based on a safe concept of operations, taking into consideration the security requirements of China’s northeast frontiers and the CPVs’ strength and safety. According to Mao Zedong’s plan after entry into North Korea, the volunteers should build their defenses north of the Pyongyang-Wosan Railroad and south of the Deckchen-Nyengyuen highway and the warefare should be fought mainly with South Korean troops. If the enemy attacked the CPVs would destroyed them in front of the positions; if the enemy tenaciously held their positions at Pyongyang and Wosan, the CPVs should wait for the Soviet Air Force entry into the war. During the waiting period they should not seek fighting with the enemy but be devoted to renewal of equipment and training; “the matter of attack will be taken up in six months.” This actually amounted to “sending out troops but not engaged in war” for the time being or avoiding direct large-scale confrontations with American forces. Even on 19 October, the day when the volunteers crossed the Yalu River, Mao Zedong still said the goal of the volunteers was “first to get a firm foothold in the northern part of Korea and then wait for opportunities to wage mobile warfare in support of the continued struggle of the Korean people.”[21]

       The victories scored during the first and second campaigns induced the Chinese leaders to make adjustment to their concept of operations. Out of political and diplomatic considerations Mao Zedong advocated a third campaign beyond the 38^th parallel, otherwise, he said, China would be put in a politically disadvantageous position politically. The “politically disadvantageous position” referred to by him had two implications. First, the United States, Britain and some other countries were proposing an armistice along the 38^th parallel in order to stop the advance of the Volunteers north of the line, a cease-fire at this time would give an impression or misunderstanding of China’s recognition of the 38^th parallel, which would hinder the war effort in the future. Second, China was under pressure within the socialist camp in fact, Peng Dehuai, General Commander of the CPVs, was subjected to the censure of the Soviet advisers and North Korea. However, Mao Zedong believed the analysis by Peng Dehuai of the difficulties faced by the Volunteers. Peng Dehuai put forward the principle of “steady advance” in order to cope with the practical difficulties while carrying forward the directive to cross the 38^th parallel. This principle took into consideration both the political requirements and military difficulties and therefore received full support from Mao Zedong.[22]

       The goal of the third campaign was to break through the 38^th parallel and to wipe out large numbers of enemy troops through mobile warfare. As seen from the results. The political goal to break through the 38^th parallel was achieved, the Volunteers occupied the territories north of the 37^th parallel, but they did not heavy casualties on the enemy. The most serious problem among the Chinese policymakers was that the impatience for quick victory revealed in the design of the third campaign was further heightened after the Volunteers had crossed the 38^th parallel. The pressure from the allies was also mounting. Kim Il-sung asked to shorten the period of rest and reorganization of the Volunteers and Stalin asked China to allow the Korean People’s Army to continue their southward advance.[23] Peng Dehuai was firmly against continued southward advance and even proposed in his telegram to Zhou Enlai on 15 January a terminable cease-fire agreement in order to have two months of rest and reorganization.[24]

       Mao Zedong firmly stood with Peng Dehuai on his proposal to stop advance and give time to the army for rest. On the other hand, he yielded to the demand from the allies. He rejected the proposal of the “Three-man Froup for Cease-fire in Korea,” for under the great pressure from the allies it was difficult to stop advance, to say nothing of cease-fire. Another reason for the rejection of the proposal lay in the fact that Mao Zedong put forward in clear term the objective “to liberate whole Korea” at the end of the third campaign (not at the beginning). It needs to be pointed out that his opposition to continuous attack and advance derived both from Peng Dehuai’s suggestion and from his own deliberations of the concept of operations. Mao Zedong had very rich war experiences, had great faith in Peng Dehuai’s commanding talent, and bore in mind the bitter lesson of the previous defeat suffered by North Korea, all these made Mao Zedong try his best to align his objectives with the realities of the battlefield. But his agreement to the rest and reorganization of the Volunteers after the third campaign was designed for a more powerful offensive. Swayed by this ambition Mao Zedong did not pay enough attention to the difficulties Peng Dehuai listed and missed a good opportunity to gain diplomatic initiative and disintegrate the alliance of the enemies.

       The above analysis demonstrates that in a limited war, tactical victories at a particular phase can be easily exploited to escalate the war with unexpected consequences. Another matter worth attention is that in a war fought on foreign territories the relations between the top policymaker and the general commander on the battlefield may have an impact on the general situation. On the part of the United States the odd relations between the top authority and the top field commander resulted in disasters to the American troops. In contrast, the better coordination between the Chinese top authority and the field general commander was responsible for greater victories under favorable conditions and less losses under unfavorable conditions.