In July of 1963, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of Mongolia signed an accord, on Enhancing Soviet Assistance to the Defense of Mongolian Borders, and Soviet troops started to enter Mongolia. The People’s Republic of Mongolia had previously declared that because it was situated between two giant socialist countries, Mongolia had no need to keep a regular defense force. As a result, all Soviet troops previously stationed there withdrew entirely in the 1950s.[23] The soviet troops entered the People’s Republic of Mongolia and were stationed near the Chinese-Mongolian border. The Soviet Union’s intent was clearly to increase Soviet military pressure on China.

From February to August of 1964, China and the Soviet Union held border talks in Beijing but the two sides could not reach any agreements or understanding. In response to the Soviet attitudes and views exhibited in these talks, Mao Zedong told Zuo Zuo Mu [Japanese name translated from Chinese term], a representative of the Japanese Socialist Party who was visiting China, during a meeting on July 10: “The Czarist Russia occupied a large portion of Chinese territory by force. We have yet dealt with those debts.”[24] After Mao Zedong’s remarks were published, the Soviet side accused Chinese leaders of “advancing expansionist plans with complicated motives” in early September. Perhaps to clarify the original intension of his remarks to the international community, Mao Zedong took the opportunity of meeting with French visitors on September 10 and explained that China did not intend to ask for the return of one hundred fifty square kilometers of territory currently belonging to the Soviet Union. Mao said that he only wanted to state that the disputes were created by unequal treaties and wanted to “take offensive measures” to put the Soviet Union “on notice.”[25] But the Soviet leaders were unwilling to let things go. On September 15, when Khrushchev met with Japanese Diet members, he said: “those who dare to sabotage the sacred borders of the Soviet Union would be met with resolute counter attacks.”[26] After the unsuccessful border talks between China and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union decided to send additional troops to the area along the Chinese-Soviet border. That move turned the border disputes into heated military conflicts. The Chinese leaders paid special attention to Khrushchev’s remarks as well as to the new military installations along the Chinese-Soviet border. On October 7 and again on October 9, Mao met with leaders from North Korea and Albania, respectively. On both days, Mao Zedong said that China should be prepared for possible military action taken by Khrushchev against China.[27] Once Mao Zedong considered the defense arrangement in major cities in northern China, he emphasized that “attention should be paid both to the south and to the north. All must be ready.”[28] On May 21, 1965, Zhou Enlai spoke at the strategy session of the People’s Liberation Army’s Central Committee. He said that China must ready itself for an early war and a major war. Zhou Enlai said: “we will take on both the imperialism and the revisionism all together. We will fight a nuclear war.” “We will be prepared to fight a war in both directions.”[29] Zhou Enlai’s remarks on that occasion were the most direct and demonstrative statements published by the Chinese government to date, showing that China once planned to wage a war against the Soviet Union.

Mainly because of the American pressure felt from China’s south, even though China was on high alert about possible military actions the Soviet Union might take against China after the unsuccessful conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese border talks, China acted with caution and restraints in dealing with border issues. China effectively froze its border disputes with others. It was true that China strongly attacked the Soviet Union’s foreign policy during that period. But such attacks were limited to words. To borrow Mao Zedong’s words, the arguments existed between China and the Soviet Union were “wars fought with brush and ink” and “would not cause death.”[30] The Chinese leaders maintain that there were fundamental differences between the Soviet threat and the threat posed by the United States’ escalation of the war in Vietnam. American invasions and expansions, to the Chinese, were direct global threats.

On October 14 in 1964, Khrushchev’s government suddenly collapsed. Chinese leaders were determined to take that opportunity to attempt to improve the relationship between China and the Soviet Union.[31] In November, Zhou Enlai led a delegation composed of Chinese government and party officials to visit Moscow. Although this visit clearly did not accomplish the goal of improving Soviet-Chinese relations, Chinese leaders did not give up further efforts in making this happen. In February of 1965, Mao Zedong received Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, who was on his way to Vietnam for a visit. Zhou Enlai also held several talks with Kosygin and made a six-point suggestion to Kosygin on how to improve bilateral relations.[32] In Zhou Enlai’s judgment, the meeting between Mao Zedong and Kosygin “naturally contributed positively” to Soviet-China relations. Even though such a meeting may not produce any concrete result, it could “lay the four ration” for future talks. At a later point, when Zhou Enlai met with the Soviet ambassador to China, La Bin [Russian name translated from Chinese term], Zhou Enlai reiterated to him the six-point suggestion he made to Kosygin in February and added: “the words of Chinese government count.”[33] The above shows that Chinese leaders still tried to stabilize the bilateral relationship between China and the Soviet Union.

From March 1 to March 5, despite repeated objections from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee called for an international conference among communist parties and labor parties of various countries. The conference issued a joint declaration. On March 23, The People’s Daily and Hong Qi (The Red Flag) jointly published an editorial titled Assessing the March Conference in Moscow. The Chinese Communist Party Central Committee public ally broke with the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee by condemning the efforts by the Soviet Communist party Central Committee in the continuation of Khrushchev’s revisionism.[34] In June, The People’s Daily and The Red Flag again jointly published another editorial titled Carrying the Struggles Against Khrushchev’s Revisionism to the End, stating that one must “carry through the struggles against Khrushchev’s revisionism to the end” if one were to fight against American imperialism.[35]

On September 6, India launched military attacks on Pakistan. The dispute over Kashmir had led to a full scale war between these two countries. Chinese government instantly issued a statement, condemning the “naked acts of invasions” by the Indian troops.[36] In addition, China increased the pressure on the Indian government regarding Chinese-Indian border issues. On the same day China issued the statement condemning India’s invasion against Pakistan, the Chinese government presented a statement to the Indian embassy in China, strongly protesting Indian troops’ crossing the China-Xi Jin border and entering Chinese territory from the west end of the Indian-Chinese border to conduct military activities.[37] China’s strong reaction to the matter of the conflict between Pakistan and India was directly related to the state of Chinese-Soviet relations. When Chinese government pointedly characterized the military actions taken by India as an invasion, it emphasized that the United States was not the only supporter of Indian’s invasion in Pakistan; the Soviet Union also “provided strong backing to the invaders.” The government of China called Soviet efforts in supporting India “the same trick” as the actions the Soviet Union carried out during border clashes with China in 1959 and 1962, “aiming at to start a world wide anti-Chinese sentiment.”[38]