By the fall of 1968, China and Vietnam held many talks regarding the issues of peace talks between Vietnam and the United States. The main issues under discussion were whether to implement and how best to achieve the goals announced by both North Vietnam and the national Liberation League. At that time, China did not support immediate negotiations between. North Vietnam and the United States. China was concerned about two factors that would have caused North Vietnam to give up their goals and leave the final victory of the was against the United States unrealized. These two factors were: 1. North Vietnam making concessions to the United States under pressure from the Soviet Union; 2. The timing of the negotiations. In terms of making concessions. Chinese leaders explained many times on diplomatic occasions how the Soviet Union made concessions to the United States during China’s liberation war and attempted to prevent the People’s Liberation Army from crossing the Long River at the critical final moment right before China’s final revolutionary victory. To Chinese leaders, the American proposal for peace talks was simply a plot to eliminate the revolutionary forces in Vietnam. The Soviet Union, by agreeing to the American proposal, had left Vietnamese people’s revolution unfinished.[79] In term of the timing for the negotiations, according to their own dealings with the United States, Chinese leaders believed that the United States would truly want to negotiate and withdraw from Vietnam only when Vietnam achieved military victories in the battle field and only when Vietnamese troops took away the life line of the American troops in Vietnam.[80]

In 1968, Vietnam forces started “New Spring attacks” on American troops. This round of attacks achieved a major political victory and brought huge shock waves to the United States. The people of the United States then realized that the United States could not suppress the determination or the ability of the Vietnamese people to fight the war, despite the fact that the United States had put in a massive amount of human and material resources in Vietnam and had suffered countless casualties. Under high pressure from unprecedented public reactions and public opinions, the will to continue the war in the United States was about to break down. However, looking from a military point of view, the arm forces of Vietnam suffered severe losses and its capacity to fight a continuing war was reduced greatly. The local structure of the National Liberation League also suffered heavy damages. Some of the cadres were arrested; soldiers were killed. The morale of the national Liberation League was low.[81] Under such circumstance, United States Prescient Johnson made a nation wide television address on March 31, announcing the United States would stop all air raids in the areas north of the North 20^th parallel line. On April 3, North Vietnam agreed to hold talks with the United States.

As soon as Chinese leaders learned of North Vietnam’s decision to conduct these talks, they expressed their resolute opposition to any talks with the United States at that time. During many meetings with North Vietnamese leaders, Chinese leaders maintained that the decision by North Vietnam to hold peace talks with the United States was inconsistent with North Vietnam’s previously announced goals and the timing for such talks was not favorable for North Vietnam. China insisted that a quick acceptance of American suggestion to hold talks would cause North Vietnam to lose its advantageous position and land itself in a passive position.[82] The disputes between China and Vietnam on the timing of the talks also caused disputes between the two on how to assess the policy of the Soviet Union.[83] These disputes, as well as the fact that North Vietnam did not consult with China before it announced the decision on conducting the talks with the United States, seriously harmed this bilateral relationship. On November 14, after listening to a report by Zhou Enlai on the meetings with North Vietnamese leaders, Mao Zedong said: “Let’s leave everything to their decision.”[84] On June 9 of 1969, when Mao Zedong held a meeting with the visiting delegation of Romanian government and party officials, he openly explained China’s new policy of separating China from Vietnam.[85]

Looking from the viewpoint of adjusting Chinese foreign policy, China’s decision to keep and increase the distance from Vietnam had indeed provided a historical opportunity for China. One cannot imagine that China could have shifted the focus of its foreign policy to the north had the relationship not gone sour because of North Vietnam’s decision to hold peace talks with the United States during the Vietnam War. In addition, with the background in which “proletarian internationalism” had become the “highest principle” of Chinese foreign policy since the 11^th meeting of the 8^th Chinese Communist Party Congress, had China maintained a close relationship with North Vietnam and continued to carry on the related political and military burdens, or, had North Vietnam not initiated an adjustment in its relationship with the United States, it would at least be much more difficult for Chinese leaders to arrive at the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with the United States.

This article demonstrated that significant changes took place in China’s security strategy, foreign policy and foreign policy system, and in Chinese—Vietnam relations before the Zhen Bao Dao Island Incident occurred in March of 1969. These changes took place on various levels and in different areas of Chinese foreign policy; some of these changes were not intended by the Chinese leaders to be opportunities that would lead to an normalization of United States—China relations. But the correlations and mutual interactions among these changes can be easily seen. In fact, these interrelated changes formed a grand backdrop against which a significant shift took place in China’s policy toward the United States. This shift made it possible for Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to complete a strategic adjustment in China’s foreign relations, despite the extremely chaotic situation created by the Cultural Revolution.