The 1946 mission to China of U.S. Special Envoy General George C.  Marshall is a rather well-studied topic in Chinese academic circles.   However, a review of the Chinese scholarly literature reveals that relatively little attention has been paid to the examination of Chinese political forces and, in particular, the attitudes and policies of the Guomindang and the CCP toward the United States compared to the effort that has gone into studying U.S. policy toward China during the period of Marshall_s mediation.  (1) This article explores Guomindang and CCP policies toward the United States during Marshall_s mediation in 1946.   It examines how the two parties assessed the impact of the United States on the GMD-CCP conflict after the war, the policies and objectives they initially set for themselves, the adjustment in their policies toward the U.S., and whether or not they ultimately achieved their objectives.

1.  BACKGROUND: CHANGES IN GMD AND CCP POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.

     Since the fragmentation of China at the beginning of the 20th century, the foreign policy of all Chinese political forces had one distinctive feature in common.  This was their enlistment of international forces to help them cope with their domestic adversaries.  Postwar GMD and CCP policy toward the U.S. was no exception.  During the war, the United States secured a position of influence in China surpassing that of any other great power, and  In the last phase of the war, the U.S. directly intervened in the GMD-CCP conflict.   The result was that by the end of the war, the U.S. had become the main foreign policy problem for both parties.  The difference between them was that Chiang Kai-shek hoped to use the military alliance he had formed with the U.S. during the war to get Washington to support his government in the postwar period even in the event that civil war broke out.   By the end of the war, the CCP and the United States had already become antagonists.  Yanan_s basic policy was to prevent to the greatest extent possible direct U.S. military involvement in GMD-CCP conflicts.   The Nationalists and the Communists both exerted considerable effort in pursuing their objectives.

     (1) Nationalist Policy toward the U.S.  

     The greatest problem the Nationalist government faced at the end of the war was how to reestablish its rule over all of China.  This necessitated that it contend with the CCP over the right to accept the Japanese surrender and the chance to control large areas in East and North China that had been occupied by, or were encircled by, communist forces.   It also included the question of recovering Northeast China from the Soviet Union.  Nationalist armies had been gravely weakened during the war and were holed up in the remote Southwestern parts of the country.  Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek wanted the Allied countries to recognize the Nationalist government as the only entity lawfully entitled to receive the Japanese surrender.  In addition, he urgently needed the United States to transport his troops into the areas of East and North China occupied by the Japanese, to supply him with military assistance, and  to strengthen the Nationalist army_s fighting capacity.  In the first three months after the war ended, Chiang Kai-shek was successful.   He received reliable, all-around assistance from the Truman government.

    First, with Hurley_s assistance, the U.S. emphasized that the Nationalist government had a legitimate right to accept the Japanese surrender on Chinese territory.   This put the CCP in a disadvantageous political position in contesting the right to accept Japan_s surrender.   Second,  U.S. forces in China transported large numbers of Nationalist troops to Central and East China to expedite their occupation of Japanese-controlled strategic points and transportation routes ahead of CCP forces.  Third, the U.S. promised to continue supplying military assistance to the Nationalist armies.  Fourth, and most provocative, after landing in North China, U.S. forces had the gall to employ Japanese and puppet troops as garrison forces to protect lines of communication on behalf of the Nationalist government. [2] U.S. support and assistance to the Nationalist government indicated that Hurley_s simultaneous effort to mediate between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong was both hypocritical and farcical.  This was because at least after mid-October U.S. support and assistance was one of the main reasons for the increasingly bitter military clashes between the Nationalists and the Communists.

    In late November, the Truman Administration began to reassess its China policy.  This was primarily due to worsening Soviet-American relations.   In Northeast China, the Soviet Army placed obstacles in the path of the Nationalist takeover effort, and actively supported the Communist attempt to control the region.   This punctured the Nationalist strategic fantasy of  _Recovering North China by military force, and recovering Northeast China by diplomacy._[3]  The second reason was that GMD-CCP military clashes in North China were growing more serious daily.  U.S. miltary clashes with CCP forces were also occurring from time to time.  Even though these were on a small scale, a number of Americans officers and troops had suffered casualties or had been detained by the Communist forces.  In a mid-November report to the U.S. government, General Wedemeyer rather accurately reflected the American outlook on the situation in China.   He said that the Soviet-American _contest to achieve the dominant position in North and Northeast China has already begun._  The report pointed out the limits of the Chinese government_s strength.  If it fails to achieve an agreement with the Chinese Communist, it will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China.  If, at the same time, it cannot reach agreement with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, it will be even less able to control the Northeast.[4]         

    The Truman administration settled on a dual course of action: to coordinate its China policy with that of the Soviet Union, and to send General Marshall on a mission to China to mediate the Guomindang-CCP conflict.   On December 15, 1945 President Truman issued a statement proclaiming the three principles underlying U.S. China policy.  These were: (1) Recognition of the Nationalist government as the sole legal government in China; (2) Hope that the Guomindang and the CCP would end their military clashes, and organize a representative system of government with the help of American mediation; (3) Assumption by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union of the duty of returning the Northeast to Chinese control.[5]

         The change in U.S. China policy represented a serious assault on Chiang Kai-shek_s strategy.  U.S. support and assistance was the foundation of Chiang_s strategy for seizing control of North and Northeast China.  U.S. troops were even directly involved in helping the Nationalist forces defend the rail line between Tianjin and Shanhaiguan and reconstruct the line between Qinhuangdao and Shanhaiguan.[6]  It was precisely Chiang Kai-shek_s dependence upon American aid that left him no choice but to alter his strategic plans.  On November 15, Chiang sent a cable to Truman, expressing the hope that the United States would undertake more active measures in the Northeast.[7]  But he elicited no additional promises from Truman.  U.S. forces in China refused to transport any more Nationalist troops to the Northeast.  Wedemeyer informed Chiang Kai-shek that the U.S. Army had received orders to desist from transporting Nationalist troops to fight a civil war.  He proposed that Chiang Kai-shek concentrate his forces in order to consolidate his grip on North China, and only afterwards attempt to recover Northeast China.[8]  Unable to obtain additional U.S. support, Nationalist forces halted their military advance in Northeast China.

    At this time, the Nationalist ambassador to the United States,  Wei Daoming, hinted to Chiang Kai-shek that he should coordinate his policy with that of the United States.  Wei_s cable to Chiang said that Truman actually strongly supported the Nationalist government, and that his statement on China policy was drafted by the State Department largely for a domestic audience.  Truman had already told Marshall that if the mediation effort failed, the U.S. would continue supporting the Nationalist government.[9]   Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek chose to coordinate his policy with that of the United States.  On December 22,  a statement circulated by the Guomindang Central Propaganda Department analyzing Truman_s policy statement, presented a rather accurate reflection of the Nationalist viewpoint.  The statement concluded that no fundamental change in U.S. China policy had occurred, and that the United States would not cut off its support and assistance to the Nationalist government.  U.S. policy, however, would stop short of direct military intervention.  The current change in U.S. policy stemmed from the need to deal with domestic politics.  The Nationalist government should coordinate its own policy with the changes in U.S. policy.  At the same time, it should implement political reforms, expand its political base, and improve its political image.[10]  The Nationalist government subsequently undertook a series of measures including placing limits on military actions, the resumption of GMD-CCP negotiations, and improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, etc.  All these measures were directly aimed at coordinating GMD policy with that of the United States.   

    (2) Communist Policy toward the United States

     Nationalist policy aimed at dragging the United States into the Chinese civil war.  As far as possible, the consistent policy of the CCP, which stood in an adversarial relationship with the United States at the end of the war,  was to keep the U.S. from getting involved in the GMD-CCP conflict.  By the end of the war, CCP leaders had concluded that the United States would assist Chiang Kai-shek in unleashing a civil war, but just how far the U.S. would go in this direction was not yet clear.[11]  Thereafter, until U.S. troops landed in North China, the CCP Central Committee requested all Communist troops to exercise restraint. In Chongqing, Mao Zedong adopted a rather tolerant attitude toward Wedemeyer_s request for an investigation of incidents in which U.S. troops had been fired upon by Communist forces.[12]  The Central Committee adopted a prudent attitude, in part because the Chongqing negotiations were going on, and strained relations with U.S. forces might harm the political struggle.  In addition, the CCP needed to acquire a better understanding of U.S. policy.