III.   Decision on Cease-fire Talks

The decision on cease-fire as discussed here refers to the policy decision of America and China on agreeing to hold cease-fire talks in June 1950. It was closely linked with the concept of “localization of war.” It needs to be pointed out that “localization of war” in the American mind meant to confine the war within Korean territory and to prevent it from spreading into China and thus sparking off a total war with China and the Soviet Union. In the Chinese mind it meant not only to keep the war off Chinese territories, but also to forbid military occupation by America of the northern part of Korea and the areas adjacent to China. America’s consent to cease-fire talks was rooted in its decision to localize the war and therefore give up the policy of unifying Korea by the military means. For China, its goal was always a limited war and its policy adjustment was based on this goal.

1.  America’s decision on cease-fire talks

With China’s entry into the war, the United States was faced with two choices: one as to localize the war, that is, to confine the war within the territory of Korea and give up the policy to unify Korea by force; the other was to extend the war into China at the risk of a direct military conflict with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting of the National Security Council on 28 November 1950 all present agreed to define the American Korea policy from the perspective of American-Soviet global confrontation. But Truman persisted that America could not afford to show weakness at that juncture. He declared at a press conference that America would augment its military forces to counter the Chinese troops and that America had been actively considering the use of atomic bombs.[25] His highly aggressive speech set off complex reactions. MacArthur strongly urged the enhancement of American military strength in Korea while the allies dreaded the possible weakening of American support to European defense and even a Soviet reprisal in Europe.

Caught in a dilemma, the American policymakers held repeated discussions among themselves and consultations with the leaders of the allies and finally decided on the policy to persist in the fighting, under the condition of no detriment to European defense and no extension of the war, until emergence of a situation favorable to America. The meeting of the National Security Council held on 11 December approved the principle.

The Chinese and Korean forces launched the third campaign on the night of New Year’s eve of 1951 and the UN forces collapsed and were forced to retreat to places along the 37^th parallel. The American government deducted from the Chinese and Korean offensive that the Chinese Volunteers were to drive the American troops completely out of the Korean Peninsula. For a while the American authorities were at a loss as to what to do. Truman called the leaders of the State Department and the military into a session on 12 January to discuss the directive to MacArthur. This important meeting decided to continue the war without extending it. Truman sent a telegram in his own name to MacArthur the following day, informing him of this decision, which also received support from the main allies.

After 50 days of zigzag warfare from the 25 January the UN forces regained control of Seoul on 15 March and then quickly pushed to the 38^th parallel. With the improvement of situation the question of whether to cross the 38^th parallel was once more put before the American government. Obviously the State Department did not approve crossing the 38^th parallel while the military leaders held it was not militarily acceptable to restore the status before the 25 June. They believed there should be a general policy incorporating both military and political considerations. A consensus was finally achieved from repeated discussions. First, it was not necessary and not possible to unify Korea by force; “the aim was to repulse the aggression and to bring about a condition of stability.” Second, “the line to be sought and held should be north of the parallel and chosen for its tactical defensive possibilities and practicality of attainment.”[26] The joint meeting of the State Department and the military on 19 March accepted the suggestion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the American forces cross the 38^th parallel in a limited way, occupy and defend the area from Imjin River to Wosan north of the 38^th parallel.[27] By now America had determined its objective of war, i.e., to cross the 38^th parallel in a limited way, create a favorable military situation and then force China and Korea to agree to a cease-fire. Washington’s decision met strong opposition from MacArthur and Truman finally removed him of all his posts. Truman’s success in hammering out a consensus at home over the Korean War laid a political foundation for his policy switch.

Seeking armistice negotiations on the part of America was an inevitable outcome of its decision to “localize the war.” At the end of the fifth campaign the U.N. forces controlled a defense line in some areas north of the 38^th parallel line. The American government cast about peace feelers and made headway. After the Soviet Permanent Representative made a statement on 23 June the Americans tried on their own initiative to establish direct conduct with the Chinese and North Korean field commanders. On June 30, Matthew Ridgway broadcast the Chinese and the North Koreans that if they were prepared to negotiate a cease-fire and armistice he was prepared to send a representative to begin discussions. Thus the American authorities made the first step towards armistice talks.

2.  China’s decision on cease-fire talks

“Localization of the war” was always the goal the Chinese policymakers strove for. It had a direct bearing on China’s decision on whether or not to enter the war, the operational principles after its entry into the war and the way the war was finally solved. Judged from later developments, it was precisely to localize the war that China sent its troops to Korea, not only confining it within the Korean Peninsula but also preventing its extension to the north of the 38^th parallel.

Since America extended its military intervention from the battlefield in Korea to the Taiwan Straits at the start it was impossible for the Chinese leaders to pin their hope for the security of their territories on American reluctance to expand the war. The American policy to unify Korea by force and to cross the 38^th parallel made the Chinese leadership believe there was no way to guarantee the security of Chinese territories but to defeat or repulse American attack. [28]

Of course, dispatching troops to Korea would likewise run the risk of irritate America to extend the war to China proper. This possibility had been hovering over Mao Zedong’s mind ever since he made the decision to enter the war. He said, “Since Chinese troops are to fight American troops in Korea we must be prepared for a declaration of war by the United States and for the subsequent use of the U.S. air force to bomb many of China’s main cities and industrial bases, as well as an attack by the U.S. navy on our coastal areas.”[29] As a matter of fact, the general mood among the top Chinese leaders was to prepare for the worst. On the other hand, they did their best endeavors to avoid this prospect or minimize the possible harms that would be done to China. Preventive diplomatic moves were initiated, the most important of which was to get aid from the Soviet Union; the appellation of Chinese People’s Volunteers was also designed to deprive America a pretext to declare war on China.

The concept of the CPVs was closely linked with “localization of the war.” The initial guiding principles for the war were very careful on the part of China: To construct two to three defense lines north of Pyongyang, to fight with the South Korean forces first if attacked, to launch the offensive after the Soviet Union supplied military equipment and provided air cover, and then to wipe out some of the enemy’s effective strength and force them to accept a cease-fire. The Chinese leaders did not take the withdrawal of American troops to the south of the 38^th parallel as the absolute condition for an armistice even when the first campaign was launched. What occupied their mind was how to repulse the attack by the American forces.

After the first two campaigns were won the Chinese leaders obviously thought over the question of cease-fire and put forward in clear terms the tentative plan of a cease-fire along the 38^th parallel. In their talks with Kim Il-Sung on 3 December the Chinese leaders said the war might soon come to an end for America might ask for a cease-fire. The condition of cease-fire put forward by China was the American agreement to withdraw all its troops from Korea, first withdrawing to the south of the 38^th parallel line. What was said during these talks laid down a principle for the cease-fire.

By the mid-December the Chinese leaders formulated the five conditions for the cease-fire in Korea with the first one being “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.” Obviously, the Chinese leaders had tended to heighten their goal in the war. Mao Zedong made his estimate of the military situation in his cable to Peng Dehuai on 14 January. In his opinion, there were two possibilities: the U.S. forces would “put up some slight resistance and then retreat from South Korea” or “hold fast to their positions at Taegu and Pusan to the last minute and then withdraw from the peninsula.” He therefore defined the objective for the spring campaign as “liberation of the whole Korea” and asked to convey his plan to Stalin.