Prepared for the Conference

“New Evidence on China, Southeast Asia

and the Indochina Wars”

Hong Kong, 11 to 12 January, 2000

(Not for citation or reproduction without

the written permission of the author.)

The Historical Background of the Shift in Chinese Policy

Toward the United States in the Late 1960s

Niu Jun, Institute for American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Science

In recent years, much research has been done in the field of Chinese history on the process and stages of the changes on Chinese policy toward the United States in the late 1960s. In comparison, the studies of the background of this policy shift appeared to be weak. Some research results have touched upon several related aspects from various angles. However, they lack a detailed and systematic analysis on how these various aspects were related to the changes in Chinese foreign policy toward the United States and how they were related to each other.[1] The goal of this paper will be to provide a systematic description of the historical background of the shift in China’s policy toward the United States and the characteristics of such a policy shift, through a discussion of several changes in, as well as the correlations among, Chinese security strategy, foreign policy, and Chinese-Vietnamese relations from the mid 1960s to 1968, in an effort to fill in the void left by other current studies.

Part One: The Shift in China’s Security Strategy

In the mid 1960s, the security environment of China quickly deteriorated. Such deterioration was characterized by simultaneous military pressure in the north and in the south, which were placed on China by the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively.

In the early 1960s, new chaos broke out in Indochina. However, after the second Geneva Conference, Chinese leaders used to believe that the possibility of a direct American attack on North Vietnam was slim.[2] On August 3 of 1964, the “Token Gulf Incident” suddenly took place and American troops launched air attacks on targets in North Vietnam. Soon after, a “Token Gulf Resolution” was passed by both houses of the United States Congress, proclaiming that “the United States Congress agrees and supports the United States president, as the Commander in Chief, to take any necessary measures to counter any military attacks on American troops and in order to prevent further invasions.” It authorized the United states president to “take all necessary steps including the use of force, to assist and protect any member countries or protected free countries in the Southeast Asian Defense Alliance.”[3] Almost simultaneously, American air force started sending auto-piloted air planes into Chinese air space repeatedly to conduct military intelligence gathering missions.

The military actions taken by the United states were followed with serious concerns by the Chinese leadership. Shortly before the “Token Gulf Incident” took place, Chinese leaders had already started to response to the American threats of attacks against the North Vietnam. From May 15 to June 17 the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee held meetings to discuss the third of China’s “five year plan”. During the meetings, Mao Zedong began to change the established goal of the planned domestic economy from solving the problems of supplying “food, clothing, and consumer goods” to the construction of the so called “three lines” projects. He asked all Chinese provinces develop a defense industry.[4] After the meetings were concluded, Mao Zedong re-emphasized the importance and urgency of having a defense industry. He even asked the major cities, such as Beijing and Tian Jin, to ready themselves militarily against wars.[5] On July 27, Mao Zedong received a delegation of officials from North Vietnam. He said that while the Chinese would continue to make all efforts to help the North Vietnamese resist the American attacks, China would also be prepared for war itself. Mao Zedong also suggested the possibility of China entering the war in Vietnam.[6]

In the first half of August 1964, clearly affected by the United States’ continued air attacks on North Vietnam, Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders paid attention more closely to the threat of war from the United States. On August 5 of the same year, when the United states started to attack targets in North Vietnam, the Central Military Committee of China’s People’s Liberation Army ordered all troops and divisions to be placed on a defense alert. Mao Zedong even felt the need to cancel a scheduled speech the next day because “a war was about to break out.”[7] During the Chinese Communist Party Central committee secretary meeting held in mid August, Mao Zedong emphasized time after time that all time and efforts should be devoted to the preparation for countering a war of invasion by the United States. He even said that the issues of whether or not China carry out the construction of the “three lines” projects were the same kind of issue similar to those dung the revolution: they were similar to issues of whether or not to go to the countryside, or whether to carry out revolutions.[8] In October, in a document to Liu Shao Qi and Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong said that the building of “three lines” was “a metter of a long term strategy. If no action [was] taken, it would be too late to regret it in the future.”[9] That decision made by Mao Zedong quickly became the consensus among Chinese policy makers and his decision was quickly implemented.[10]

On March 2 of 1965, the United States troops started the so called “Project Thunders,” continuously conducting air raids on North Vietnam. American ground troops, in the name of protecting United States military air force bases, directly engaged in military confrontations with the forces of the Vietnamese people’s Army in Vietnam. The first batch of United States marine troops landed in South Vietnam’s Jian Gang [Vietnamese name translated from Chinese term] in April. In May, United States air force entered the area north of the No.20^th parallel line, extending air raids to the entire area of North Vietnam. In addition, United States naval air planes intensified activities in the air space above China, and United States navy ships frequently patrolled in China’s South China Sea. American war planes even attacked Chinese commercial ships and fishing boats.

The escalation of military actions in Vietnam by the United States, as well as its increased activities to invade China’s air space, posed serious threats to China’s security in the southern border area. In order to counter the American invasion, Chinese air force was ordered to station on Hai Nan Island in early 1965. At the beginning of April, the People’s Liberation Army’s Central Military Committee decided to lift the restriction that only permitted the People’s Liberation Army’s air force to “monitor” American planes invading Chinese air space. A policy was order so that “resolute actions should be taken to attack any enemy planes that enter the air space above China’s mainland as well as above the Hai Nan Island.”[11]