It was directed first of all against the special situation created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But the reason why the United States conside red the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a severe threat to the US security was rooted in the energy and hostage crises of the 1970s. It was during that period the United States determined the Gulf situation was directly related to the strategic interests of the United States and its allies. The Persian Gulf was seen as a “litmus test paper” of the American security and was described as having to do with the life or death of American lifestyle.[5]

    Judged by the series of measures taken at the time by the United States, I believe the key objective of the Carter administration was to contain the Soviet Union and prevent it from expanding further to take over the control of the Middle East after the occupation of Afghanistan. However, it can be seen from the mind of the American decision makers that the US new policy of the Persian Gulf was not merely a countermeasure against the Soviet Union. We may take a look at what Zbigniew Brezinski wrote in his reminiscences: The later stage of Carter’s foreign policies involved the establishment of a new balance between power and principle. In the internal debates caused mainly by the Soviet expansion and the Iran crisis, the dominance of power in the world affairs was seen more clearly, and its central role in the world affairs was highly evaluated. As a result there was a hard policy on the Soviet Union, and there were great efforts in establishing a new, regional security structure in the Middle East.[6]

    Apparently, in the mind of the US decision makers, the containment of the Soviet expansion and crackdown on the anti-US forces (or the regional forces that posed a threat to the interests of the United States) in the Gulf countries comprised the dual objectives of the US Gulf policy during the Carter administration. The only difference was that such a policy would have its own priorities in accordance with the situations of different periods. Therefore, while responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States also pitched a higher tune against Iran, resulting in an increase of tension in the US-Iran relations.

    Judged by the statements of the US leaders and the measures taken by the United States in the Gulf region, the new policy of the Persian Gulf covered at least the following aspects: 1) The United States had a vital strategic plan in the Middle East and Persian Gulf and was determined to exercise a control over the area; 2) the objective of the US Gulf policy was not only to check the Soviet expansion, but also to crack down the anti-US countries and forces in the region; and 3) it was necessary for the United States to establish a security mechanism in the region, but any diplomatic effort and security arrangement must be backed by firm policies of power. In another word, the United States was prepared to use military force in safeguarding its strategic interests in the region.

    To carry out the new policy, the United States started to organize the Rapid Development force in view of the Gulf situation after “Carterism” came into being. In 1987 the force was headquartered at the Macdill Air Force Base in Florida, and soon a series of strategic guiding policies and plans were produced. The RDP strategy was oriented to handle both the “internal” and “external” threats or crises in the Gulf region. The “external” threat to the US interests came from the Soviet expansion in the region, and the “internal” crises referred to wars and conflicts among the Gulf countries. The RDP emphasized containment. Its roles were to quell political turmoil, prevent attacks from the Middle East countries, and check the Soviet expansion.

    In September 1980 a war started between Iraq and Iran and lasted for eight years. With the escalation of the war, Iraq and Iran extended their battlefields from the land to the sea. At the beginning the two sides attacked each other’s cargo and oil ships and later all ships in the Gulf. Some American ships became victims, too. According to statistics, in the eight years a total of 546 oil, cargo and other ships were damaged or destroyed by Iraq and Iran, with over 300 death casualties. The shipment insurance fee was as high as US $1 billion.[7]

    On May 9, 1987 President Reagan said in a statement that the use of this crucial waterway in the Gulf should not be put at the mercy of Iran, nor should it come into the control of the Soviet Union.[8] Three weeks later, President Reagan approved the US convoy plan for Kuwaiti oil ships. In carrying the plan, the United States had several military skirmishes with Iran. To coordinate with its military actions, the United States declared trade embargo against Iran. But that was as far as the United States went.

    Though the United States saw its interests in the Persian Gulf as crucial, its ability to solve the Gulf issue was inevitably hampered by its confrontation with the Soviet Union. Since the Iraq-Iran War was beyond the scope of the US cold war with the Soviet Union, the US influence on Iraq and Iran and the war between them was very limited. Its policies were basically passive and defensive and did not support active intervention.

II. US Defines Its Enemy (or Source of Threat)

       The Gulf War broke out at the end of the cold war. In the dissolution process of the bi-polar world structure, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, viewed from the perspective of the US security strategy, created at least two subsequent problems.

First, with the decline of the Soviet Union, the world was likely to shift from the bi-polar structure to anarchy or a multi-polar status. Considering the possible subsequent developments, if Iraq succeeded in conquering Kuwait, it would undoubtedly become a regional hegemony, or a new “pole” in the Middle East. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait involved neither complicated background factors as in Arab-Israel conflicts nor incitation by the two superpowers. It was a hidden regional crisis that was formed in the bi-polar era and erupted during the dissolution of the old structure. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was capable of controlling the situation.

       Secondly, Iraq was defined as an “enemy” country in the US strategy. The primary of any strategy was a clear definition of the enemies (or threats) and friends and classification of priorities accordingly. In the cold war era, the US pivoted its strategies on the goal of containing and defeating the Soviet Union. Though, by doing so, the United States saw clearly its strategic goals, its ability to handle a regional problem was greatly hampered. The United States failed to put an effective control over a hidden situation that it was faced with and aware of.

       With the rapid decline of the Soviet Union and changes of the strategic situation in the Gulf region, the United States defined Iraq as a threat soon after the end of the Iraq-Iran War. In the fall of 1989 the US Ministry of Defense proposed in its routine plan adjustment that, after the decline of the Soviet Union and the end of the Iraq-Iran War, Iraq would replace the Soviet Union to become a regional threat to the American interests in the Gulf region. This plan was approved by the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. [9] In the spring of 1990 the US army worked out a new program for the Gulf operations and conducted relevant exercises. The above information was disclosed by the Ministry of Defense after the war. Though the Ministry of Defense may be suspected of trying to claim credit for itself afterwards in its judgements of the Iraqi strategic intention and military preparation and planning, the determination of Iraq as a regional threat was for sure. Beginning from the spring of 1990, there was an increasing tension between the United States and Iraq, partly due to the above judgements of the United States.