First, China’s propaganda on foreign policy became more and more extreme, and the tone of such propaganda was set higher and higher. On the one hand, China proclaimed that “the new era of world revolution has come,” or “the era is guided by the great banner of Mao Zedong thoughts,” and “it is the great era in which the stage of a final match between the Proletarians and the Capitalists has been set world wide.”[50] On the other hand, China self-claimed to be “the focal point of world conflicts and the storm center of global revolution, ” as well as “revolutionary center of the world.”[51] It needs to be pointed out that the goal of such propaganda programs was to encourage the greatest number of people to actively participate in the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, the propaganda went in great details to describe domestic political struggles against revisionism as struggles for “the future of world revolution and realization of beautiful human ideals.” They proclaimed that “the future of China determines the future of the global proletarian revolution…and a global proletarian revolution is a top priority on the global.”[52] However, such descriptions of the trend of world revolutionary trend, as well as China’s self-claimed world importance, inevitably affected the understanding of international affairs and the judgment in conducting foreign affairs among some Chinese leaders.

By that time, Cultural Revolution had already begun. China’s domestic political situation became more and more chaotic. Fanned by the propaganda describe above, there was a feverish out pour of extreme and radical sentiments. This phenomenon derailed Chinese foreign policy. Chinese diplomatic missions abroad suffered severe setbacks. Shortly after the Cultural Revolution started the Chinese government eventually recalled all ambassadors except Huang Hua, who was then Chinese ambassador to Egypt. This certainly caused difficulties in the bilateral relations between China and other countries.

On September 8, 1966, the Secretariat of External Affairs of the State Council published a report titled Brief Report on External Affairs During Cultural Revolution. The Interim Secretariat of the Cultural Revolution Coordination Committee of the Communist Youth League Central Committee also published an article titled A Letter from A Tanzanian Citizen Criticizing Bourgeois Behavior Among Chinese Diplomats at Foreign Mission Posts. Both reports were sent to Mao Zedong. On the next day, Mao Zedong commented: “This letter of criticism was well written. All foreign mission posts should pay attention. We need a complete revolution.”[53] From that point on, activities at Chinese foreign diplomatic posts were directly connected to the revolution at home. There was chaos at these posts. As China’s domestic political activities elevated, spreading Mao Zedong thoughts world wide became the central mission of all Chinese embassies everywhere. Some of the diplomats indiscriminately distributed propaganda material of Mao Zedong thoughts and posted flyers and posters to publicize China’s Cultural Revolution everywhere. Some made inappropriate remarks on some diplomatic occasions.

Shortly after chaos filled Chinese missions abroad, the foreign affair system back home was also seriously affected by the waves of the Cultural Revolution. On January 11 in 1967, the People’s Daily published an editorial calling for the rebels to “take over the power” nation wide.[54] A massive wave of fights for power quickly spread through out the foreign policy system. From Foreign Minister Chen Yi to all the ambassadors and minister counselors, everyone was criticized and paraded through the streets. Almost none of the offices of in the foreign policy system could perform their regular functions. On August 7, Wang Li, a member of the Chinese Cultural Revolution Central Committee, spoke to the rebel group inside the Chinese Foreign Ministry and encourage them to get rid of Chen Yi and take over the power of the foreign ministry.[55] Having the support of the Central Committee, the rebel group in the foreign minister increased their activities. They took over the political office of the Ministry, sealed off the Party Secretary’s office, and issued orders in the name of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to Chinese diplomatic missions world wide. The end result was that the authority of foreign policy making was left to this group of rebels. Diplomatic activities fell in the state of anarchy.

While the Chinese foreign policy system fell into a state of chaos, mass movements and vicious political storms all affected foreign diplomatic missions in China. In January of 1967, some Chinese students who were studying in Europe stopped by Moscow on their way home. They gathered in front of the tombs of Lenin and Stalin and recited the words of Mao Zedong. The students were surrounded by Soviet police and were beaten by the policemen. When the news came over to China, many people went to the Soviet embassy in Beijing to protest. This protest was followed by more protests in front of the Indian embassy, the Indonesia embassy, and the Burmese embassy. From May to August, China had an assortment of conflicts with a dozen of African, Asian and European nations with whom China had established formal diplomatic ties.[56] The most serious incident took place on the evening of August 22 when more than ten thousand people surrounded and attacked the British Office of Charged’ affaires in Beijing. The rebels burned down an office building and paraded the British charged’ affaires on the streets.

The burning of the British consulate in Beijing marked the height of the chaos in Chinese foreign affairs during the Cultural Revolution. However, it also offered a window of opportunity for the readjustment of Chinese foreign affairs. The chaos at various foreign diplomatic missions quickly drew the attention of Chinese leaders who were in charge of foreign affairs. In January of 1967, Zhou Enlai sent Chen Yi to the Great Hall of the People to announce that “the authority vested in the foreign affairs system cannot be taken away.”[57] On February 6, responding to the chaotic situation a Chinese diplomatic missions abroad, Chen Yi ordered his secretary to draft a telegraph which prohibited the so called “Big Four” activities in Chinese embassies world wide. The draft telegram was sent to Zhou Enlai, who in turn handed it in to Mao Zedong. Mao Zedong okayed the telegram the next day. When Zhou Enlai later edited this draft again, he added that the so called “exchanges of revolutionary experience” activities and “revolutionary fighting teams” were strictly prohibited in Chinese embassies. The telegraph was sent out in the form of an order on February 7.[58] On March 3, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, the People’s Republic of China State Council, and the People’s Liberation Army Central Military Committee jointly issued a document titled Notice on Discouraging Members of the Red Guard and other Revolutionary Masses to Offer voluntary Assistance to Vietnamese Efforts Against the United States, to prevent some members of the Red Guard and other youths from illegally entering Vietnam.[59]

These measures obviously were not enough to eliminate the chaos in the foreign affairs system. Chen Yi lost control of the Chinese Foreign Ministry after the defeat of the “February Resistance War.” Zhou Enlai was forced to deal with the situation himself time after time. On August 8, Zhou Enlai read the “August 7 Speech” by Wang Li in a newsletter circulated by the Red Guard. Zhou Enlai immediately called Wang Li and Kang Sheng for a meeting, only to be turned down by them both. It was quite possible that Zhou Enlai tried to use the meeting to exchange opinions in order reach consensus to control the situation. But Zhou Enlai learned even his power had become limited then.[60] During several following confrontations with the rebels in the People’s Republic of China Foreign Ministry, it became clear to Zhou Enlai that he was no longer able to prevent the situation form deteriorating by solely relying on his reputation and prestige.

At such a difficult time, Zhou Enlai was determined to take the opportunity provided by the burning of the British Office of Changed’ affaires to turn around the situation. On August 25, Zhou Enlai met with Yang Cheng Wu one on one. He asked Yang Cheng Wu to report the series of events to Mao Zedong, who was out on an observation tour, including the contents of Wang Li’s “August 7^th Speech.” On August 26, Mao Zedong condemned Wang Li’s remarks as “the worst type” and decided that Zhou Enlai would take charge to arrest Wang Li and his followers.[61] According to the instructions given by Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee conducted an investigation of Wang Li and others. On October 3, during a meeting with foreign diplomats where Mao Zedong was accompanied by Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong again offered his support to Zhou Enlai, saying that “it was wrong” for the Red Guards to try to oust Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi.[62]