From the moment of Marshall_s appointment as Special Ambassador, the Guomindang_s main tactic of getting a grip on him was their argument that the Nationalist-Communist conflict was a struggle in which the Nationalist government was resisting the Soviet Union_s Chinese proxy, namely, the CCP. [28]  The success of this tactic may be seen in the extreme suspicion with which Marshall viewed Soviet intentions in the Northeast, and his resolve to transport Nationalist troops to the Northeast as quickly as possible to recover the region from the Soviets.[29]  The ceasefire agreement signed on January 10 stipulated that once the ceasefire came into effect Nationalist troops could enter the Northeast and move about within the region.[30]  This clause was the product of policy coordination between Marshall and Chiang Kai-shek.   Chiang likewise traded concessions on other issues in return for U.S. promises to support and assist the Nationalist government_s takeover of the Northeast, including the transport of Nationalist forces to the region.  The results of Marshall_s actions were obvious.  When Nationalist forces in the Northeast were threatened, the United States felt obliged to provide assistance.  One may even say that with the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the United States assumed special military obligations on behalf of the Nationalist government.

     Initially, Chinese Communist leaders adopted a rather cautious attitude toward Marshall_s mediation effort.  Even though they believed there were some positive aspects to the new U.S. China policy, their ingrained mistrust of the United Stated led them to believe there could be no fundamental change in U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek, and that _there must be no illusions_ concerning this point.[31]  In fact, CCP leaders initially could not make up their minds whether to allow Marshall to take part in the GMD-CCP negotiations.  Unable to veto Marshall_s participation in the negotiations, they even toyed with the idea of simultaneously inviting Soviet and British representatives to join the negotiations as a check upon Marshall.[32]

     It is very likely that Marshall_s performance in the GMD-CCP negotiations surprised CCP leaders.  They assumed that any political concessions Marshall might make could not transcend the limits of the Five Point Agreement Hurley had signed during his 1944 visit to Yanan.[33]  During their first meeting,  Zhou Enlai, replying to Marshall_s emphasis on military unification, said that there must first be an unconditional ceasefire, next complete democratization of the government, and only then could one solve the question of military unification.[34]  The subsequent negotiations demonstrated in fact that Marshall accepted Zhou Enlai_s perspective.

     In the ceasefire negotiations, Marshall basically adhered to the principle of an unconditional ceasefire.  With respect to the provisions concerning the Northeast, even though Marshall insisted that the Guomindang must be allowed to move troops in the region, the Communists really never firmly opposed this provision, and merely sought to attach certain limiting conditions.  The outcome of the PCC negotiations was obviously much better than the Communist leaders_ initial expectations.  Therefore, when Zhou Enlai returned to Chongqing from Yanan he told Marshall that the CCP Central Committee had decided to endorse the PCC agreement, and was willing to cooperate further with the United States.  Mao Zedong issued a public statemt in which he said that _one could not ignore the meritorious service_ Marshall rendered in expediting the ceasefire and promoting peaceful democratization.[35]  With respect to what from the CCP_s perspective was the most sensitive set of negotiations, namely those relating to military reorganization, even though the Communist leaders maintained constant vigilance toward U.S. intentions, they recognized that Marshall_s reorganization plan contained a subbstantial number of acceptable features.[36]  In the end, the Chinese Communists signed the military reorganization agreement.  In addition to the fact that the provisions of the agreement were acceptable to them, another reason they were willing to sign was their belief that Marshall_s attitude had been scrupulously fair.

          Apart from there being substantial congruence between the CCP_s proposals and Marshall_s own point of view, the Communists were able to achieve a relatively favorable  outcome from the negotiations because they employed appropriate tactics.  Throughout the process, they loudly proclaimed their devotion to _peace_ and _democracy;_  they recognized Chiang Kai-shek_s leadership position and the position of the Guomindang as the leading party; they allowed Nationalist troops to enter the Northeast, and so forth.  These measures produced a substantial impact upon Marshall_s attitude, and resulted in Chiang Kai-shek_s bitter complaint that Marshall _was being poisoned more every day by the Communist party._[37]

     In sum, during the first phase of Marshall_s mediation, the GMD and the CCP both made rather significant concessions with respect to political and military issues.   Almost all of these concessions were ones that Marshall strongly demanded they make.  From another perspective, however, we may say that the GMD and CCP had no choice other than to utilize Marshall in pursuit of their own strategic objectives.  Chiang Kai-shek traded temporary concessions in other areas for Marshall_s undertaking to transport Nationalist troops to the Northeast and provide support and assistance.  The Communists allowed Nationalist troops to enter the Northeast in exchange for Marshall_s pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to implement an unconditional ceasefire and carry out political reforms.  With respect to military reorganization, which both sides regarded as the most critical and sensitive issue, the Nationalists and the Communists both reserved their positions.  They signed the agreement, but they procrastinated and adopted a wait-and-see attitude.

2.  GMD and CCP Tactics toward Marshall concerning the Northeast Question

     From March to June, the Northeast question became the focus of Marshall_s mediation.  This was also the period in which critical changes occurred in GMD and CCP policies toward the United States. 

     One of Chiang Kai-shek_s tactics for solving the Northeast question was to drag the United States into the picture.  After Marshall got to China, Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in taking advantage of U.S. suspicion regarding Soviet intentions in the Northeast.   He actually persuaded Marshall to believe that the Northeast question was an issue between the Nationalist government and the Soviet Union, and that the CCP was merely acting like a Soviet puppet.  Marshall clearly fell into the trap that Chiang Kai-shek set for him even though he was partly responsible for it himself.  Marshall_s reports from this period show that he was almost entirely under Chiang Kai-shek_s influence. [38] Thus, while he urged the Communists to agree to the entry of Nationalist troops into the Northeast, he ignored Communist demands concerning resolution of the Northeast question.  The classic example of this was that the draft plan he drew up on March 11 concerning the dispatch of small truce teams to the Northeast almost entirely reflected the Guomindang point of view.  The agreement reached on the basis of this draft concerning deployment of small truce teams to end the clashes was naturally the first agreement to win Chiang Kai-shek_s commendation since the start of Marshall_s mediation.[39]

     From the beginning of April, Chiang Kai-shek adopted an increasingly uncompromising position on the Northeast question.   In a speech to the second session of the Fourth People_s Political Council  on April 1, 1946, Chiag Kai-shek said that the Northeast question _is essentially a diplomatic issue._  The Chinese Communists must not take advantage of a diplomatic difficulty in order to coerce the government and promote themselves.[40]  This was tantamount to a declaration of war against the the CCP.  Simultaneously, Nationalist troops began to launch attacks against Communist forces in the Northeast.  Around this time, Chiang Kai-shek put U.S. mediation on the back burner.  Even after Marshall returned to China from the United States, Chiang Kai-shek still persisted in his old ways.  He not only scorned Marshall_s proposals for a Northeast ceasefire, later in order to evade Marshall_s nagging he used the pretext of an inspection tour to get out of Nanjing and visit the Northeast.

     Chiang Kai-shek_s unwillingness to make any further concessions to Marshall on the Northeast question expressed his belief that the situation had changed radically.  First, beginning in February, Soviet-American relations began to deteriorate steadily.   The U.S., Britain, and other countries were certain to implement a hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union.  Second,  the United States would definitely not permit the Soviet Union to control the Northeast.  Therefore, Marshall could not allow the Chinese Communists to obstruct the Nationalist takeover of the Northeast.  Third, because Chiang Kai-shek had adopted a cooperative posture during the first stage of Marshall_s mediation, he had succeeded in changing the Nationalist government_s image in the United States.  Relations between the Chinese Nationalists and the U.S. were steadily improving.  Marshall_s visit to Washington to report on his mission had a positive impact on the Nationalist government_s efforts to secure assistance.  Fourth, Marshall now recognized that the CCP was pro-Soviet.[41]  It was precisely this judgment that led Chiang Kai-shek to disregard Marshall_s strenuous opposition, and continue his northern campaign after Nationalist troops had occupied Changchun.  When Chiang agreed to a ceasefire in the Northeast in mid-June, Marshall_s pressure upon him had something to with it, but the main reason was Chiang_s assessment that Nationalist troops had run out of steam. 

     Their own assessment of the Northeast situation led CCP leaders to agree to permit Nationalist troops to move into and around the Northeast during the ceasefire period.   At this time, the Central Committee believed that since the U.S. and the Soviet Union had reached agreement at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December, Moscow was in no position to help the CCP control the Northeast.  The CCP was unable on its own to prevent Nationalist troops from entering the Northeast and occupying the major cities and lines of communication.  Therefore, the CCP sought to gain a legal position in the Northeast through negotiations.  Considering Marshall_s role in the mediation, the Central Committee believed that as long as they could convince the Americans that they had no intention of monopolizing the occupation of the Northeast, Marshall would not object to a peaceful resolution.[42]  After the clash in Yingkou, the Communists supported the despatch of truce teams to the Northeast.  This shows that the Comunists believed U.S. involvement in the Northeast question would not necessarily be to their disadvantage.  For a while, Communist leaders even believed that it was better to invite Marshall to take part in mediation of the Northeast question than to invite a Soviet representative, because his attitude toward the Chinese Communists _was fair and impartial._[43]