As mentioned in previous sections, the targets of the military action in 1954 and 1955 were multiple.  They included the following.  The first was to rapidly gain control of Dachen Islands outside Zhejiang coast.[45]  A further purpose was to force, if possible, KMT army to withdraw from Kinmen and Matsu.[46]  The second target was to prevent the US from signing a treaty of defense with Taiwan.  Further analysis is needed in this regard.  Generally speaking, upper end of the target is to prevent the US from signing such a treaty.  In terms of military deployment and implementation, the nature or acceptable bottom line of the target was to prevent such a treaty from covering islands along the Zhejiang and Fujian coasts or even islands along the Guangdong coast which had already been taken by the PLA.[47]  The third target was to demonstrate China’s sovereignty over Taiwan and its determination to liberate Taiwan and prevent internationalization of the Taiwan question.[48]

While pursuing the above-mentioned three targets, Chinese decision-makers were rather prudent with the military actions.  Two clear boundaries were drawn for the military actions in 1954 and 1955.  One was to concentrate on coastal islands rather than direct offensive of the Taiwan Island.  Chinese leaders were very cautious even on whether Kinmen, Matsu and other islands along Fujian coast were to be taken or not.  The CPC Central Committee believed that reunification of Taiwan would be a long-term and complex task, which could not be accomplished in just one go.[49]  Another was to avoid military conflict with the US as far as possible.  Mao Zedong estimated that the taking over of Dachen Islands outside of Zhejiang coast would not cause large-scale American military intervention.[50]  This was certainly a very important reason for the PLA to choose Dachen Islands as first target of their offensive.  Before the battle began, Mao Zedong stressed once and again that the PLA should avoid military conflict with US troops.  He even thought about reconsidering the time schedule for Yijiangshan Island.[51]  Chinese leaders also take diplomatic measures to demonstrate that the PLA’s actions would be limited to islands just outside of the mainland coast.[52]

Policy readjustments were manifested mainly with policies towards Kinmen and Matsu.  As discussed above, in summer 1954 when military actions began, the PLA had not completed the preparations for taking over Kinmen and Matsu.  Military actions began with the bombarding of Kinmen on 3 September possibly because of some accidents.  When KMT army had withdrawn from Dachen Islands in February 1955, Chinese decision-makers were immediately faced with the issue of Kinmen and Matsu.  Mao Zedong thought about the possibility of KMT army withdrawing on its own under certain military pressure.[53]  That was why the PLA did not immediately halt its military moves after the taking over of Dachen Islands on 28 February.  Just because the PLA did not intend to combat through landing on Kinmen and Matsu, when it was roughly certain that an international war was to break out in Taiwan Straits, Chinese leaders immediately stopped large-scale military actions and shifted their focus to relaxing tension in the Straits and in China-US relations.[54]  On 23 April, Zhou Enlai issued a public statement during the Bandung Conference, expressing hope for a relaxation of China-US relations.  The first round of military actions acroos the Taiwan Straits came to an end.

In recent years there have been quite some researches into the motives and targets of bombarding Kinmen in summer 1958 with inspiring conclusions.[55]  But a common problem with them was the negligence of the relationship between the bombarding of Kinmen with the taking over of coastal islands in 1954 and 1955.  It was most possible that Mao decided to bombard Kinmen to promote the reunification strategy through military actions.

Archives show that shortly after Mao’s proposal about air force deployment, Fujian provincial party secretary Ye Fei and air force commander-in-chief Liu Yalou raised the idea of bombarding Kinmen, attacking and blockading Kinmen and Matsu by artillery and air forces.  On 19 January 1958, they told Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission that shelling Kinmen and Matsu would “possibly force the eninies on the two islands to withdraw” or at the least force Chiang Kai-sheck to “stop bombing Fujian”.[56]  Judging from Mao’s articles, it is basically sure that the primary motive or objective of bombarding Kinmen was to force KMT army out of islands along Fujian coast or at least force KMT air force to stop bombing Fujian.[57]  To “observe and test the determination of the Americans” as Mao talked about can also be described as targets of the military actions.  However, it mainly reveals that Mao at that time was not sure whether the bombardment would drive KMT troops out of Fujian’s islands and the he found American determination to intervene or not key.[58]  Some decision-makers thought that Chiang Kai-shek would not easily give up Kinmen and Matsu.[59]

In summary, the targets of bombarding Kinmen were at three levels.  The highest one was to drive KMT forces out of Kinmen and Matsu, thus completing the plan of taking over all coastal islands.  The next was to ensure deployment of air force in Fujian  and obtain air supremacy in that area.  The lowest level target was to obtain an exact understanding the bottom line of the US policy towards the Taiwan Straits.  As to supporting people’s revolution in the Middle East, fueling the Great Leap Forward or noosing the US as Mao talked about, they were just side products and should not be listed as real targets of the military actions.

The bombardment of Kinmen in summer 1958 had its boundaries.  The first was not to attack the Taiwan Island.  According to instructions of the Central Military Commission, the scope of activities of PLA air force in Fujia was mainly above Kinmen and Matsu with the purpose of obtaining air supremacy over Fujian Province.  Air strike of Taiwan would take place only on condition that KMT air forces bombing mainland cities, such as Shanghai and Hangzhou.[60]  When the bombardment began, the Central Military Commission made it clear that the navy and air force should not go into the open sea or attack the Taiwan Island.[61]

The second was not to directly engage in conflict with the US troops or conduct any military action that might lead to direct involvement of the US troops.  This has been elaborately discussed and I will not repeat here.[62] 

Policy readjustment was obvious in the process of bombardment.  Chinese decision-makers finally decided not to take over Kinmen and Matsu for the time being and to pack them together with the Taiwan Island and Penghu Islands.[63]  The decision actually marked an end to the attacks of coastal islands.  The process of policy readjustment had already been elaborately discussed and will not be repeated here.  Reasons leading to the readjustment were mainly two.  First, the scope of US military deployment exceeded the expectation of Chinese leaders and proved the necessity of Mao’s prudence.  With the US deployment, to attack and take over Kinmen and Matsu or force KMT troops to withdraw from the two islands became very difficult to realize.[64]  Second, when the Taiwan question was seen to last for a fairly long term due to US intervention, the Chinese leaders thought it better that a package solution covering Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu would be the best choice to prevent the separation of Taiwan from China.[65]