When the CCP leaders decided to conclude an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union, they were not sure about what attitude the Soviet Union would take on this question. The Soviet behavior gave them good reason to doubt whether the Soviet Union would actually practice "the proletarian internationalism" they announced in public. Before the CCP crossed the Yangzi River, it told its non-Communist friends that "some foreign treaties would be abolished; some revised; and some kept."[102] The revision and maintenance was only meant to apply to the Sino-Soviet treaty. Obviously, at the bottom of their hearts, the CCP leaders did not trust the Soviet Union although they were ready to make some concessions out of more important considerations.
During his visit to the Soviet Union, Liu Shaoqi had proposed three alternatives to the resolution of the problem of the Sino-Soviet treaty: (1) keep the treaty and the new Chinese Government recognizes it; (2) abolish the treaty and establish a new treaty; (3) the two governments exchange memorandum stating that they would maintain the treaty temporarily but would conclude another treaty at an appropriate time. Liu Shaoqi also mentioned Mongolia and the mining equipment the Soviet Union removed from the Northeast after the Japanese defeat.[103] However, except promising to conclude another treaty, Stalin did not make clear his views concerning the principles of the new treaty and other concrete questions. The content of the new treaty later became the focus of the talk between Stalin and Mao.
On December 16, Mao Zedong arrived at Moscow. In the afternoon, however, his talk with Stalin failed to achieve any result. Stalin stated during the talks that it was not a proper time to challenge the legitimacy of the treaty. Otherwise, the issue of the Qiandao (Chinese spelling) Islands would have to be related. He suggested that as an appropriate step at this stage, a statement on the Lushun issue be publicized. It was becuase of Mao who insisted on the abrogation of the treaty that Stalin had to commit to a fundational revision of the treaty within two years.[104] The result of the first talk led Mao to question whether Stalin really intended to sign a new treaty. On December 22, Mao proposed two lternatives to Stalin through Kovalev: One was to invite Zhou Enlai to come to Moscow to resolve the problem of the Sino-Soviet treaty; the other was that both sides just held broad discussions about related problems but with no intention to arrive at any agreement.[105] However, during the Mao-Stalin talk on January 24, Stalin avoided mentioning Mao's formulas. It was obvious that Stalin had no intention to solve the issue of treaty at that moment. The ultimate reason was no other htan that the USSR was unprepared for changing the status quo in the Far East (including the future of outside Mongolia) and losing its interests thereof.
It was by January 2, 1950, the Soviet position had a critical change. When Mao met Molotov and Mikoyan, Mao still began with proposing three alternatives for the Soviet Union to choose: (1) sign a new treaty; (2) issue a brief statement through the news agencies of the two countries announcing that the two countries had reached agreement on important questions; and (3) issue a common statement to outline the important points in the relations between the two countries. Molotov immediately expressed the view that the first alternative was the best and he suggested to invite Zhou Enlai to visit Moscow.[106] After the talk, Mao cabled Zhou Enlai to come to Moscow. At the time, he already had reservations about the new treaty. He believed that comparing to the old treaty, the new treaty could only make some changes to the question of Lushun and Dalian.[107]
On January 20, Zhou Enlai arrived at Moscow. Two days later, Mao, Zhou and Stalin held talks and made decision on the basic content of the treaty. The negotiation then entered the stage of discussing specific issues. With regard to this stage of negotiation, some Chinese participants in the negotiation have already published their memories. However, their description about the negotiation on specific issues is by no means very clear. The piblished some indirect materials prove that both China and the Soviet Union made some concessions on some key issues in the treaty as Zhongdong Railway and Lushun Port and Darlian.[108] To the leaders of both sides, the finalized treaty might not be the most satisfactory. However, it was one that could be concluded at the time. We will learn what impression this negotiation experience left on the mind of the Chinese leaders at the time when the historical archives concerning this episode become available in the future. Judging from the subsequent development of Sino-Soviet relations, one can argue that this impression could not be too good.
On February 14, 1950, the Chinese and Soviet leaders signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance in a formal and warm atmosphere, marking the birth of the Sino-Soviet alliance. To the Chinese Communists, the alliance was both an aim of the Chinese Revolution and the only realistic choice the CCP could take in a world of fierce confrontation between the socialist and the capitalist camp. The Soviet choice also reflected both ideological and realist considerations. Stalin obviously did not decide to ally with China just out of pure practical interest. Although ideology may have played the lesser role, this does not mean that it was not important. Reviewing the historical process of the formation of the Sino-Soviet alliance, one can argue that on both sides the alliance was formed in a process of mutual coordination of interests and ideology.
[1]Among the more systematic works one finds Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, Uncertain Patterns: Stalin Mao and Korean War (U.S.A.: Stanford University Press, 1993); Niu Jun, Cong yanan zou xiang shijie: zhongguo gongchandang dui wai guanxi qiyuan (1935-1949) (From Yenan to the World: Origins of the Foreign Relations of the Chinese Communist Party 1935-1949) (Fujian, China: Fujian People's Publishing House, 1992). Odd Arne Westad, Cold War and Revolution: Soviet- American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, (New York: Columbia University, 1993).
[2]At that time, the Comintern found CCP CC's political line unsatisfactory. It believed that it was "necessary to send new faces who are familiar with the international situation to help the CCP CC." It was against this background that Wang Ming was sent to Yanan. See "xxx's talk on the China question in a meeting of the Comintern Executive Secretariat", August 10, 1937, Department of CCP History, Chinese People's University comp. Gongchan guoji he zhonggguo geming jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Teahing reference material on Comintern and the Chinese Revolution), vol.2, p.680.
[3]"Zhou Enlai guanyu jiangjieshi yaoqiu huabei wojun peihe zuozhan deng wenti xiang zhongyang de qingshi" (Zhou Enlai's report to the CC on Jiang Jieshi's request for our military support in Huabei), May 10, 1941; "Zhou Enlai guanyu yu Jiang Jieshi tanpan qingkuang xiang zhongyang de baogao" (Zhou Enlai's report to the CC on the progress of the negotiation with Jiang Jieshi), May 11, 1941; "Guanyu huabei wojun peihe guomingdang duiri zuozhan deng wenti de zhishi" (Instructions on our military support to the KMT against Japan in Huabei), May 14, 1941; see Central Archives comp. Collection of CCP CC Documents) (Beijing: CCP CC Party School Press, 1992), vol.13, pp.103, 105, 107-108.
[4]"Jimiteluofu zai gongchan guoji zhiweihui mishuchu huiyi shang jiu zhongguo wenti de fayan", op.cit., p.680.
[5]Wa Cuikefu (I.V.Chuikov), Zai hua shiming: yige junshi guwen de riji (China mission: notebook of a military adviser) (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 1980), p.34.
[6]"Jimiteluofu jiu zhongguo gongchandang nei zhuangkuang zhi Mao Zedong de xin" (Dimitrov's letter to Mao Zedong on CCP's internal situation), December 22, 1943. In this letter, xxx expressed concern over the internal situation of the CCP. He expressed the belief that the Correction Movement demonstrated that some CCP caders "had unhealthy views toward the Soviet Union." Since Dimitrov wrote the letter in Moscow, it must also reflect the attitude of the Soviet leaders on CCP's Correction Movement.
[7]Department of State of the United States of America, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944, vol. VI, the Far East, China, pp.799-800. In his meeting with American Ambassador Hurly, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov also expressed the same view. See Zhongmei guanxi ziliao huibian (Collection of materials on Sino-American relations) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi Publishing House, 1957, vol.1, p.149.
[8]xxx, op.cit., p.35.
[9]As late as August 1944, in a report to the CCP CC, the Southern Bureau of the CCP was still not clear whether the Soviet Union would join the war against Japan. It even expressed the belief that Soviet participation in the war was "not necessary." "Nanfang ju tongzhi dui waijiao de yijian ji dui zhongyang de jianyi" (Views of the comrades of the Southern Bureau about diplomacy and their suggestions to the Central Committee), August 16, 1944. Mao personally tried to ascertain this with the Soviet representative stationed in Yenan a few times, but without success.
[10]"Zhongyang Guanyu Waijao Gongzuo de Zhishi"(The instruction of CPC CC on diplomatic works), Zhonggong Zhongyang wenjian xuanji, Vol 14, pp.314-318.
[11]"Mao zedong guanyu muqian xingshi ji canjia zhengfu tiaojian zhi Zhou Enlai dian" (Telegram from Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai on current situation and conditions for joining the government), February 3, 1945; "Zhongyang guanyu fazhan guomindang tongzhiqu de minzhu yundong gei Wang Ruofei de zhishi" (Instructions of the CCP CC to Wang Ruofei on developing democratic movement in areas under the Guomindang Government); see CCP CC United Front Department and Central Archives comp. Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzhu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian, (Selections of documents of the CCP CC on the National United Front against Japan) (Beijing: Dangan Publishing House, 1985), vol.2, pp.790, 793-794.
[12]In autumn 1944, the CCP CC decided to send troops and large number of caders to the coastal areas of East China with the aim to cooperate with expected American landing and taking over of Shanghai, Nanjing and other major cities. "Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu su zhe yu wan fazhan gei huazhongju de zhishi" (Instructions of the CCP CC to Central China Bureau on development in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan, and Anhui), October 24, 1944, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, vol.14, pp.386-387. Also see telegrams of the CCP CC to Rao Shushi, Zhang Yunyi, and Lai Chuanzhu, November 2, 1944.
[13]"Jinchaji fenju jiji peihe sulian zuozhan zhunbei gongzuo de zhishi" (Instruction of the Jinchaji Branch Bureau on actively prepare to cooperate with the Soviet forces in the war against Japan), April 18, 1945.
[14]Mao Zedong, "Lun xianhe zhengfu" (On coalition government), Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily), May 20, 1945. Mao Zedong, "Zai zhongguo gongchandang di qici quanguo daibiao dahui shang de koutou baogao" (Oral report to the Seventh National Representative Conference of the CCP), Dang de wenxian (Party documents), (1993:6), p.18.
[15]Mao Zedong, "Zai dangde di qici daibiao dahui shang de jielun" (Conclusions made at the Seventh National Representative Conference of the Party), May 31, 1945. In July 1942, Mao Zedong telegraphed Liu Shaoqi estimating that the CCP forces would probably move to the Northeast but he told Liu not to tell anyone else about this idea. Mao did not re-raise the issue until the Seventh National Representative Conference. Mao Zedong, "Shandong you keneng chengwei zhanlue zhuanyi de shuniu" (Shandong was likely to be the intersection of strategic transfer), July 9, 1942, Mao Zedong wenji (Collection of Mao Zedong Works) (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1993), Vol.2, pp.434-435.
[16]By this time the CCP CC had already learnt about the content of the conversation with regard to Soviet policies toward the CCP and the KMT between Stalin and Hurley on April 15, 1945. According to the Southern Bureau's report, Stalin told Hurley that the Soviet Union would not provide support to the CCP. CCP Chongqing Representative Office, "He'erli, Sidalin tanhua qingxing" (The Content of the talk between Hurley and Stalin), May 7, 1945.