The aim of this chapter is to explore the reasons behind the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s. It will study internal and external factors shaping the alliance, Chinese and Soviet intentions in forming the compact, and the evolution of CCP and Soviet policies. For many years scholars have made tremendous efforts to study the alliance and related questions. However, during the Cold War period, as a result of various constraints, the study of the origins of the alliance produced more questions than answers. In recent years, because the Chinese government allowed the publication of many historical documents and Russia opened the diplomatic archives of the former Soviet Union, historians have begun to reconsider old conclusions. This literature -- still only in its infancy -- has delivered some important relevant works.[1] These studies have extensively utilized previously unavailable historical records and have therefore been able to offer many valuable interpretations of the motivations of the Chinese and Soviet leaders in formulating and developing policies. The recent opening of historical archives and these thought-provoking studies have -- most importantly -- enabled us to provide more systematic and critical explanations of the policies of both countries.
1.
To understand post-World War Two relations between the CCP and the Soviet Union, it is first necessary to briefly review their relationship before and during China's war against Japan. As a branch of the Comintern, the CCP from its very beginning stood firmly on the side of the international Communist movement led by the Soviet Union and received support and assistance from the Soviet Union and Comintern. Up to the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, Communist ideology played a key role in the CCP's relations with the Soviet Union. However, during the anti-Japanese war, important changes took place in this relationship.
From 1937 on, the CCP Central Committee and the Soviet Union/Comintern had frequent disagreements over how the CCP should carry out the policy of a united front during the war against Japan. The difference between the CCP and the Soviet Union took the form of intra-party conflicts from the day when Wang Ming arrived at Yenan from Moscow on November 29, 1937.[2] This conflict lasted until the outbreak of the Wannan Incident in which the CCP suffered great loss. In the Jinnan battle following the Wannan Incident, either intentionally or unintentionally, the Soviet adviser I.V.Chuikov expressed support for the GMD's attempt to remove CCP troops. The CCP leaders were very dissatsified with this attitude and critizised the Soviet representative. Mao instructed Zhou Enlai to tell the Soviet adviser "not to speak irresponsibly."[3] After the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the CCP CC rejected demands of the Soviet Supreme Command for attacking Japanese troops in North China. The Comintern leaders criticized the CCP CC and Wang Ming used this opportunity to restart the debate within the CCP over the validity of Mao Zedong's political line. However, by this time, criticisms from the Soviet Union and Comintern could not change CCP policies. Wang Ming found himself thoroughly defeated in the debate.
As soon as this new confrontation between Mao Zedong and Wang Ming started within the CCP the differences between Moscow and Yanan became unbridgeable, even though the Soviet Union and Comintern still approved and supported some aspects of the CCP CC's political line. The problem was that the starting point of the CCP CC's policy considerations was how to defend the party's interests in a complicated environment, whereas the primary concern of the Soviet Union and the Comintern was how to protect Soviet strategic interests. Once the CCP leaders decided that it was necessary to give priority to protecting its own interests, some of its policies became irreconcilable with Moscow's.
Moreover, the ideological ties between the CCP and the Soviet Union were weakened during this period. The policy differences between the two sides made the Soviet and Comintern leaders suspicious as to the nature of the CCP's marxism. Following Lenin's theory on party building, they believed that the CCP's long-term rural work had resulted in an excessively large peasant component within the party and that this situation had become a serious ideological problem. During the first years of the anti-Japanese war, the Comintern leaders worried that its ideology prevented the CCP CC from carrying out the united front policy on which Moscow insisted.[4]
As the differences between the CCP and the Soviet Union/Comintern deepened, it is obvious that Stalin no longer thought that the CCP's policies was only results of the CCP leaders' inexperience. In a typical fashion, Stalin used the categories of Lenin's class struggle theory to trace the origins of the CCP policies. In the autumn of 1940, Stalin discussed his views on the CCP leaders with I.V.Chuikov who was on his way to China. He said that the CCP was largely composed of peasants. It tended to underestimate the strength of the working class. This inevitably would leave a strong peasant influence on CCP's policies and ideology, affecting the latter's efforts to promote international unity.[5]
The Rectification Campaign in the CCP in the early 1940s only strengthened the critical views of the Soviet leaders.[6] In June 1944, in a talk with American Ambassador Averell Harriman, Stalin remarked that the CCP leaders were "margarine
communists." Once the economic situation changed, "they would forget this political orientation." Hence, it was not necessary for the GMD to underline ideological disputes.[7] In the eyes of the Soviet leaders, the CCP was no more than a nationalistic peasant and petty bourgeois political party and did not possess much real power. Comparing the way the Soviet Union and the Comintern celebrated every political and military victory during the 1930s, these remarks represented a stark contrast.[8]
In handling the ideological problems in its relationship with the Soviet Union, the CCP CC confronted a very complicated problem. On the one hand, the Chinese communists firmly believed in Marxism-Leninism and believed that its policies were consistent with Marxist and Leninist principles. They showed great respect to the authoritative position of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Chinese communist leaders had learnt from their own experience that dogmatic adoption and application of the theory, practice and policies of the Soviet Union could only bring great harm to their party both ideologically and organizationally. In terms of ideology, unless the CCP modify the basic principles of Marxism and Leninism and "sinizise" them, it would not be able to establish ideological guidelines that would suit China's domestic conditions. In terms of organization, unless the CCP leadership purged the influence of Wang Ming and his associates, it would not be possible for the CCP to reduce intra-party conflicts resulting from differences between the CCP CC and the Soviet Union, to end the political challenges to Mao Zedong's leadership position from those sponsored by the Soviet Union, and ultimately to avoid division within the party and thereby the failure of the Chinese Revolution.
Mao Zedong launched the Rectification Campaign at least in part to adjust his party's relationship with the Soviet Union. Mao's campaign was very successful: Organizationally, he purged the influence of Wang Ming and his allies; ideologically, he reconfirmed the authority of Mao Zedong Thought within the party. For Mao, the only thing which remained after the Rectification Campaign was to seek Soviet acknowledgment that Mao Zedong Thought was in accordance with Marxism-Leninism. Tom Mao it was still important to get the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Chinese Revolution led by him in the international communist movement. The Soviet Union was Lenin's home, the birthplace of revolution. The Chinese communists were idealistic and enthusiastic -- if the Soviets had openly rejected their theory and beliefs, the consequences could have been very damaging.
The Soviet Union was still an important factor influencing CCP policies during this period. However, their contacts during the anti-Japanese war were minimal. The Soviet Union kept itself out of the China theater and the CCP could not determine when the Soviet Union would join the war there.[9] Meanwhile, the United States was playing an increasingly important role in China's war efforts and in Chinese domestic politics. This situation compelled the CCP to focus its foreign policy on developing its relations with the United States. In the summer of 1944, the CCP CC began to adopt a policy of active cooperation with the United States. It hoped to develop a comprehensive cooperative relationship with the United States on the basis of its military cooperation with the American army in China.[10]
In sum, during the Sino-Japanese War, the relationship between the CCP CC and the Soviet Union was quite weak. On the one hand, the Soviet Union conducted its business according to its own needs and judgements with little effort to improve its relations with the CCP. On the other hand, while the CCP leaders were deeply concerned with Soviet policies, Soviet assistance was limited and the CC did not expect it to increase soon. The fact that some previous instructions from Moscow were considered damaging to CCP interests compelled the party to act on its own both in its internal and external affairs.
In the spring of 1945, as the European war was ending and Moscow signalled its coming war with Japan, the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union began to take a new turn. The Soviet Union finally signed a secret agreement on the question of the Far East with the United States and Britain at Yalta. Consequently, its policy toward China began to take firmer shape. Reviewing Soviet efforts at Yalta, one finds that it had two objectives in its policy toward China. One was to defeat Japan so as to eliminate Japan's long-term threat to the Soviet border. The other was to maximise its influence in the country through military participation in the war, and to establish buffer zones along the Soviet border. On the basis of these long-term considerations, Stalin hoped that Chinese politics would be rlatively stable and that he could maintain stable relations with China. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union tried to cooperate with the United States on Chinese issues -- including recognition of the legitimacy of the GMD Government -- and to use its diplomatic influence to make Jiang Jieshi maintain neutrality in the contest between the Soviet Union and the United States. This policy included the factual control of China's Northeast and a certain public sympathy with the CCP. However, within its international policy framework, the Soviet Union did not view the CCP as an important factor. The CCP factor became relevant only when Stalin deliberated such questions as how to maintain Chinese political stability and how the party could be used to influence the GMD Government.
In contrast to the Soviet Union's passive attitude toward the CCP, beginning in the spring of 1945 the CCP leaders began to reconsider the role the Soviet Union would play in Chinese politics and how to develop their relations with the Soviet Union. Two factors led to this change in CCP foreign policy. One was that the CCP leaders' certainty that the Soviet Union would join the war against Japan.[11] The was the serious deterioration of CCP's relations with the United States and -- by the fall of 1944 -- its difficulty in expanding its influence southward because of stiff resistance from GMD troops.[12] Under these new circumstances, the CCP leaders decided to shift the emphasis of their foreign policy toward the Soviet Union.
On April 18, 1945, thirteen days after the Soviet announcement to suspend the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, Mao Zedong approved the instruction of the JinChaJi Branch Bureau on preparation for cooperation with the Soviet army. Mao's central idea is to shift CCP strategic focus from assisting the landing of American forces on the Southeast coast to assisting the Soviet forces in North and Northeast China. For this purpose, his order required that in addition to military preparations, CCP organizations should emphasize the important role of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan and purge unrealistic expectations about the United States among party caders.[13] In the Seventh Party Congress of the party held soon after, Mao warmly praised the great contributions of the Soviet Union in the war against fascism and claimed that the Pacific question could not be resolved without Soviet participation. He especially emphasized that the Soviet Union was the "best friend of the Chinese people."[14] Against this background, Mao for the first time revealed to the party his long-held plan for control of the Northeast.[15]
To some degree, one could say that the Congress reaffirmed CCP policy of seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union. After all, CCP thinking about the international role of the Soviet Union throughout the war against Japan viewed Moscow as a positive force which the party should seek a more active cooperation with. In addition, Mao's speech was useful as a morale booster for the revolutionary ranks, especially at a time when the CCP was under great pressure from the United States. Mao knew that the CCP could not expect the Soviet Union to provide them with any substantial assistance.[16] During the conference, Mao cautioned the party to strive for self-reliance and not to expect too much from the Soviet Union, while he showered praises on the Soviet leadership.[17] Obviously, Mao could not determine at this time how close his cooperation with the Soviet Union would be and what scope it would have.