Meanwhile, the command of the Chinese People’s Volunteers also put forward the slogan “to wipe out completely the enemy and liberate the whole Korea.” However, Peng Dehuai did not think this goal could be accomplished with one or two campaigns. From Peng’s analysis we could sense the trammels of political considerations for military decisions. Peng Dehuai had to obey the orders, but he firmly adhered to “the principle of preparing to fight a protracted war, …to stop the advance of the enemy and steadily create a favorable military situation.” He also reminded Mao Zedong that if the offensive did not go well the troops might step back. Once again Mao approved his operational principles.[30]

By the middle of February the Volunteers switched from the offensive to the defensive on all the fronts. Peng Dehuai returned to Beijing for a talk with Mao Zedong, which had decisive effects on the readjustment of the concept of war of the Volunteers. After hearing Peng’s report, Mao Zedong changed his advocacy for a quick victory and made the decision “not to be impatient for final victory: to strive for a quick victory if conditions permit, wait for a long-term win if conditions do not permit.”[31] On 1 March, Mao Zedong informed Stalin of the decision of the Chinese leadership. On 15 Zhou Enlai conveyed to Kim Il-sung China’s decision and Stalin’s reply. Now China had completed its policy coordination with its allies. On 14 March the Chinese and North Korean armies abandoned Seul and retreated to the 38^th parallel for defense.

The Chinese and North Korean troops launched the fifth campaign on 22 April to wipe out effectively the enemy forces between the 37^th and the 38^th parallel line, foil the enemy’s landing and take the initiative on the battlefield into their own hands. A stable frontline emerged along the 38^th parallel between the two opposing sides at the end of the campaign and the war was at a stalemate. Afterwards the volunteers switched from mobile warfare with offensive in the main to the positive defensive. It was against this military background that the Chinese leaders began to think seriously about cease-fire negotiations. Anyway the Volunteers now held on the 38^th parallel, which went beyond the expectations at the beginning and the strategic goal of “localization of the war” had been reached.

At he beginning of June the Soviet side notified China of the talks between George Kennan and Malik. At this time Kim Il-sung came to Beijing for talks with Mao Zedong. They agreed to hold negotiations with the American side with the 38^th parallel as the cease-fire line. After consultation among the Chinese leaders it was decided that it was acceptable “to fight while the negotiation is going on and to strive for a settlement through talks” along the 38^th parallel.[32] Mao Zedong informed Stalin of China’s stance on the cease-fire on 13 June. After M. Ridgway suggested to hold armistice talks Peng Dehuai and Kim Il-sung expressed their agreement in a joint reply on 1 July. A new stage of the Korean War began.

       We can see from the above that the military stalemate on the battlefield was the direct cause of the cease-fire negotiations. However, in the final analysis, the decision to hold these negotiations was dictated by the strategy of localization of the war, which again derived from the acknowledgement of strategic interests and the estimate of balance of strength by the Chinese and Americans. In this sense, studies of the guiding principle of local wars are of great significance for recognizing and anticipating the size, process and final result of a local war.

NOTES

1.  Foreign Relation of the United States, 1950, vol. I, p. 288.

2.  FRUS, vol. VI, pp. 349-351.

3.  Harry S. Truman: The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman.

4.  Ibid. And Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department, p. 527.

5.  Syngman Rhee, The Korean War (Chinese edition), Military Science Press, 1983, pp. 33-34.

6.  FRUS, Vol. VII, p. 263.

7.  Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Chinese edition), vol. 6, pp. 106-108.

8.  Shen Zhihua, Studies on Sino-Soviet Alliance and Korean War, Guangxi Normal College Press, 1999, pp.380-381.

9.  “Stalin’s Letter to Kim Il-Sung on China’s Entry into the War.” Ref: Shen Zhihua, Studies on Sino-Soviet Alliance and Korean War, pp. 386-388.

10.    Xu Yan, “The Convoluted Road to the Decision on the Entry into the Korean War” in Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Research Materials of the CPC’s History), 1991, no. 4, p. 11; Shen Zhihua, “Decision-making on China’s Entry into the Korean War’ in Research Materials of the CPC’s History, 1996, no. 1, p. 9.

11.     “Stalin’s Letter to Kim Il-Sung on China’s Entry into the War.”

12.    Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Chinese edition), vol. 6, p. 107.

13.    Harry Truman, The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman.

14.    Ibid.

15.    Ibid. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department, p. 307.

16.    FRUS, Vol. VII, pp. 68-70.

17.    Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Review of Some Important Decisions and Events), Central Party School Press, vol. 1, p. 43.

18.    Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Chinese edition), vol. 6, pp. 106-108.

19.    Zhou Enlai, “We Will Intervene If U.S. Troops Cross the 38^th Parallel,” Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan (Selected Diplomatic Documents of Zhou Enlai), Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 1997, pp. 67-68.

20.    “Recollections of Several Important Decisions during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” in Dang de wenxian, 1994, no. 1, p. 27.

21.    “Mao Zedong’s Telegram Dated 21 October 1950” in Dang de wenxian, 2000, no. 5, p. 11.

22.    Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Chinese edition), vol. 6, pp. 245-246; 249-250.

23.    Chronological Life of Peng Dehuai, People’s Publishing House, 1988, p. 465.

24.    Ibid., p. 467.

25.    Military Situation in the Far East, hearing before the Committee on Armed Service Committee and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the United States, Washington, 1951, vol. V, pp. 3543-3544.

26.    Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department, p. 389.

27.    FRUS, 1951, vol. VII, pp. 246-247.

28.    “Mao Zedong’s Telegram to Zhou Enlai Concerning the Need of the Chinese People’s Volunteers to Enter the War in Korea” in Dang de wenxian, 2000, no. 5, p. 11. Self-accounting of Peng Dehuai, People’s Publishing House, 1981, p. 257.

29.    Mao Zedong, Selected Military Writings (Chinese edition), vol. 6, pp. 106.

30.    Chronological Life of Peng Dehuai, pp. 471-473

31.    Ibid., p. 480.

32.    The Memoirs of Nie Rongzhen, The People’s Liberation Army Press, 1984, vol. 2, pp. 741-742.

Translated by Jiang Yajuan from Dangdai Zhongguo shi yanjiu, 2000, no. 6