There was also another reason, which was not unimportant. In terms of military security, control of roughly all coastal islands and knowledge of US policy towards Kinmen and Matsu, the mainland was no longer faced with security threats from islands occupied by KMT army, which greatly relaxed the pressure for the use of force. [66]
As to the military exercises in the 1995 and 1996, it is until now not possible to conduct in-depth analysis due to the limited publicly available historical literature. However, developments of the situation manifested the same three basis features, only with unique contents and appearance.
The newly published memoirs by Qian Qichen gave a fairly complete summary of the judgement made by Chinese decision-makers about the nature and influence of Lee Teng Hui’s visit to the US. They believed that the purpose of the Clinton Administration’s issuing visa to Lee was to “test the bottom line of China on the Taiwan question” in the belief that China would “take it”. More importantly, the act of the Clinton Administration was against the backdrop of the long-term US policy of containing China with Taiwan and rampant anti-Chinese forces in the world. Chinese leaders believed Lee’s visit would have serious consequences, including severe damage to the political basis of China-US relations, encouraging the separatist policies of the Taiwan Authorities and giving rise to anti-China atmosphere in Taiwan and around the world.[67]
According to the above judgements, it is basically sure that the targets of military exercises in July 1995 and March 1996 were at least two-folded. The first was to remind the US side of the extreme significance and sensitivity of the Taiwan question and to warn international anti-China forces not to challenge China’s bottom line on the Taiwan question.[68] The second was to affect the political situation in Taiwan and deter the development of separatist tendencies. Specific considerations about different issues at different stages will require further historical literature to prove.[69]
Later developments show that the series of military exercises between July 1995 and March 1996, though manifesting the special role of force in China’s strategy of peaceful reunification, were in nature military deterrence aimed at preventing the situation in the Taiwan Straits to develop into an international crisis. The boundaries of the military actions were also clear. The PLA did not intend to launch an offensive of any part of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, nor did it intend to engage in a military conflict with the US. Furthermore, the public stated purpose, scale, time and venue of military exercises excluded the possibility of a China-US military conflict.
Some other questions are worth further researches and they are linked to each other. Did the decision-makers foresee that the US would respond militarily to the March 1996 exercises?[70] Did the Chinese decision-makers make prior preparations for a possible military response by the US? Did the military response by the US, i.e., dispatching two aircraft fleets close to exercise areas, affect China’s policy targets, and if it did, to what extent? These questions can be reasonably answered and explained only on the basis of more historical evidence.
Conclusion
The analysis of this paper suggests that each time when Chinese policy-makers decided to conduct military actions in the Taiwan Straits they always paid attention to avoiding direct conflict with the US no matter for what specific reasons. With such consideration in mind, the time of action was carefully chosen so that it was the least possible for the US to directly intervene (end of 1954 and summer 1958 for instance). The targets were set in such a way that would not lead to direct US intervention (the taking over of Dachen Islands in 1954 and 1955 and the bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 for example). The forms of military actions were also thought as least possible to cause direct US intervention (bombardment of Kinmen in 1958 and military exercises in 1995 and 1996 for example). In this sense, it is not appropriate to define Chinese decision-making by international crisis standards and the explanation of China’s decision-making over Taiwan Straits by international crisis management theories is flawed, although there is no denying that the theories are inspiring in understanding the relevant Chinese policies.
The above conclusion inevitably leads to such a question: will China and the US encounter an international crisis in the Taiwan Straits? Is it really as difficult and complex as imagined to prevent a crisis between China and the US? We must stop creating a tension which could have been avoided and then looking for ways to manage the international crisis as the US government did in 1995 and 1996.
[1] Dai Chaowu, Time of Hostility and Crisis: China-US Relations from 1954 to 1958, Beijing, Social Sciences Press, 2003. Pang Xianzhi & Jin Chongji ed. Biography of Mao Zedong (1949-1976), Beijng, Central Historical Literature Press, 2003, vol 1. Another paper worth attention is Zhao Xuegong’s The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis and China-US Relations, Contemporary Chinese History Research, no. 3, 2003.
[2] Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Decision –Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000”, seen in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, edited by David M. Lampton, ( ); Robert S. Ross: “The Stability of Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait”, The National Interest, Fall 2001; Robert Ross S. Ross:“Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations”, International Security, Vol. 27, No.2(Fall 2002); Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems Without Catching Up: China’s Rise and challenges for U.S. Security Policy”, International Security , Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001); Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and 1995-1996 Crisis, edited by Suisheng Zhao, (New York: Routledge, 1999); Robert L. Suettinger: Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relation, 1989-2000, (D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2003).
[3] Niu Jun, Mao Zedong’s Sense of Crisis and Beginning of China-Soviet Breakup, in Zhang Baijia & Niu Jun ed. The Cold War and China, Beijing, World Knowledge Press, 2002.
[4] Zhou Enlai, On Current Fiscal Situation and Several Relationships in New China, 5 December 1949, Central Historical Literature Research Office, Selected Important Documents since Founding of the PRC, Beijing, Central Historical Literature Press, 1992, vol 1, p73. Mao Zedong, Telegraph to Liu Shaoqi Approving Su Yu’s Application to Move four Divisions, 10 February 1950, Selected Important Documents since Founding of the PRC, vol 1, p257.
[5] He Di, “ ‘ The Last Campaign to Unify China’: The CCP’s Unmaterialized Plan to Liberate Taiwan, 1949-1950”, Chinese Historians, Vol. 5, Number 1, Spring, 1992.
[6] Mao Zedong’s letter to Zhang Zhizhong, 20 March 1950, Central Historical Literature Research Office, Articles of Mao Zedong since Founding of PRC, Beijing, Central Historical Literature Press, 1987, vol 1, p271.
[7] Contemporary Chinese Navy, Beijing, Chinese Social Sciences Press, 1987, p198..
[8] Contemporary Chinese Navy, p166.
[9] Contemporary Chinese Navy, p189.
[10] Political Department of the Air Force, A Brief History of PLA Air Defense Force, Beijing, 1993, pp192-198.
