During the process of the CCP-GMD talks early 1946, because of General Marshall's participation, the CCP repeatedly planned and also invited the Soviet Union to participate in the talks. From the view of the CCP leaders, Soviet participation could offset Marshall's presence and put greater pressures on the GMD. Commenting on the invitation, the CCP leaders said unambiguously: "From the very beginning, China had depended on checks and balances between several states to maintain its independence, that is, using barbarians to deal with barbarians. If China were exclusively controlled by one state, then it would have been disintegrated long time ago." In mid-February, when the talks centered on the Northeast question, the CCP CC decided that it was no longer necessary to seek Soviet participation, because the Soviet "could ask us to make greater compromises" in order to demonstrate its fairness.[53] During February, because the United States, Britain and the GMD Government stirred up another wave of anti-Soviet activities, the Soviet attitude toward the GMD Government hardened. Seizing the opportunity, the CCP CC again made efforts so that the Soviet military in the Northeast would transfer some areas under its control to the CCP. In the light of previous experience, the CCP CC warned that the Northeast Bureau should obtain clear-cut agreements with the Soviet forces because "the Soviet Union could express its good opinion toward Jiang again again when it resolved the problem of economic cooperation with the GMD Government in the future."[54]

    It is true that even after the Soviet Union changed its Northeast policy in mid-November, 1945, it still maintained close relations with the CCP and provided secret assistance to the latter in the Northeast. However, the limited cooperation between the two sides was conducted to serve the mutual interest of preventing the United States from entering the Northeast and the GMD Government from exclusive domination there. In exchange, the CCP must also cooperate with the change of the Soviet policy.

    It is necessary to point out that CCP's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union and adaptation with its policy changes not only reflected its tactical considerations but was also closely related to its leaders' view about the post-war international situation. During the WWII, the alliance between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union led the CCP leaders to modify their view that the two major political forces i.e., revolutionary and reactionary, in international relations were irreconcilable and to believe that the new world order resulting from the war-time alliance would continue after the war. In this new order, major international issues would have to be settled through consultation between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union and related domestic issues in different countries would be resolved through compromise of interested parties. When the war ended, the CCP leaders believed that the central international issue was the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and that the rivalry between the CCP and the GMD was a reflection of the Soviet-American  rivalry.[55] This view influenced almost all major policy decisions of this CCP CC during this period. The reason behind Mao's decision to go to Chongqing to negotiate with Jiang was his belief that "the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain did not approve civil war in China" and hence this provided the opportunity for China to "enter into a new stage of peaceful development."[56]

    At the beginning of 1946, after the Soviet Union adjusted its Northeast policy and President Truman issued a statement on Washington's China policy, and the CCP-GMD talks made some progress, Mao immediately announced that "the stage of China's peaceful development will begin from here." In his eyes, the dynamics for the change was the big international trend of Soviet-American compromise.[57] In a word, the CCP leaders had always considered its development strategies with a view to adapt them to changing Soviet-American relations. The continuous adaption of the CCP to Soviet policies was a result of this way of thinking, although the CCP leaders had already realized that Soviet policies often constituted a restraint to its activities.

    In the spring of 1946, Soviet-American relations deteriorated rapidly and the Cold War international system began to take shape.  As Soviet-American global confrontation heightened, their efforts to advance their respective policies also intensified. Under these circumstances, the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the GMD Government over economic issues in the Northeast could not reach any conclusion and the Soviet Union did not wish to let the GMD occupy the Northeast exclusively.  It therefore decided to support the CCP in the latter's attempt to control the areas north of Changchun so as to exclude United States' and Jiang Jieshi's influence from the Soviet border zones.  On the eve of the Soviet withdrawal Moscow advised the CCP to "fight without restraint" and accepted the CCP for support to overtake occupy Changchun, Harbin and Chichiha'er.[58]  The Soviet offer of support was exactly what the CCP had hoped for.  However, they also knew that the Northeast question was "known in and outside China." When it wanted to take the large cities there, the party should take into account the consequences of such actions and its international implications in the light of the changes in the Soviet-American relations and their influence on the Chinese Revolution. In April, when the CCP and the GMD were locked in fighting over Changchun, Mao Zedong wrote a document for limited circulation among the top party leaders, revealing that he was changing his basic views about the post-war international situation. Mao wrote that Soviet-American compromise was a general trend in the foreseeable future. However, he believed that Soviet-American compromise does not mean that people in other countries would follow suit and make domestic political compromise. Moreover, he argued that the Soviet-American compromise could only be a result of the struggle of the world democratic forces against the United States[59]  According to Mao, under the current international structure of Soviet-American confrontation, it was only logical for people of various countries to engage in struggle.

    In the latter part of June, the Civil War broke out. The CCP was confronted with another important choice. The war took place against the background of Soviet-American Cold War.  When the CCP leaders decided to take the challenge, it was necessary for them to evaluate the new international situation and to position the Chinese Revolution and its influence in the new international situation at a theoretical level.  Between August and November, in his talks with foreign visitors and other CCP leaders, Mao completed the revision of his previous view about the international situation and its connection with the Chinese Revolution.  He said that the center of international politics was not the Soviet-American rivalry; rather it was "the confrontation between American reactionaries and the peoples of the world." The anti-Soviet propaganda conducted by the United States was merely a smokescreen for its domestic problems and its external expansion. Before the United States conquered the "intermediate zone", it could not attack the Soviet Union. Therefore, the revolutions of the peoples of various countries in the intermediate zone played a decisive role in maintaining world peace and defending the Soviet Union.  Under the circumstances, the CCP's policy was "the policy of war." It meant determined efforts to defeat the GMD offensive in order to carry the Chinese Revolution to the victory.[60]

    Mao's talks were targeted toward those within the party who had different views and proposed for formulating basic policies of the party.  There are substantial differences between Mao's views and the international strategic thinking of the Soviet Union at the time.  From mid-1946 on, Mao openly placed the nationalist revolution represented by China above the strategic role of the Soviet Union and future Soviet support for the CCP.  During the civil war the Soviet Union repeatedly asked the CCP to compromise because it feared that CCP activities might provoke the United States into intervention and lead to Soviet-American conflict.  But Mao's revaluation of the international situation demonstrated that the CCP CC no longer believed that the United States and the Soviet Union had decisive influence on the Chinese political situation and that the CCP therefore should be an ally of Moscow, but not an instrument of Soviet diplomacy and strategy.

4.

Even though the relationship between the Soviet Union and the CCP had improved up to the outbreak of the Civil War, this improvement did not lead to fundamental changes in Soviet East Asian policies.  From the perspective of the Soviet leaders, the CCP forces were too weak to win the Civil War and risked defeat if not total elimination.  The primary task of Soviet diplomacy was to prevent a direct U.S. intervention in the Chinese Civil War.  The Soviet Union therefore used all occasions to expose and condemn United States military assistance to the GMD Government as intervention in Chinese affairs.  Stalin continued to expressed his willingness to coordinate policy toward China with the United States.  In December 1946, Stalin told Roosevelt's son that the Soviet Union "would like to practice a common policy with the United States on the question of the Far East." [61] In April 1947, in a letter to Marshall, Molotov wrote that what Stalin meant by adopting "a common policy" was to adhere to the agreement reached by the foreign ministers of the three great powers in December 1945.[62] 

    When the CCP leaders decided to use the means of war to fight against the GMD, they were also trying to protect the interests of the Chinese Revolution and to destroy the international system in the East Asia centered around the Soviet Union and the United States.  Between July and September 1947, the People's Liberation Army changed its strategy from defense to offense.  In October, the CCP CC launched the slogan "Defeat Jiang Jieshi and liberate the whole country." In a CCP CC meeting in December, Mao Zedong repeated his views proposed in April 1946, that compromise between the Soviet Union and the United States did not necessarily mean that people in various countries must also follow suit and make compromise at home.  Mao criticized the French Communist Party and the Italian Communist Party for their "right deviation."  He said that the fundamental reason for the defeat of the revolutionary forces in those countries was that the two parties had been too devoted to the parliamentary road.  He also praised the policy of Yugoslav Communist Party, arguing that unlike some West European Communist parties who had been deceived by the Potsdam and Yalta agreements, the Yugoslavs had adhered to armed struggle and won.  He suggested that one should study the experience of the Yugoslav Communist Party in its practice of the united front policy.[63]  Mao at the time may not have known that the policies of the French and Italian Communist parties had direct links with Soviet directives.  Even so, his comments were to some degree a challenge to the Soviet Union.

    Although the CCP and the Soviet Union had established some cooperative relations in the Northeast and shared interests in opposing American intervention in the Chinese Civil War, these did not obliterate all differences between the two parties formed during the war against Japan. Stalin belittled CCP strength and distrusted the party's leaders.[64]  His repeated requests asking the CCP to make compromises with the GMD in order to support Soviet diplomacy annoyed Mao. The CCP chairman cautioned in a December meeting that the party should "rely on itself, not on foreign assistance."[65]

    It was the military turn of the tide in the Chinese civil war which made Stalin reconsider Soviet relations with the CCP from a strategic perspective.  On February 10, 1948, in his meeting with Yugoslav leaders, Stalin admitted that he had made a mistake in evaluating the Chinese situation. He said that while the CCP leaders had accepted Soviet advice, they had in fact practised a different policy -- and they had been right.[66] In the spring of the same year, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party decided to assist with repairing the railroads in the Northeast at the CCP's request. Unlike previous Soviet actions, the Soviet decision came not as a matter of convenience or a consideration exclusively for the Northeast area.  In May, Stalin told Ivan Kovalev -- the CPSU CC special representative to China -- that the Soviet Union was to exert itself to help the CCP. As long as "the two countries took the road of socialism, the victory of the world revolution was assured."[67]  The decision of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and Stalin's new views signified a fundamental change in Soviet China policy. If the Soviet trade relations with the CCP-controlled areas in the Northeast were regional and tactical measures, its assistance to the CCP from this time on was a strategic consideration. After the Soviet experts arrived in the Northeast, they unambiguously conveyed to the CCP that the Soviet Union would continue to provide assistance and was willing to develop relations with a future CCP government.[68]

    The Soviet experts provided useful help to the CCP in repairing the railroads and in training technical personnel for the CCP military. The rapid restoration of the Northeast railway provided an extremely important condition for the CCP Northeast forces to participate in the Liaoshen military campaign and the CCP's victory in that campaign. It can be said that the timely Soviet assistance to the CCP in the Northeast opened an important opportunity for the two sides to develop relations.