In early 1949, the CCP leaders began to design the foreign policy of New China.  In his speech at a Politburo meeting in January, Mao said that the New China "should not be anxious to get diplomatic recognition from the imperialist countries. We want to overthrow them, not to recognize them." China, according to Mao, "should be busy with discussing the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other people's democracies."[82] However, the meeting did not make any decision concerning the new foreign policy. The opinions expressed at the meeting were those concerning the general orientation of the New China's foreign relations and the resolutions passed in the meeting did not touch on diplomacy. The relevant directives of the CCP were primarily concerned with how to deal with its relations with the diplomatic missions of Western countries in China.[83]

    Mikoyan's visit and the development of CCP's relations with the Soviet Union prompted the CCP to make a series of new decisions concerning its foreign policy. At the Second Session of the Seventh Central Committee in early March, Mao Zedong warmly praised the Soviet Union for its support and assistance.  He said that "the relationship between China and the Soviet Union is a close and brotherly relationship. The Soviet Union and we should stand on the same front. We are allies. We should publicly issue a statement when an appropriate opportunity comes."[84] In his formal report at the conference, Mao in fact announced that the New China would "lean to one side" in its diplomatic relations.[85]  This conference signified that the CCP CC was opting for a formal alliance with the Soviet Union.

    From the perspective of the CCP leaders, in a world structure in which the Soviet Union and the United States were in fierce struggle, any political force must decide on which side it stood. However, political principle was not always diplomatic policy.  The New China and the United States could establish a normal relationship even though it had to be ranked behind that with the Soviet Union as long as the United States abandoned its hostile policy toward the CCP and treated the new state as an equal.  Although regarded throughout the Civil War as hostile, the CCP leaders in fact believed that the United States did not have the resources to carry out large-scale military intervention and that its aid to the GMD Government was limited.[86] The CCP's strong condemnation of the United States was in part to clear external obstacles and in part to promote the anti-imperialist enthusiasm of the Chinese masses. Until the incident at the American Consulate General at Shenyang in the winter of 1948, the CCP leaders did not believe that it was impossible to establish diplomatic relations with the United States.[87]

    However, one event following the Shenyang incident led the CCP leaders to reevaluate their aims.  In December, American Journalist Lei Wenhe (Chinese spelling) told a CCP representative that the gist of the United States' China policy was to "create an effective opposition" within New China's Government. The United States would recognize New China, but in return the new Chinese government should contain an opposition acceptable to the United States and should give the United States the right to station its troops in Shanghai and Qingdao.  Mao Zedong's reaction to the message was particularly strong.  He believed that the CCP should be on guard and foil the American conspiracy.[88]  On December 30, Mao published his article "To carry revolution through to the end." He pointed out that US China policy had already been transformed from purely supporting Jiang Jieshi to continuing its aid to the GMD in its military resistance while trying to organize political opposition within the revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the Chinese people must act to foil this American "political program."[89] On January 8, 1949, the CCP Politburo passed a resolution stressing the double-sided strategy of the United States so as to defeat the "imperialist conspiracy."[90]

    After the PLA occupied Nanjing, the foreign affairs department of the CCP Nanjing Military Control held several talks with American Ambassador Leighton Stuart, exploring the relationship between the New China and the United States.  In the talks, Stuart expressed the view that at the moment the United States could not recognize the CCP Government.  He also expressed his hope that the Chinese Government would include as many democratic representatives as possible. During the time when the talks were held, Stuart publicly revealed that he had already set up contacts with the CCP.[91]  Stuart's arrogance and diplomatic irresponsibility angered the CCP leaders and prompted them to be even more cautious in their dealing with the United States.  They knew how the United States and its allies had tried to help the opposition defeat the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, and that the reason for Communist success in these countries were primarily the military might of the Soviet Union.  Stuart's behavior fitted all too well into this pattern, and thereby pushed the CCP CC to be more firmly adhering its policy of allying with the Soviet Union so as to prevent the problems the United States might create such as internal political turmoil and external military threat. If Stuart's contacts with the CCP produced any effect on CCP's foreign policy, it added a stronger flavor of confrontation with the United States to CCP's policy to ally with the Soviet Union.

5.

    After the CCP crossed the Yangzi River, the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance appeared only a matter of time. The Second Session of the CC had already decided on the policy of alliance with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union also had no reason to hesitate. However, this does not mean that the problems between them could easily be resolved. In May, the CCP CC decided to ask Liu Shaoqi to form a delegation to visit the Soviet Union. On June 31, on the eve of Liu's departure for the Soviet Union, Mao published his well-known article "On people's democratic dictatorship", in which he stressed once again that the New China led by the CCP would lean toward the Soviet camp.[92] As early as April 8, in a conversation with Zhang Zhizhong, Mao had already detailed the main viewpoints of the article.[93] The reason that he chose to delay publishing the article to the eve of Liu's visit to the Soviet Union was to reduce Stalin's lingering suspicion of the CCP.[94]

    The CCP delegation left from Beijing on July 2 and arrived at Moscow in the afternoon of  July 7. After its first meeting with Stalin, the delegation drafted a written report to Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. This report consisted of four parts: "The current situation of the Chinese Revolution," "New Political Consultative Conference and the Central Government," "On the diplomatic question," and "On Sino-Soviet relations." It relatively comprehensively outlined the domestic and external policies after the establishment of the new national government and the basic principles the CCP would follow in handling its relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party.[95]

    In view of the content of the report, the CCP CC hoped to reach agreement with the Soviet Union at least on the following questions: (1) help the Soviet Union understand the formation of the new Chinese Government and its major policies; (2) achieve consensus with the Soviet Union on the international situation and the foreign policy; (3) seek earliest possible diplomatic recognition from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; (4) obtain aid from the Soviet Union to achieve national reunification including gaining understanding and support from the Soviet Union on the question of Xinjiang and Soviet assistance in PLA's efforts to liberating Taiwan;[96] (5) seek Soviet economic and technological assistance to the New China; (6) abolish the Sino-Soviet treaty concluded between the Soviet Union and the GMD Government in 1945 and if possible its replacement with a new Sino-Soviet alliance treaty; (7) establish basic principles in handling the relationship between the CCP and the Soviet Communist Party.

    In its meeting with Stalin, Stalin basically expressed agreement on all questions related to China's domestic policies. On the question of handling the relationship between the two parties, Stalin even stressed that equal and mutually respectful principles should be observed. He said that the victory of the Chinese Revolution was "an achievement of the Chinese Marxists." He called Mao Zedong "a Marxist leader" and "the Soviets and Europeans" should learn from the Chinese Communists. He also apologized for interfering in CCP's policymaking in the post-WWII period. In addition, Stalin gave positive assurance to nearly all CCP requests for economic, technological and military aid.[97] Stalin's generosity came in part as his response to the lesson of his previous intervention in the making of CCP's policies and in part because he did not consider these questions so important.

    In comparison, Stalin had much advice on foreign policy questions, probably because he gave more attention to diplomacy. On the one hand, Stalin stated that the Soviet Union would extend immediate diplomatic recognition to the New China in the wake of its establishment. On the other hand, he encouraged the CCP to take a strong position to the United States and other Western countries and not to establish diplomatic relations with them in a hurry. As to how to handle the Sino-Soviet treaty signed by the Soviet Union and the GMD, Stalin's attitude was quite complicated. On the one hand, he said that he had already told Mao Zedong that the treaty was not an "equal" one, because the Soviet Union was dealing with the GMD at the time of the conclusion of the treaty and it could only happen that way. The problem could be resolved when Mao visit Moscow in the future. On the other hand, Stalin's attitude on certain questions such as the stationing of Soviet troops in Lushun etc., was ambiguous at best.[98]

    Liu Shaoqi's Soviet trip was quite successful. It basically completed the preparation for forming an alliance with the Soviet Union on the eve of the founding of the PRC. Stalin's promise to offer economic, technological, and military assistance to the PRC and his assurance to extend diplomatic recognition to it in the wake of its founding constituted effective support to the CCP both at home and abroad. After Liu's visit to the Soviet Union, the only thing left to do was for Mao to visit Moscow and conclude the treaty. However, the abolition of the old Sino-Soviet treaty and the conclusion of a new alliance treaty could be said as both within easy reach and the most difficult.

    The victory of the Chinese Revolution meant a revolutionary transformation of international relations in East Asia. It not only destroyed the East Asia international order based on Yalta secret agreements and Sino-Soviet treaty, but also made the established powers face a new revolutionary state arisen from a civil war. In dealing with this new state, the previous rules no longer applied. This was so to the United States.  It was also the case for the Soviet Union. In the previous order, through coordinating its policy with the United States, the Soviet Union could obtain dual interests i.e., economic and security in the East Asia. When the Chinese Revolution finally succeeded, if the Soviet Union wished to develop an alliance relationship with the new Chinese Government, it had to adjust its policy on two fronts. First, the Soviet Union needed to find out what objectives the Chinese Communists were seeking in the Chinese Revolution and what the victory of the Chinese Revolution meant for the international order of East Asia. The Soviet Union was much more effective than the United States in this respect. Second, the Soviet Union had to reconsider how to manage the benefits it obtained under the previous East Asia international order. During the Cold War, the strategic benefits of concluding an alliance with China to the Soviet Union were self-evident. The alliance could not only formed a giant security screen in the east for the Soviet Union, but also greatly encourage the revolutionary movements in Asia. The key problem was whether the Soviet Union was willing to abandon the benefits it had obtained in China's Northeast. On this point, Stalin's concession was not as forthcoming as his presenting Mao with the title of "Marxist leader."

    The attitude of the Chinese leaders on the question of disposing the existing Sino-Soviet treaty was also quite complicated. During their youth, they had all gone through a process from being patriots to revolutionaries and then to devoted believers of Communism. One of the most important reasons for them to decide to "take the Russian road" was the Soviet announcement on two separate occasions in 1919 and 1920 to abandon the territories occupied and the prerogatives grabbed by Tsarist Russia.[99]  To them, "the Russian road" not only meant abolition of a social system in which people exploit people, but also symbolized establishment of a new international order. This belief of the CCP leaders did not change with the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty in 1945, although they were definitely dissatisfied with the treaty.[100] Whatever praises appeared in CCP newspapers of the 1945 treaty were both limited and tactical. They merely approved its positive significance in maintaining peace in the East Asia.[101]