The changes in Soviet policy had fundamental influence on CCP strategy. Although the party was anxious to take advantage of the Soviet participation in the war against Japan to control the Northeast and to set up a base area near the Soviet Union and Mongolia, it hesitated to go all out in carrying out the plan in August because it was not certain about the Soviet Northeast policy.  The visit of the Soviet military representative in mid-September finally enabled the CCP leaders to clarify the Soviet policy.  They decided that while the Soviet Union set limits to CCP activities, it also provided opportunities. As long as the CCP took full advantage of these opportunities it could acquire a favorable position in the Northeast.  As American and GMD troops entered North China, it became quite urgent for the CCP to get its forces in place in the Northeast.  Between September 15 and 19, the CCP CC decided to speed up its efforts to seize the Northeast.[35]

    According to the CC's strategic plan in mid-September, the Communist troops in the Northeast should be stationed in the east, west and north, trying to control the rural areas and small and medium cities not occupied by the Soviet forces. The CCP believed that the real opportunity for massive expansion could only come after the Soviet forces left the area.[36]  At the end of October, as a result of Soviet encouragement, the CCP CC readjusted its strategic plan. It decided to "take all-out efforts to dominate the Northeast". To achieve this goal, it prepared to carry out a strategic battle with the GMD forces in south Manchuria and Rehe.[37]  In order to win time for manoeuvring troops, the CCP CC instructed its Northeast Bureau and the CCP delegation in Chongqing to consult with the Soviet Union and seek to postpone the withdrawal of Soviet forces and to prevent GMD landings along the northeastern coast.[38]  While the Soviet military replied that postponement of the withdrawal was difficult, it did agree not to allow the GMD to airlift its forces to Changchun.  In addition, it was prepared to supply the CCP forces with weapons, communication equipment and means of transportation.  It also permitted the CCP forces to conduct its activities in areas where GMD forces landed. In Changchun, for instance, the CCP was able to replace all local government officials, except the mayor.[39]  As the Soviet forces withdrew from Yingkou and Huludao, they assisted the CCP to occupy these two strategic ports and consequently prevent GMD forces from landing there.

    Relations between the CCP and the Soviet forces in the Northeast had a far-reaching influence on the CCP-Soviet relationship. In order to counter American pressures and consolidate its own position in the Northeast, the Soviet Union did not have any better alternative than assisting the CCP forces to take over the Northeast. The CCP could not realize its plan to seize the Northeast and establish large base areas there without securing Soviet acquiescence and assistance.  It was the common interest in opposing attempts of the United States and the GMD Government to control the Northeast that gave rise to a strategic relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union.  Although the Soviet Union later readjusted its Northeast policy, the strategic relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union formed during this period experienced no fundamental changes. In this respect, the development of the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Union in the Northeast was a major turning point in their post-war relations and constituted a foundation for the development of their future relations.

3.

Nevertheless, the strategic relationship between the two sides was still limited.  The basic policy of the Soviet Union in the immediate post-war period was to keep its agreements with the United States and the GMD Government and protect its established interests in the existing international structure. However, the inherent tendency in the stradegy that the CCP was carrying out was to bring about fundamental changes to the structure in the Far East ,although CCP leaders did not understand it at that time and still were making a effort to make the party adapt to the existing structure.   Therefore, when the external factors that help to bring about their cooperation changed, such cooperation  could not remain unaffected.

    In mid-November 1945 Jiang Jieshi decided to suspend his negotiations with the Soviet military in the Northeast and ordered the GMD Northeast Headquarters to withdraw from Changchun to Shanhaiguan. This decision coincided with General Wedmeyer's visit to China at President Truman's request.

Soon after Wedmeyer's arrival in China, the Soviet Union began to be concerned.  Moscow concluded that while the United States maintained the appearance of not intervening in China, its real ambition was to control China and even to invade the Northeast.  The United States would rapidly increase its assistance to the GMD on the Northeastern question.  The Soviet Union estimated at the time that it would take two months for the United States and the GMD to prepare their offensive.[40]

    The Soviet Union did not wish an immediate confrontation with the United States over the Northeast. Hence it took measures to improve its relations with the GMD Government. The day following GMD's announcement to withdraw its Northeast Headquarters, the Soviet Union informed the GMD Government and its Northeast Headquarters that it wished to continue the talks over the transfer of the Northeast to the GMD.[41] In mid-December, Stalin explained to Jiang Jingguo -- who was visiting the Soviet Union -- that the Soviet Union did not wish to interfere in the struggle between the GMD and the CCP. However, the GMD Government must maintain neutrality between the United States and the Soviet Union and must not allow Americans to enter the Northeast.[42]

    As the Soviet Union tried to improve its relations with the GMD Government, it began to take measures to restrict CCP activities in the Northeast. On November 19, the Soviet military representative told the Northeast Bureau of the CCP that Moscow had already decided to transfer all the cities along the Changchun railroad to the GMD Government and that the CCP forces must move out of the areas within 50 kilometers along the railroad. In addition, CCP forces were not allowed to enter areas where Soviet troops were stationed and could not fight the GMD before Soviet forces left the area. The Soviet representative claimed that the Soviet military was ready to use force expel the CCP if needed.[43]  Soon after, the Soviet military closed down the CCP governments and forbade the party to carry out activities in major cities which interfered with the execution of the Sino-Soviet treaty.[44]  The Soviet reaction to the GMD pressures demonstrated that it was ready to use diplomatic means of direct negotiation with the GMD Government to replace its policy of assisting the CCP to control the Northeast.

    This change of policy took the CCP leaders completely by surprise.  The CCP's strategy of "seizing the Northeast, consolidate North China and Central China" largely depended on Soviet assistance. The Soviet policy change suddenly made the strategy worthless. In the Northeast, because of the promise of the Soviet military to supply weapons to the CCP, large numbers of CCP troops went there without arms.  As Moscow changed its policy, these troops were literally defenseless. Facing this situation, the leaders of the CCP Northeast Bureau naturally became very upset with the Soviet behavior.[45]

    Before receiving the news from the Soviet military representative, the CCP CC had already noted the change in the diplomatic climate in the Northeast.  It believed that Sino-Soviet relations were in a state of crises and that the overall political setting had not yet taken its final shape. It therefore advised the Northeast Bureau to be prepared for possible changes of situation there.[46]  After learning about the Soviet requests, the CC instructed the Northeast Bureau that it should not comply.  To win time, it should propose to the Soviet military that it agree to continued CCP control over the Jinzhou and Shanhaiguan areas. Finally, it should ask the Soviet military to postpone as much as possible the entrance of GMD forces into the Northeast.[47] The CCP CC still hoped that while it could not take over all of the Northeast, the Soviet Union would help it to take over some major cities. The Northeast Bureau believed that the CCP could rely on the cooperation of these governments in its efforts to recover these cities in the near future.[48] 

    To the CCP CC, one incident appeared to have confirmed this belief. On November 29, Zhang Jia'ao, a key official of the Northeast Headquarters of the GMD Government, met with CCP Representative Dong Biwu, requesting the CCP to hand over the Beining Road to the GMD.[49]  In light of Zhang's request, the CCP CC guessed that the gist of Soviet Northeast policy was to prevent American forces from entering the Northeast on the one hand and facilitate talks between the CCP and the GMD on the other.  Accordingly, it instructed its Northeast Bureau to seek Soviet intervention so as to realize joint takeovers of the large cities of the Northeast by the GMD and the CCP.[50]

    In their efforts to understand the motivation for the change in Soviet policy, the CCP CC and its Northeast Bureau put much emphasis on the struggle between the Soviet Union and the GMD Government.  They believed that the policy change was to enable the Soviet Union to take the initiative in its diplomatic struggle with the United States and the GMD Government.  Therefore, it was an act of expedience.[51]  The problem of this assessment was that while it stressed the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States and the GMD Government, it under-estimated Soviet willingness to compromise. Therefore the CCP CC and its Northeast Bureau still dreamed that the CCP could take over or partially take over large cities in the Northeast with the Soviet assistance. At the time, Chen Yun, Gao Gang and Zhang Wentian who were in the Northeast expressed some more systematic thinking on this question. In their report to the CCP CC and the Northeast Bureau on November 30, they pointed out that the basic goal of the Soviet Northeast policy was to "maintain peace in the Far East and the world." According to them, the change in the Soviet policy was to serve this general purpose. Therefore, the CCP should make preparations for long-term struggle and it should "try to avoid unrealistic dependence on Soviet assistance and blind optimism or pessimism as a result of the increase or decrease of the Soviet aid."[52]  While still not understanding the development of Soviet policy, they did identify the nature of the problem, that is, the change of the Soviet policy was to serve the Soviet strategic interests, not those of the CCP.

    At the beginning of December, the Soviet Union engaged in talks with the GMD in an attempt to further its economic control in the Northeast, it naturally did not wish to offend the GMD for the sake of the CCP. In this context, CCP's proposal for Soviet intervention so as to promote CCP-GMD joint takeover of the Northeast could not materialize. In mid-December, Jiang Jingguo was invited to visit Moscow. At the end of December, the Soviet-American foreign ministers' meeting reached an agreement on the China question. These events finally made the CCP CC realize that Soviet restrictions of CCP activities in the Northeast were not acts of convenience and hence the CCP not only had no chance to take exclusive control of the Northeast, it could not even expect further Soviet assistance and establish its presence in the large cities. It knew that its own limited resources did not allow it to prevent the GMD forces to enter the Northeast and to take over large cities and key communication lines. In the end of December, the CCP CC decided to move the center of its work in the Northeast to areas far from large cities and major communication lines and there to establish solid base areas. It also harshly criticized those caders in the Northeast who still maintained the hope that the CCP could receive Soviet assistance in taking over large cities.

    The CCP CC proposed the policy of "establishing solid base areas in the Northeast." This marked a change in CCP's strategy from dependence on Soviet assistance to self-reliance in achieving its objectives. In appearance, this was an act of necessity under the circumstances. At a different level, however, one could say that CCP CC's reconfirmation of its principle of self-reliance also represented a new development in its understanding of its relationship with the Soviet Union. The latter's wilful actions ignored CCP's difficulties and made the CCP reconsider its relationship with the Soviet Union from a very realistic perspective.