Shortly after the interruption of China-US ambassadorial negotiations, Mao in mid June 1958 made it clear to the Chinese Foreign Ministry that he found it necessary to readjust policy towards the US adopted since 1954 and that China should persist in a struggle with the US rather than developing relations with the US government.[37]  On 30 June, the Chinese Government issued a public statement demanding resumption of ambassadorial negotiations within a time limit and stressing the seriousness of Taiwan question in China-US relations and China’s being “fully capable of liberating Taiwan”.[38]  Mao in an instruction explained the relationship between bombardment of Kinmen and change of policy towards the US, that is, the bombardment was directly against Chiang Kai-shek and indirectly against the US.  “It is to give the US a lesson.  The US has bullied us for so many years.  Why don’t we take the opportunity to teach them a lesson?”  “It is to observe and test the determination of the US.”[39]

If China’s pursuit of reunification is taken as a continuous and uninterrupted process and China-US ambassadorial-level meetings as a way to resolve the Taiwan question, it is logical to conclude that the bombardment of Kinmen in summer 1958 was but a limited military choice made by Chinese leaders when they found China-US negotiations at a dead end.  There was simply no other better way to promote reunification and force the US back to negotiation table.  Admittedly, an outcome of the bombardment was a change of policy towards Kinmen and Matsu, which will be discussed.

The military confrontation in 1995 and 1996 also took place during a period in which China-US relations experienced con1tinued deterioration since summer 1989.  China-US relations went through new lows from the Tian’anmen event in 1989, drastic change in Eastern Europe and disintegration of the former Soviet Union to spring 1996.  If the military confrontation between China and the US in the Taiwan Straits is to be understood from the perspective of China-US relations, two fundamental prerequisites must not be neglected.

    First, the military confrontation was one of the serious of conflicts and disputes between China and the US in that period.  Then China-US relations as a whole were in a very difficult situation.  China and the US found themselves in conflict with each other in almost all fields including intellectual property rights, human rights, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, most-favoured-nation status of China and US sanctions against China.  The bilateral relations on the whole were in a confrontational atmosphere.

Second, almost all conflicts were settled through confrontation or in a process with confrontational elements, for example, the continuous confrontation in the human rights field and resulted confrontation on MFN status beginning from 1993, the difference on weapons proliferation that first appeared in 1993 and led to the Yinhehao Event, and the difference on intellectual property rights between 1994 and 1995 which led China-US relations to the brink of a trade war.[40]

As conflicts and contradictions took place in almost all fields and almost all conflicts went through a process from confrontation to relaxation, the situation of tension is Taiwan Straits would naturally be no exception.  With strong mistrust and confrontation between China and the US, some acts of the US government, including the granting of visa to Lee Teng-hui, were defined by the Chinese decision-maders as “a diplomatic provocation” “to test China’s bottom line on the Taiwan question” “amid rising anti-China forces in the world.”[41]

Of course, the Chinese decision-makers made the above judgement not just because of the low mood in bilateral relations.  Two basic facts played rather important role.  One month before the US government declared granting of visa for Lee Teng-hui, US Secretary of State Christopher promised to Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that the Clinton Administration would not allow Lee to visit the US.[42]  In his memoirs, Qian mentioned that Chinese leaders felt “shocked and angry” about the lack of trustworthiness on the part of the US.[43]

Another important event was that the Chinese Government tried once and again to make representations with the US to eliminate the negative effects of Lee’s visit to the US through diplomatic means and to recovered the “political foundations of China-US relations” which had been “seriously damaged”.  However, the Clinton Administration did not wish to make adequate effort to save the situation from deterioration.  In this situation, the Chinese leaders judged that the Clinton Administration had the illusion of China making concessions on the question of Lee’s visit with only some US gestures.  They further decided that the Chinese Government had to make powerful responses for the US to “really realize the seriousness of the issue”.[44]  The military exercises beginning from autumn 1995 can be seen as a measure taken to stress the “seriousness” of the Taiwan question and to demonstration China’s determination and capability to the US.  To take the words used among then policy analysts, the purpose of PLA action in Taiwan Straits was to “deter Taiwan independence and give the US a lesson”.

The above analysis roughly reveals the major influence of China-US relations on Chinese decisions to take military actions in the Taiwan Straits.  In other words, military decisions of China were usually products of acute confrontation or serious deterioration of China-US relations on the question of Taiwan.  It is of course necessary to carry out in-depth, detailed and specialized research and analysis into how China-US relations influence some specific decisions in China.  For example, in the various stages of military decision-making, how did Chinese leaders make judgement about the intention of the US, how did their judgement come into being, what influence did the judgement produce on the decision-making?

 

III. Basic Characters of Chinese Decision-Making

 

According to Mao Zedong, when a target is determined, the channels and means to realize the target may not be fixed or unchangeable.  At the strategic level, reunification is the target while the paths, means and time taken to realize the target will identify themselves in the process.  At the tactical level, the target of each military action in the Taiwan Straits are also fixed but its implementation each time is not fixed.

The decision-making for the three military actions has some common points.  The policy targets were all diversified yet limited and the policy readjustments were rather random.  These features led to rather complicated and sometimes vague decision-making process.

The diversity of policy targets refers to the fact that no decision-making was designed for a single military target.  Instead, actions were taken for multiple purposes in the diplomatic, political and military areas and military victory was not even the primary goal.

Policy targets’ being limited is two folds.  First, the military targets were limited.  No military action, including air strikes, was taken against the island of Taiwan.  No attempt was made to attack and occupy Kinmen and Matsu when other coastal islands were taken.  Second, it was explicitly stressed every time when a decision was made that the PLA would not launch offensive against US troops and best efforts would be made to avoid a military conflict with the US.

The randomness of policy readjustment was determined by the diversity and limits of policy targets.  With the macro objective borne in mind, the scope and intensity of military actions were revised from time to time on the basis of target priorities and outcomes of military actions.  The purpose was to avoid escalation of military action to an extent difficult to control leading to direct conflict with American troops or expansion of conflicts with KMT army to coastal cities.

The above-mentioned three characters were shown in all three military actions across the Taiwan Straits.