Accordingly, when the situation across the Taiwan Straits relaxed between the spring and summer of 1955, China immediately intensified its preparations of war targeting Kinmen and Matsu. On 8 July, the Central Military Commission met and discussed about the combat plan fro Kinmen. On 14 July, Mao Zedong approved the decision made at the meeting.[14] At a meeting in Xiamen on 10 September, Peng Dehuai put forward a specific battle plan for taking over Xiamen, which was appaorved by the Central Military Commission.[15] In order to meet the need of a war, the Nanjing Military Command conducted major internal readjustment in spring 1956 and a Fujian Military Command was established to take direct responsibility for an offensive of Kinmen and Matsu. In 1957, the railway linking Yingtan and Xiamen was completed. In spring 1957, the Central Military Commission discussed about the plan and timing of PLA air force being stationed in Fujian and the possible outcomes including reaction by the US. In July, it was decided that the air force would promptly be posted to frontier airports in Fujian as planned. According to the plan of the Central Military Commission, all-out preparations for a war to take over Kinmen would begin in summer 1958.[16]
Tension across Taiwan Straits relaxed in October 1958 partly because Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders began to reconsider the role of Kinmen and Matsu in reunifying Taiwan. The whole process of bombarding of Kinmen in summer 1958 showed that the PLA had not made a decision on landing on Kinmen beforehand. As a matter of fact, the PLA terminated the stage of taking over coastal islands in October. After that, no large-scale military conflicts have taken place between the mainland and Taiwan over coastal islands. China’s reunification strategy entered into a new and more complex stage.
China-US relations began to normalize since the visit to China by US President Nixon in 1972. In 1979, China and the US established diplomatic ties. After that, the Chinese Government gradually formed a strategy of peaceful reunification to resolve the question of Taiwan. On 30 September 1981, Chairman Ye Jianying of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress wrote about the “Nine Principles for Peaceful Reunification of the Motherland”.[17] It marked a strategic transformation of China’s reunification strategy from one by the use of force to one focusing more on political and peaceful means.
Adoption of the peaceful reunification policy lead to a relative lowering of the role of military means in reuniting Taiwan. That is to say, military means has since changed from the main method of liberating Taiwan to one of strategic deterrence. Yet it has to be kept as deterrence in the reunification strategy no matter as primary or auxiliary means. At the beginning it was used to stress to the US side in the process of normalization of China-US relations that the Taiwan question was China’s internal affairs, the resolution of which brooked no American interference, thereby emphasizing China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.[18] Developments of the situation have gradually enriched the contents of military deterrence, which was later fully expounded in the 2000 white paper, The One-China Principle and the Question of Taiwan, as opposing foreign interference, Taiwan independence or indefinite resistance to peacefully resolve the issue of reunification through negotiations.[19] It can be roughly inferred that in different periods of peaceful reunification, the focus of military deterrence will vary.
The first is to prevent meddling in the Taiwan question by foreign countries. How “meddling in” is defined and which type of meddling in would cause the Chinese side to use force or backtrack with its reunification strategy are issues worth further research. In brieft, the bottom line should be the military and political relations between the foreign country and Taiwan result in expansion of pro-independence forces or seriously undermine China’s reunification strategy in certain period.[20]
The second scenario is that pro-independence force in Taiwan grows to such a extent that Taiwan might declare independence or independence become a trend diffficult to resist by other means. Acts along this line include attempts to gain international legitimacy for Taiwan independence through so-called “pragmatic diplomacy” or promote independence through elections or by changing its name or referendum.[21]
The third scenario is linked to the second one, that is, rejection of negotiation for a peaceful reunification prolongs indefinitely.[22] This has not become a big issue, as the Chinese Government has not put forward any explicit time schedule.
The military exercises in the Taiwan Straits by the PLA in 1995 and 1996 show that military means constitutes important “pre-emptive” deterrence in the strategy of peaceful reunification and its purpose is to prevent reverse of situation in the complicated and long process towards peaceful reunification.
II. China-US Relations and Chinese Decision-Making
As mentioned before, the decisions made by China in the three military actions in the Taiwan Straits had element of response to US policies. The two military actions in the 1950s were against the backdrop of military confrontation with the US. The one in 1995 and 1996 was but one more acute problem among many conflicts between China and the US since their relations seriously deteriorated since 1989.
The Taiwan Question was directly related to China-US confrontation. The Chinese leaders paid close attention to US policy from the very beginning of mobilization for liberation of Taiwan. Although stating that “Taiwan was the last stronghold of the US imperialists’ aggression of China”, they thought that the US was not likely to directly protect Taiwan with its military force.[23] This judgement of 1950 went through a fundamental change due to the blockade of Taiwan Straits by the US since the outbreak of the Korea War. Since then any military action taken by China in the Taiwan Straits has been directly related to US policies.
In 1954 and 1955, Chinese leaders made up their minds to conduct military actions in the Taiwan Straits for mainly two reasons. The first was the drastic escalation of military conflicts between the mainland and Taiwan for coastal islands. The second was the consultation between the US and Taiwan Authorities about the signing of a treaty of common defense. Past researches have basically revealed the role of these two factors but failed to provide reasonable explanations for the relations between the two.
PLA leaders began in 1952 to plan for fight with KMT army over islands along Fujian and Zhejiang Coast. Military actions began roughly at the time of conclusion of the Korea War, when PLA leaders also began to plan for the liberation of Kinmen.[24] Nonetheless, when the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed in summer 1953, a new feature in the Taiwan Straits was that encouraged by the policy of the Eisenhower Administration Taiwan army strengthened its military action along Zhejiang Coast. Against this background, the military actions taken by the PLA in summer 1953 were aimed at both implementing the set policy of reunification with Taiwan and disrupting the US support of Chiang’s offensive. The latter may event be the primary target.
