The intellectuals and the populace were also averse to US policy of arms support for the Jiang Kai-shek regime.  In fact, all circles in China had warmly welcomed and followed with great interest the Marshall mediation.  However, after the embarkment of the civil war by the KMT, such optimistic expectation completely vanished.  Public opinion went that the US should bear major responsibilities as it winked at and shielded the war-starter.  A strong anti-Americanism was fostered.  Most representative of this feeling was the verses by Mr. Tao Xingzhi ------ “Who is killing the Chinese?  ‘Heroes’ of our own.  Where come the guns?  ‘Friendly nation’ of our own.  Where come the bullets?  America of its own.”  It was just on the issue of opposing US support for Jiang Kaishek that intellectuals came to a consensus with the CCP, which formed the basis for intellectual acceptance of the policy of “leaning to one side”.

III  The Impact of CCP-US Contacts

During the period of the Liberation War, the CCP had on three occasions contacted the US directly.  First contact was with US special envoy Herley around the Chongqin negotiations, followed by the second round of contact with US officials of various levels during the Marshall mediation.  From the end of 1948 till summer in 1949, the CCP handled the issue US consulate’s radio equipment and the Ward Incidence.  CCP representatives also held talks with American Ambassador Stuart after Nanjing had been taken over in 1949.  These communications reflected the whole picture of how new China’s America policy finally took shape, and how various factors played a role in this process.

The CCP took a wait-and-see attitude toward American consulate in China.  Up to the middle ten days of November in 1948, this attitude hardened gradually.  The radio equipment issue and the Ward Incidence occurred just when new China’s America policy began to be considered.  Two-folded factors led to this change in attitude.

First, the Military Control Commission of Shenyang issued an ultimatum on Nov. 15 to have the Americans surrender their radio equipment out of the need for military security, which was in fact approved by the Party Central Committee.  However, the American consulate adopted a stance of confrontation toward such military control measures, arguing that no permission from the sending state had been granted.  The Party Central Committee viewed US refusal as deliberately creating trouble and instructed that the Military Control Commission of Shenyang should show no shrinking back by entering the consulate building and confiscating the listed equipment on the condition that prior warning had been given.

Second, due to lack of experience in handling foreign affairs, the Party Central Committee preferred more consultation with the USSR, while the latter claimed the importance of confiscating all the transmitters in US, British and French consulate on Soviet interest.

Out of these two-folded considerations, on Nov. 20 the Military Control Commission entered the American consulate, and ferreted out transmitters and related radio equipment.  Besides, communications between the consulate and the outside world were severed, water and electricity supply cut off, and the American diplomats’ freedom of movement restricted.

These measures obviously went beyond the scope of the Party Central Committee’s authorization.  On learning the consulate blockade, the Party Central Committee instructed that the current policies practised in the Northeast should take into consideration the following three points: i. Difference should be made between the US on one side and Britain and France on the other.  ii. The policies adopted against the American consulate in Shenyang are not necessarily applicable in other regions of China.  iii. Current actions of the CCP do not mean “we will never establish diplomatic relations with these imperialist countries”.  Later on, the Northeast Bureau cracked an American spy case.  Here the Party Central Committee again disapproved of isolating US diplomatic staff without clear evidence indicating direct linkage between the spy case and the American consulate.  In mid-December the Party Central Committee further instructed that restriction on the consulate staff get due loosening since the spy case so far made no progress.  The following development of events showed that the issue was actually suspended as to how to deal with the American consulate in Shenyang.

In early December, a report was submitted to the Party Central Committee, passing on information acquired from a US journalist, who was said to have close association with Marshall and the State Department.  According to this report, the focus of America’s new China policy was “to foster an effective opposition faction” within the new regime.  Therefore, preconditions for getting US recognition of the PRC would be that the new government in China should admit opposition members the US regarded as acceptable, and that it should grant the US a privilege to station forces in Shanghai and Qindao.  This, in the view of the Party leaders, was “ a policy of sabotage from within”.

The CCP’s contacts with Ambassador Stuart totally dispelled the Party leaders’ thought on developing normal relations with the US.  First of all, Ambassador Stuart expressed that the US was not ready to sever its relations with the KMT.  Meanwhile, he asserted that the new government should “include as many enlightened democratic persons as possible”, thus leading the Party leaders to the conclusion that the US would not abandon its hostile policy toward the PRC.  Second, while seeking contacts with the Party, Stuart spread it all around Nanjing’s diplomatic circle that he had established contacts with the CCP.  In the final stage of this round of communications, the US government made it public that it granted Stuart no authorization to visit Beijing.  Such kind of contradicting words and deeds intensified disgust and animosity from the CCP leaders.  Mao Zedong published his “On People’s Democratic Dictatorship” on June 30, announcing that the foreign policy of new China would “lean to one side”.  (indicating allied with the USSR)  Most significantly, the Party Central Committee cabled to the municipal Party committee of Nanjing on the same day, noting that “We bear no illusion that the US imperialists would ever change their policies.”  The “White Paper on US-China Relations” issued by the State Department on August 5, together with Mao’s critical comments on the White Paper marked the beginning of formal confrontation between the PRC and the US.