The military actions by PLA actually began in summer 1953.[25]  The combination of military actions in 1954 and the large-scale “liberation of Taiwan” publicity campaign in late July was mainly because of the consultation between the US and Taiwan about the signing of a military alliance treaty.  In early July, Zhou Enlai came back to China during recess of the Geneva Conference to report to the decision-makers about the Conference.  At the Political Bureau’s meeting on 6 July, Mao Zedong specially talked about prevention of the US from signing a military treaty with Taiwan by publicity and diplomatic means including condemnation of US policy and diplomatic contacts with the US.[26]  US-Taiwan relations and their influences were discussed at the meeting and participants were obviously deeply worried about the development of US-Taiwan military relations.[27]

It is possible that because there were views in the world about Taiwan’s status decided by the United Nations, Mao Zedong found it necessary to take more explicit and firmer actions to demonstrate China’s position on the question of Taiwan.  On 23 July, the People’s Daily issued an editorial entitled “We Must Liberate Taiwan”, followed by large-scale publicity in Chinese media.  According to the CPC Central Committee’s telegram to Zhou Enlai on 27 July, “after the ending of the Korea War, we did not put this task forward to the people in a timely manner (late by about half a year), nor did we take necessary measures and carry out effective work in the military, diplomatic and publicity areas in the light of this task in a timely manner, which was inappropriate.  If we do not put forward the task and begin out preparations now, we will be making a serious political mistake.”[28]

Quite some researchers believed that the publicity and military actions taken by China were designed to prevent the signing of a joint defense treaty between the US and Taiwan and concluded that China did not realize its target but rather accelerate the signing of a US-Taiwan treaty.[29]  The opinion had its point.  However, it seems obviously too simplistic.  First, it can hardly be convincing to say that Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders believed that statements in newspapers and limited military actions along the coast would be adequate to prevent the signing of an US-Taiwan treaty.  They after all had adequately rich political and military experiences.  They had just completed a three-year negotiations with the US about armistice on the Korean Peninsula and had not very long ago pointed out very clearly that diplomatic contacts with the US were needed to prevent the signing of such a treaty.[30]

The crus of the problem might the understanding by the Chinese leaders of the scope of application of the US-Taiwan treaty.  In their view, the treaty would cover islands along Zhejiang and Fujian coast and expand the scope blockade of mainland to “coast of Guangdong Province and Tokyo Bay”.[31]  As a result, it would not only cause a protracted separation of Taiwan but also pose more serious security threat to the mainland.  Consequently the PLA would not be able to fulfil its set plan of taking over coastal islands.  In this sense, to take over islands held by KMT army was strategic action of both offensive and defensive purposes, which was designed to both create conditions for unification and prevent coastal islands from becoming strongholds against the mainland.

Intensified publicity about liberation of Taiwan and reactions to US-Taiwan consultation for a military treaty actually had two purposes.  One was to demonstrate, through publicity and military action, Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan, opposition to internationalization of the Taiwan question and opposition to signing of military treaty between the US and Taiwan.

The second purpose was to take over Dachen Islands along Zhejiang coast before the signing of an US-Taiwan joint defense treaty.  In his instructions to Huadong Military Command on 11 November, Chief of Staff Su Yu instructed that the relevant troops should through combat made it impossible for the US-Taiwan joint defense treaty to cover islands along mainland coast that were occupied by KMT army.[32]  The order of combat issued by the General Headquarters of Staff on 30 November further revealed that the military actions of the PLA were aimed at preventing islands along the mainland coast to be covered by the US-Taiwan treaty.[33]  The war to take over Yijiangshan Island had not been adequately prepared for, which reflected the serious worry of the Chinese military about the situation under the shadow of the US-Taiwan treaty.[34]

The above analysis is to show that in the decision-making process in 1954 and 1955, although political targets and military ones were coordinated, to take over coastal islands occupied by the KMT army was the substantive goal and constituted the most important action to demonstrate China’s sovereignty over Taiwan, realize the plan to take over all coast islands, exclude islands along Zhejiang coast from the scope of a possible US-Taiwan joint defense treaty and eliminate security threats posted by US and Taiwan from coastal islands.

Since to take over coastal islands was both a strategic step towards liberation of Taiwan and an imperative security question, it is reasonable to infer that the Chinese leaders cared more about whether the US-Taiwan treaty was to cover islands along mainland coast.  From this perspective, it will be difficult to simply conclude that the decisions made by then Chinese leaders failed to reach their targets.  The problem is, they possibly did not think about the situation in which the US supported defense of the Island of Taiwan and at the same time encouraged or demanded Chiang Kai-shek to give up coastal islands so as to avoid military conflict with the mainland, the result of which would be further distance between the mainland and Taiwan.

The Chinese decisions in 1958 about the bombardment of Kinmen have already been elaborately discussed both in China and the US.  Recent researches have focused on Chinese domestic politics and produced valuable results.[35]  However, they also have obvious flaws in failing to reveal the cause and effect in the two military actions, the role of China-US relations in particular.

Problem left over from the military actions in 1954 and 1955 was the failure to take over all coastal islands occupied by Chiang’s army and the failure to know exactly whether the US-Taiwan joint defense treaty would cover those islands along Fujian coast or not.  In this connection, it was considered necessary by the decision-makers to take further military actions against islands along Fujian Coast following Guangdong and Zhejiang.  The time of military actions was determined by military preparedness and China-US relations.  Other factors such as domestic politics, China-Soviet relations and Mao’s ideological considerations, were not as important.  Furthermore, apart from some comments by Mao, it was very difficult to determine the influence of these factors in the decision-making process.

The PLA had hardly completed its military preparations for war against Kinmen and Matsu in summer 1958.  However, in July that year the PLA air force entered Fujian, basically completed air defense in the province in coordination with other troops and began battles for air supremacy.  Although the PLA was still not able to attack and occupy Kinmen and Matsu, it had secured conditions for limited offensive.  In this situation, the status of China-US relations became key.

The China-US meetings at ambassadorial level beginning in summer 1955 were interrupted in December 1957.  Even during the negotiations, the US had not stopped helping the Taiwan Authorities to strengthen military forces, including deployment of surface-to-surface tactic missiles in 1957.  The Chinese leaders were forced to reconsider how to promote reunification.  As early as in March 1956, Chinese leaders realized that the US might use China-US negotiations to freeze the Taiwan question and strengthen its military presence in Taiwan, Kinmen and Matsu.  In view of this, China must not allow indefinite dragging on of the issue.[36]