I Revolutionary Thinking and the Birth of Policies toward the US.
The policy of “leaning to one side” was mainly formulated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Therefore, the Party leaders’ view on the United States in different historical periods played an essential role in the
making of this policy.
It is in the autumn of 1948 that the Party leaders first looked to the would-be relations between new China and the United States after the war, which was generally regarded as a de facto beginning of new China’s foreign policy making, as well as the final stage of Communist victory over the KMT troops in the Chinese revolution. Inevitably the revolutionary thinking of the Communist Party became an important aspect of the principles guiding new China’s foreign policy.
The Party leaders had been long holding that the Chinese revolution, as a part of the nationwide socialist revolution, aimed at overthrowing the imperialist rule in China thoroughly. Up to the eruption of China’s civil war and the establishing in several European countries of Communist Intelligence Bureaus, the Party Central Committee was prepared to accept Soviet vision on “two major camps” emerging in the world, and concluded that the Chinese revolution was a component of the “Soviet-led anti-imperialist camp”, the mission of which included defeating US imperialists’ “enslaving plan” with “all the peoples in the world”.
Naturally, the Chinese revolution didn’t pitch the US as an archenemy out of pure theoretical deduction. The US, with identity of an imperialist country, had been viewed as an enemy of China’s revolution ever since the birth of the CCP, except that it was once called “greatest ally ” in battling Japanese invasion during the Pacific War. However, before the conclusion of China’s Anti-Japanese War, the US had not been classified as the No.1 enemy. Up to the closing months of 1948, the Party leaders realized that the US was being a major external threat against the complete victory of the CCP. Therefore, the CCP went on active preparation for any possible form of intervention on the side of the US, might it be direct military intervention, schemes to penetrate into the revolutionary bloc, economic isolation, or standing in the way in Taiwan’s liberation. In short, America was depicted as the most abhorred enemy and most dangerous external threat during this historical period.
Another important aspect guiding the Party Central Committee’s foreign policy making was knowledge of the nature and purpose of new China’s diplomacy. In the view of the Party leaders, new China’s diplomacy should make its core that the humiliating history is forever gone. This made initiatives which could innovate the mental attitudes of the Chinese people for the better, reflect the thorough liberation of the Chinese nation, and establish an equal footing for new China in the international community all necessary.
The need to improve the Chinese people’s mental attitudes with regards to foreign affairs was a constant topic underscored in several major policy decisions of the Party leaders. After the eruption of the nationwide civil war in 1946, Mao Zedong put forward his opinion that “US imperialists are a paper tiger.” (indicating the US was not so strong as it appeared) When the PLA began to launch strategic counterattacks in 1947, Mao Zedong pointed out specially that fear of imperialism was only a mental effect, natural because the Chinese people used to suffer great losses in combating imperialism. He also mentioned that the same was occurring in the USSR, where people worshipped American tinfood and cigarettes so much that they looked upon the reality. Mao remarked that source of such fear lay in “a traumatic past and an imprisoned mind ”. In fact, emphasis on and pursuit of mental emancipation was displayed at every juncture in dealing with the US during the historical period, particularly in the case of criticizing Zhu Qiwen, Mayor of Shenyang for his return visits to American, British and French consulate in Shenyang, and in Mao’s comments on the State Department’s “White Paper”. As was termed by Mao, “We have a low opinion of Americans, instead of being afraid of them. No imperialist is fearful.”
Furthermore, the Chinese leaders thought diplomacy of the new China should be one that thoroughly terminates the century-old history of humiliation. When Mao Zedong spoke of policy orientations of the forthcoming new China in January 1949, he said, “We will overthrow it (imperialism), not recognize it.” In the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee held in March, Mao stated explicitly, “On the issue of imperialist recognition of new China, not only should we refrain from solving it in a hurry now, but there is no need to hurry in a period of considerable length even after the nationwide victory has been achieved.” The Party leaders believed that only in this way could the previous shackles leading to diplomacy of insults and humiliation be rid of.
II External and Internal Climate
The CCP’s way of dealing with the US was also influenced by the external and internal climate then. Without the unique contemporary circumstances, it might have been difficult for the policy of “leaning to one side” to be drafted or to receive widespread support.
1 External Climate
Since the world had split into two antagonistic camps led by the US and the USSR respectively, pressure on the CCP in its foreign policy making flowed from two sources, namely the US and the USSR.
Pressure imposed by the US lay in three aspects. First, no matter how earnestly the internal circles of the US Government had once considered “hands-off” from China’s civil war, US assistance to the Nationalist regime, in KMT’s last-ditch struggle against the PLA and even in its retreating to Taiwan, did pose a de facto as well as de jure obstruction to the complete victory of communism in China. It appeared that the US was intentionally consolidating its power in China while entrenching itself at every step. Second, the US attempted to influence new China’s would-be domestic and foreign policies by exploiting the recognition issue and organizing alliance among western countries to isolate new China. To epitomize such an attempt, Secretary of State Dean Acheson put forward three prerequisites for recognizing the PRC, which were dismissed as unreasonable by China. In his talks with Huang hua, American Ambassador to China John Leighton Stuart asked that the CCP “practice no communism”, “admit democratic persons” in the new government, and “not enter into alliance with the USSR”. Finally, the US squeezed new China on purpose both economically and by supporting the KMT troops to blockade mainland ports. American performance naturally incurred public wrath.
Diplomatic pressure also came from the USSR, due to a strong distrust possessed by the Soviet political leaders toward the CCP. In order to dispel such distrust, the Party leaders granted Sino-Soviet relations prime importance and actively drew close to the USSR from the very outset, even at the cost of shelving Sino-US relations.
2 Internal Political Situation
The internal political situation will be discussed from two perspectives, namely within and outside the revolutionary contingent. Inside the Party and the military circle, mentality of fearing and worshipping the US had till now been cleared up, owing to the two-year-long effort of ideological mobilization and the victorious process in the civil war. As a matter of fact, in the final stage of the civil war, evolutionary and patriotic passion within the Party and the PLA had run unprecedentedly high. The zenith of such feeling was typically possessed by CCP leaders of middle and lower levels. They displayed it in their handling of American consulate in Shenyang after the city’s occupation, and in their searching of American Ambassadorial residence in Nanjing after seizure of Nanjing. In order to avoid radical actions that might lead to international disputes, the Party Central Committee on several occasions had to impose strong measures on local Communist officials.
