III
The Clinton Administration’s permission to allow Lee Tunghui to visit the United States in the summer of 1995 aroused great FEELING IN China AGAINST? the United States RELATIONS. Since then, a long debate has been going on in the United States on its policy towards China. Meanwhile in China, frequent discussions have been HELD on American policy towards China and Sino-US relations. In essence, these discussions are a kind of debate, although not as open and heated as that in the United States.
The rapid deterioration of Sino-US relations made the parties concerned in China anxious to clarify the following questions before they could come up with countermeasures. Why did the United States go back on its own word on Lee Tenghui’s visit? What kind of China policy was the Clinton Administration advocating? The discussions went on among the international relations experts from various units including some MILITARY departments concerned. Not only did their views affect public opinion but also their influence on the policy makers was increasing. There were generally three kinds of judgment during the discussions. That is, the American policy towards China was 1) engagement; 2) containment; or 3) a combination of engagement and containment (ALSO KNOW AS soft and hard measures). It is not this paper’s intention to point out the differences and similarities between these views. However, it should be noted that all three judgments presupposed unfriendly intentions IN American policy toward China. Whatever THE JUDGMENT WAS—engagement, containment or soft and hard measures—all WERE considered as a means to the end of “breaking up China,” or of “preventing China from becoming more powerful,” or of taking China into some “orbit”. In a word, they were not for the purpose of improving Sino-US relations.
Another common ground among [THOSE HOLDING these people who held] different opinions was that all of them agreed that a clear understanding of Sino-US was very difficult. ANALYZING the discussions, one can SEE that their judgments of Sino-US relations was often affected BY the situation between the two countries at that time. The continuous fluctuation of Sino-US relations led to a fluctuation of their judgments. After many fluctuations, a sense of crisis emerged. They feared that Sino-US relations would GET out of control after suffering long-term disturbances. They also feared that the two countries’ relationship would be beyond their understanding, which created a sense of crisis. This cycle went on till eventually there emerged a mentality WE WILL CALL “deep worries”, WHAT CAUSED them TO believe that at least uncertainty was one of the essential features of American policy towards China after the Cold War.
IV
Discussions OF China’s national interests became [INCREASINGLY more and more] popular inside the circle of international relations studies. This reinforced the suspicion of American policy. The strategic pondering over American policy towards China and Sino-US relations and theoretical reflectionS on China’s national interests in a relatively independent way began almost simultaneously. Most significantly, the outcome of the specialists' independent study of China’s national interests concurred with the previous views of China’s policy makers and, in reality, theorized and systematizeD some of those views. According to these people, the main national interests of China at the current time were economic development, MAINTAINING stability, and defending national unity. These were also called China’s “core interests” or the “minimum basis” for survival and development.
When one views the above-mentioned definition of China’s national interests with the development of Sino-US relations after the Cold War, the conclusion is obvious and grim. It is widely recognized by international relations experts that the main problems of post-Cold War Sino-US relations all involve China’s core interests and that the differences between the two countries’ interests have acquired “an element of strategic confrontation.” Some experts have even gone so far as to think that for China the differences between the two countries are more complex and serious than those between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Because “most of the crises between the United States and the Soviet Union were power struggles outside the two countries’ borders and INVOLVED competition for global hegemony, at least they were not directly related to the two countries’ independence and survival, national unity, territorial integrity, or maintenance of fundamental systems. However, the crises that took place in recent years between the United States and China were all directly linked to such core interests of China…”.
Many cases in trade, human rights, security, and nonproliferation between the United States and China can be cited to prove the above view. The Taiwan problem is the most typical. When the Chinese blame the United States FOR PLAYING the “Taiwan card,” they not only accuse the United States of interfering in China’s domestic politics but also attempt to disclose that the United States intends to prevent China from becoming powerful and prosperous. To many Chinese, China cannot be a power in a real sense until it finally achieves the country’s unity: in today’s world, no country IS regarded as a power IF IT IS not completely unified. In this sense, what the United States has done concerning the Taiwan issue challenges not only China’s history but also her future.
V
The influence of suspicion is different from that of dislike and indignation. While the latter can build an emotional atmosphere, the former can gradually form unique foreign policy concepts and concrete policies. Suspicion does not promote extreme and irrational responses to American moves. It DOES HOWEVER lead to a strong WATCHFUL mentality and such policies as “opposing hegemonism and power politics,” “pushing the world forward to multiplicity,” and establishing bilateral or multilateral security cooperation mechanisms with neighboring countries. In terms of policy towards the United States, all these combined can be called “preventive anti-containment.” (They are by no means the whole policy towards the United States.) The purpose is to weaken the capacity of the United States TO [OMIT that might be used to]“contain” China in the future and to eventually force the United States to give up its intention of “containing China” completely and forever.
As the essential feature of Chinese thinking ABOUT Sino-US relations after the Cold War, suspicion is not as emotional OR detectable as dislike, indignation or hostility. HOWEVER, it has far-reaching and profound influence on China’s policy towards the United States and even China’s foreign policy as a whole. Due to the existence of suspicion, such promiseS as working towards a strategic cooperative partnership for the 21st century looks like [A WORK BY CHOPIN? Choplin’s THE POLISH COMPOSER? performance], humorous yet bitter. Because to the Chinese, when differences of opinions between the two countries touch upon the core interests of China (e.g., the differences on Taiwan issue),[THE SOLUTION BECOMES ELUSIVE AS THE US IS UNWILLING not only DOES the solution BECOME quite elusive, but also the United States is even unwilling] to adjust its attitudes.
The suspicion of the Chinese [WILL NOT EASILY ] disappear. The summit meeting between the two countries in October 1997 did not eliminate this suspicion. Clinton’s visit to China in 1998 did not become a turning point, either. It is INconceivable how the worries of the Chinese were aggravated by US-led NATO’s invasion against Yugoslavia. The intensive coverage of the war by the Chinese media inflamed the emotions already existing among the public. GIVEN these circumstances, when the US Air Forces [ BOMBED] the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia with several missiles, the Chinese public immediately drew THE conclusion that the event had been a deliberate aggressive provocation, which evoked protests and demonstrations by Chinese students and the public. One of the results of this atmosphere was that THOSE IN China policy studies circleS found it necessary to rethink United States INTENTIONS and the future of Sino-US relations. To date, discussions of this kind CONTINUE TO occur from time to time.
China’s suspicion of the United States is apparent and has a number of reasons. Generally speaking, HOWEVER, it is mainly a response to American attitudes and actions in dealing with international affairs (especially those concerning China). The anti-US sentiment of the Chinese is aimed at specific events. It has no deep social roots. The Chinese still believe that China needS and should CONTINUE TO LEARN things from the United States TO SERVE China’s modernization drive, including the experience of American democracy and politics for China’s political reforms. The Chinese believe that their demands on the United States are by no means EXCESSIVE . The differences between China and the United States in their relationship are not like the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union that had its origin from their power struggles abroad. Therefore, so long as the United States does not interfere, particularly without any reason, in China’s own affairs and does not challenge China on her core interests on the Taiwan and Tibet issues, THE Sino-US relationship will not turn confrontationAL. AT HEART The suspicion probably lies in the Chinese BELIEF that the United States will NOT restrain itself from interfering in China’s affairs.
“Increase trust, reduce troubles, develop cooperation, avoid confrontation” is often mistaken as a kind of rhetoric or political tactic. In fact, it is a maxim for the development of Sino-US relations, for it is the product of the specific circumstances facing China and embraces the Chinese people’s understanding and feeling of THE problems DISCUSSED ABOVE.
