The March 11, 1991 issue of Newsweek carried an article entitled “A New World Order?” American historian James Macgregor Burns expressed his concern in it that “in cases of future aggression there will be a temptation to use Iraq as a model simply because it worked so well.” [1] In view of the US inclination to use force more than any other means in handling crises after the Gulf War, Burns’ concern is predictive. The only difference is that the United States is prone to resort to force even when it is not a case of aggression. The Kosovo War stands as an evident example.

       A week before the war was launched against Iraq, Secretary of State James Baker met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva. Baker warned Iraq if it did not accept the US terms, it would suffer military blows. But the warning was given a deaf ear. Nevertheless, Baker still tried to persuade Aziz to take President Bush’s letter back to Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. When the two stood up for departure, Baker pointed the letter on the table and asked if Aziz was sure that he would not take the letter with him. Aziz answered yes. When Baker returned to his hotel, he called his superior and reported that after a talk of six hours and 27 minutes, Iraq signaled no concession.[2] Then Washington made up its mind to go to war with Iraq.

       Similar diplomatic activities occurred prior to the Kosovo War. Even the details hardly varied. On March 22, 1999, US envoy Richard Holbrooke walked into the house of President Milosevic to deliver him the ultimatum. Holbrooke may have crossed his figure over his luck and hoped Milosevic may change his mind. At the end of the meeting, Holbrooke asked Milosevic if he understood very well what would happen after Holbrooke walked out of that room. Milosevic replied calmly that the US would start aerial bombardment. At the noontime on March 23, Milosevic declined again Holbrooke’s advice. Holbrooke got very angry. He walked out of the house of the Yugoslavian President and called Clinton and Albright telling them that he couldn’t get any concession. NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana declared the same night that NATO would launch air strikes against Yugoslavia at 19:00 Greenwich mean time on March 24. Then NATO air attack started.

       The war that the United States waged in the Gulf in early 1991 and the one in the Balkans in 1999 were very different in nature. The former aimed to drive invader Iraq out of the occupied territory. The latter was an air war staged because of the internal affairs of a sovereign country. The comparison of what had happened prior to each of the two wars is meant to show that the diplomatic efforts made by the United States before it was about to launch a war could hardly prevent the outbreak of the war. There are at least two reasons. One, the coerced would not compromise in the face of military pressure whether it was out of the misjudgment on the resolution of the United States, or it was a concern of crucial interests. Two, the terms put forth by the United States were those that the coerced was not willing to accept or was impossible to accept, while the United States would rather settle the issue by means of force. In this sense, the way that the United States handled the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was more a war decision than a crisis management. This thesis attempts to reveal some basic characteristics of the US decision making through a study of the changes of the US strategic policies prior to the Gulf War in August 1990 and major features of the US policies after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

I.  Changes of the US Gulf Strategy and Their Significance

During the cold war era, every war the United States launched was related to some strategic considerations. This characteristic did not vanish with the ending of the cold war. Without the so-called “New Interventionism,” the US would not likely to have waged an air war against Yugoslavia. It is also true in the case of the Gulf War. After the oil crisis of 1973, the United States defined the Gulf region as an area of strategic interests. This judgement had determined basically the American policies during the Gulf War.

    The American policies following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait can be traced back to the readjustment in the 1970s of the US strategies in the Gulf area. Beginning from the 1970s, the world oil supply started to take adverse changes against the interests of the consumer countries. The United States saw the largest increase in demand for oil. By 1973 the oil import accounted for 36.1 percent of the total oil consumption in the United States. According to some other statistics, even after the strategic readjustment on the oil supply and reserve, the United States still could not change fundamentally its reliance on import oil. In the first half of 1990 the United States imported an average of 8,425,000 barrels per day, accounting for 50 percent of the national daily consumption. The import came mainly from the Middle East, with 700,000 barrels from Kuwait and 609,000 barrels from Iraq. Saudi Arabia was even a bigger supplier.[3] (3)

    After the war broke out in the Middle East in October 1973, Opec began to exert pressure on the United States by raising oil prices and cutting down outputs. On October 20 Saudi Arabia declared an overall oil embargo against the United States. On December 22 Opec decided on another significance raise of oil prices. The United States was threatened by an energy crisis, which quickly spread to the entire Western world. The crisis dealt a severe blow on the Western economy and finally led to an economic crisis in 1974.

    The energy crisis revealed fragility of American economy and the threat posed to the American security by the heavy reliance of its economy on import energy. The Nixon administration made almost every diplomatic effort to solve the conflict on the Arabia. However, Kissinger’s success was transient. The US relations with the radical anti-Israel Arab countries were actually estranged.

    In February 1979 Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returned home from exile and led an “Islamic revolution.” On April 1 the founding of the Islamic Republic was announced. Since the United States were very close to Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, it was on a tense term with the new regime. The tension finally led to an anti-US movement and the hostage crisis. Iran tried again to use the oil weapon in order to smash American economy.

    The constant crises in the Gulf made it clear to the United States that to maintain smooth oil supply from the Middle East was significant to the United States and its Western allies. Beginning from the 1980s, the United States gradually changed its strategy that leaned heavily on Europe to the neglect of Asia. As a result, the importance of the Gulf in the US global strategy increased steadily. This outcome was also related closely to the appearance of “Carterism.”

    On January 21, 1980 President Jimmy Carter stated in the State of Union Message that any attempt by outside forces to control the Persian Gulf would be deemed an encroachment on crucial American interests and would be answered by blows of all means necessary, including military force. [4] “Carterism” was characterized mainly by this new policy of the Persian Gulf.