The purpose of this article is to investigate the main characteristics of the diplomatic policy of New China during the period of its formation and its historical implications.
I. “Leaning to One Side” and the Revolutionary Nature of New China’s Diplomacy
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) began to consider New China's diplomatic policy around the end of 1948. The main diplomatic principles formulated within approximately three months consisted of the following : Non-recognition of imperialism and a bias towards the Soviet Union (later called “ leaning to one side”), “ building a new stove” ( i. e. ,cooking one's meal in a new way) , and “cleaning up the house first, then Inviting guests.” In the light of the guiding principles and the problems to be resolved, all these "three principles showed a strong revolutionary commitment.
By ``revolutionary commitment'' we mean that they appeared under the Guidance of the theory of Chinese revolution and were closely linked to the fundamental problems to be resolved in the late phase of the Chinese revolution. In this sense, ``leaning to one side” was the most representative.
The concept of leaning to one side had two meanings -- the guiding principle and development strategy for New China. Firstly, Mao Zedong's motive in proposing “leaning to one side” was to answer the question of on which side China should stand in an international configuration of states divided into two camps - the socialist camp and the capitalist camp. At this level., leaning to one side was both a guiding principle for the diplomatic strategy of New
China , and a vivid description of its diplomatic pattern. Alliance with the Soviet Union and non-recognition of imperialist states were only specific manifestations of this general pattern.
Leaning to one side was a product of more than twenty years of revolution and was put forward as a cardinal principle on the eve of victory. It is impossible to interpret the formation of the principle of leaning to one side, or the inherent limitations in the later readjustments made to New China’s foreign policy, unless the understanding of the relations between the Chinese revolution and world politics on the part of the CPC leadership are taken into consideration .
The great changes brought about by the end of World War I and the victory of the October Revolution in Russia established the international background for the Chinese revolution led by the Communists. Lenin's theory of imperialisrn, the October Revolution, the lessons learnt from the failure of the 1911 Revolution, and the experience and plight of the early CPC leaders were all incorporated into the Communists" knowledge of important matters such as international affairs and the relationship between the Chinese revolution and the world. In their view, “the world capitalist and imperialist powers are in collaboration to exploit the proletariat and the oppressed nations throughout the world.” The Chinese revolution would prevail over imperialism “only if it
integrates itself into the world revolutionary trend of the oppressed nations and is linked to the international proletarian revolutionary movement.” “This is the only road that will enable the Chinese toiling masses to gain liberation from imperialist oppression.” 1 As testified by history, this knowledge gained in the early stages influenced the strategies and tactics of the CPC in all later periods.
At the beginning of the anti-Japanese national united front, the CPC Central Committee pointed out that “the Chinese people are faced with the task of linking China’s anti-Japanese national united front with the world peace front,” and China “should work for joint opposition to Japanese imperialism” with Great Britain and America.2 In January 1940, against the background of deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union on one side and America, Great Britain and France on the other, and after the German invasion of Poland and increasing conflict between the Guomindang and the CPC, Mao Zedong reemphasized in “On New Democracy” that, “the Chinese revolution… forms part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution.” “In the international situation of today, the ‘heroes’ in the colonies and semi-colonies either line up on the imperialist front and become part of the forces of world counter-revolution, or they line up on the anti-imperialist front and become part of the forces of world revolution. They must do one or the other, for there is no third choice.”3 Mao Zedong meant that if there was a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Western nations the CPC leadership was bound to stand with Moscow and adopt radical measures in the domestic struggle .
At the end of 1941, Moscow formed an alliance with Washington and London against fascism and the leadership of the CPC modified their views on the irreconcilability between international revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces. They believed that the alliance had created a “ new world order” in which important international problems must be solved through “agreements between states headed by America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.” and domestic problems “must also be solved in accordance with democratic principles”4 Within the overall pattern of cooperation among the three world powers, the Guomindang dared not engage in large-scale anti-Communist activities, and the CPC was also restrained from radical social revolution . “For some time after the War the whole international situation will still be one in which the democratic forces cooperate and form a united front , China will have to be a democratic republic before it enters socialism.”5 The CPC made adjustments to its domestic and foreign policies several times between the summer of 1942 and the end of the War of Anti-Japanese Aggression, but all were within this basic framework.
The outbreak of full-scale civil war and the beginning of the Cold War between Washington and Moscow in the summer of 1946 made the leaders of the CPC change the basic views they had held since the summer of 1942 , and the concept of an “intermediary zone” was raised. This concept had rich connotations and far-reaching significance. One element of this concept was that the rivalry between America and the Soviet Union would not decidedly influence the situation in China.6 However, the concept of an “intermediary zone” lasted for only a short period in the minds of the CPC leadership.
In September 1947 the Communist and Workers' Parties of nine European countries established Information Bureau and issued a declaration stating that the world had been divided into two camps, the anti-imperialist democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union and the imperialist camp headed by the United States. Although the declaration made no mention of the major significance of the Chinese revolution, the CPC Central Committee lost no time in welcoming the theory of “two camps” and declared that it would side with the Soviet camp.
From the spring of 1948, the Communist leaders began to express their ardent desire to strengthen their ties with the Soviet Union and make urgent political and ideological preparations for this new development within the party. Liu Shaoqi stated in a simple and straightforward manner in an article that in the current situation it was impossible to remain neutral, and that forming an alliance or not forming an alliance with the Soviet Union was “a demarcation line between revolution and counter-revolution,” and “a demarcation line between progress and retrogression” for a nation.7
When the communist leaders began to map out their foreign policies they had a relatively profound and fixed understanding of the world political. situation and the trends of development,
i. e. , that “conflict between the two blocs headed respectively by America and the Soviet Union is the most fundamental conflict, and the struggle between the two blocs is a life-and-death struggle.”8 In this sense, the policy “ to lean to one side,” that is, towards the Soviet Union, embodied the Communist leaders' general view of the division of world political forces and trends of development.
As noted by some scholars, the term “leaning to one side” also had another meaning, and was put forward as the “general fundamental principle of the Party.” When he advocated to one side in “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship” Mao Zedong was answering a question greater than diplomatic strategy - the question of the road China would follow. The logical inference was that Mao Zedong’s consideration of New China's diplomatic strategy was closely linked to the nations development strategy, and that the former was also closely linked to the Communist leadership's decision to set up a people's democratic government and follow the socialist road .
In recent years Chinese scholars have begun to study the way in which the Chinese Communist leaders adjusted their basic domestic policies in an effort to forge an alliance with the Soviet Union. Newly released archives also show that during Mikoyan’s visit to Xibaipo and Lui Shaoqi’s visit to Moscow the Chinese Communist leaders devoted a great deal of effort to bring Chinese general and specific domestic policies in line with those of the Soviet Union. It can be definitely stated that it would have been difficult for the Soviet Union to accept New China as an ally if no agreement had been reached between the CPC and Moscow on the Chinese Communists’ domestic policies. Against the background of two opposed international political and economic systems, the ultimate result of high legal coordination between the CPC's domestic and foreign policies and those of Moscow was that New China entered into the political and economic system headed by the Soviet Union.
